Law & Paneir: Realisation of Our Rights

  Malaysia does not need to replicate India’s counter-terrorism institutions to learn from its experience. The introduction of PRAHAAR, India’s National Counter-Terrorism Policy and Strategy, instead raises a more practical question: how can Malaysia strengthen the implementation of its own security framework? The Malaysia Action Plan on Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (MyPCVE) 2024–2028 already provides a national framework built around four pillars: prevention, enforcement, rehabilitation and reinforcement.  It recognises that violent extremism requires coordinated action by government agencies, civil society and other stakeholders. The priority now should be to ensure these pillars produce measurable results. Five policy measures could strengthen implementation. First, Malaysia should conduct a whole-of-government coordination audit. The Royal Malaysia Police, intelligence authorities, Bank Negara Malaysia, the National Anti-Financial Crime Centre, immigra...

  Counter-terrorism requires more than strong legislation and arrests. It demands intelligence coordination, effective institutions, public cooperation and safeguards against the misuse of state power.  India’s evolving approach offers Malaysia an opportunity to examine these priorities, particularly following the introduction of PRAHAAR, India’s National Counter-Terrorism Policy and Strategy, in February 2026. PRAHAAR establishes a framework built around seven pillars: preventing attacks, responding proportionately, coordinating government capabilities, upholding human rights and the rule of law, addressing conditions conducive to terrorism, strengthening international cooperation, and building societal resilience.  Its relevance to Malaysia lies not in copying Indian institutions, but in assessing whether existing Malaysian arrangements translate national policy into effective outcomes. Malaysia already has its own framework. The Malaysia Action Plan on Preventing a...

Saudi Arabia’s security faces a critical test as Houthi missile and drone attacks expose the limitations of military superiority without effective regional coordination. The Mecca Joint Defence Agreement, signed by Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan on 7 August 2026, offers a framework for collective security. However, whether it can genuinely safeguard the kingdom depends less on the symbolism of the agreement than on the signatories’ willingness to translate their commitments into practical military capabilities, intelligence cooperation and conflict prevention. The agreement establishes that an armed attack against one signatory should be regarded as an attack against all three. This principle strengthens collective deterrence and signals that Saudi Arabia is seeking alternatives to an overreliance on external security guarantees. Nevertheless, the agreement’s effectiveness must be measured against a difficult question: can it prevent Houthi attacks, or merely improve Saudi Ar...

Saudi Arabia’s  vulnerability to repeated attacks on its civilian infrastructure exposes a deeper crisis than the failure of air defences. It raises questions about whether international institutions can prevent regional conflicts from escalating when powerful states pursue competing strategic interests. The reported Houthi attack on Riyadh’s King Khalid International Airport on 10 October 2026, which Saudi authorities said killed 12 people and injured more than 300, underscores the human cost of a conflict that continues to resist diplomatic containment. The central question is no longer whether the United Nations can condemn attacks. It is whether the UN, particularly its Security Council, can translate condemnation into effective measures that prevent further violence. The ongoing wars involving Iran and the United States, and Russia and Ukraine, have intensified doubts about the organisation’s ability to uphold collective security consistently. Saudi Arabia’s Security Cri...

  Saudi Arabia’s vulnerability to missile and drone attacks on its airports and strategic infrastructure exposes a fundamental weakness in regional security: military strength cannot guarantee stability when neighbouring conflicts remain unresolved and regional institutions struggle to convert diplomatic declarations into coordinated action. The reported Houthi attack on Riyadh’s King Khalid International Airport in October 2026, which killed civilians and injured hundreds according to initial reports, has transformed Yemen’s conflict into an immediate test of Arab regional leadership. The question is no longer simply how Saudi Arabia can strengthen its air defences or retaliate against the Houthis. It is whether the League of Arab States and the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (GCC) can develop a coordinated strategy to prevent further attacks, contain the conflict and establish conditions for a sustainable political settlement in Yemen. Both institutions...

  The renewed fighting in Yemen is no longer simply a domestic struggle between the Houthi movement and the internationally recognised Yemeni government. It is becoming a dangerous regional confrontation with implications for Saudi Arabia’s security, Iran’s strategic calculations, international shipping and the global energy market.  For Malaysia, the crisis demands more than expressions of concern. It presents an opportunity to mobilise the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) in pursuit of a negotiated settlement before another regional war imposes a heavier economic and humanitarian burden on the world. Reports on October 7 and 8 indicated that Houthi attacks had targeted Saudi airports, killing civilians, while Saudi-backed Yemeni forces advanced against Houthi positions near the strategically important Bab al-Mandeb Strait.  Reuters also reported that Syria was considering possible military assistance to Saudi Arabia, although the scope of any involvement rema...