Introduction
"The King himself ought not to be subject to man, but subject to God and the law, because the law makes him King".
The rule of law in its modern sense owes a great deal to the late Professor AV Dicey. Professor Dicey's writings about the rule of law are of enduring significance.
The essential characteristic of the rule of law are:
| i. | The supremacy of law, which means that all persons (individuals and government) are subject to law. |
|---|---|
| ii. | A concept of justice which emphasises interpersonal adjudication, law based on standards and the importance of procedures. |
| iii. | Restrictions on the exercise of discretionary power. |
| iv. | The doctrine of judicial precedent. |
| v. | The common law methodology. |
| vi. | Legislation should be prospective and not retrospective. |
| vii. | An independent judiciary. |
| viii. | The exercise by Parliament of the legislative power and restrictions on exercise of legislative power by the executive. |
| ix. | An underlying moral basis for all law. |
My observations are on points i,ii and ix.
Supremacy of the law is a fundamental concept in the western democratic order. The rule of law requires both citizens and governments to be subject to known and standing laws. The supremacy of law also requires generality in the law. This principle is a further development of the principle of equality before the law. Laws should not be made in respect of particular persons. As Dicey postulated, the rule of law presupposes the absence of wide discretionary authority in the rulers, so that they cannot make their own laws but must govern according to the established laws. Those laws ought not to be too easily changeable. Stable laws are a prerequisite of the certainty and confidence which form an essential part of individual freedom and security. Therefore, laws ought to be rooted in moral principles, which cannot be achieved if they are framed in too detailed a manner.
The idea of the supremacy of law requires a definition of law (to which the above principles may go some way). This must include a distinction between law and executive administration and prerogative decree. A failure to maintain the formal differences between these things must lead to a conception of law as nothing more than authorisation for power, rather than the guarantee of liberty, equally to all.
The rule of law ensures that individuals have a secure area of autonomy and have settled expectations by having their rights and duties pre-established and enforced by law.
This aspect of the concept of justice is based upon the rights and duties of the individual person. The liberal concept of justice is an interpersonal one - resolution of conflicts between individuals. Individuals can suffer or perpetrate wrong. Individuals can be punished, protected and granted restitution. Justice is an interpersonal thing. It consists in upholding that which is right and due as between persons. Social justice which involves society and groups is a concept which is directly antagonistic to the liberal idea. It is a concept which is nebulous and non achievable. Its proponents increase state power to effect it, with counterproductive results.
Even between persons, absolute justice is frequently unattainable. The best result which is practically and logically possible is not necessarily the perfect result. For example, in motor accident cases where one person suffers brain damage due to the negligence of a drunken driver, it is practically impossible to grant full restitution to the injured person. He can be compensated for medical expenses. He can be awarded a sum sufficient to improve his situation. He cannot be restored to his pre-accident condition. His brain damage cannot be repaired. It can only be ameliorated. It is not easy to determine a just punishment for the drunken drivers.
In other cases, perfect justice is logically (rather than physically) impossible. Such cases arise in situations where there are legitimate interests on both sides but the interests are in conflict. Only one can prevail. Someone has to lose. Justice requires that the better interest should prevail but that does not mean that there is no merit in the inferior interest. The law of adverse possession provides an illustration where the conflict is between an owner who has abandoned his land and another, professing to be the owner, sells it to a person who takes possession of it and improves it. There is merit (and possibly demerit) on both sides. The best that can be done is to develop rules to help ascertain which side has the better right.
Between persons, justice consists in upholding right behaviour and the courts can adjudicate between persons. Resort to the courts is only considered when a problem (a conflict) exists. The role of the judicial process is, therefore, the resolution of conflicts. Perfect justice cannot be dispensed by the state. The role of the courts is to deal with injustice once it has already occurred.
The traditional emphasis upon adjudication and non-recognition of so-called social welfare rights is evident in the protection which the law traditionally afforded to private property. The idea of redistribution of wealth is completely alien to the common law. A rich man cannot be sued by a poor man merely for being rich. Taxation was prohibited to the executive government, being confined rather to the representatives of the nation in Parliament, who were expected to be jealous defenders of their individual liberty and property.
Inter-personal adjudication is practical and realistic. By its very nature it deals with the real problems which arise between individuals, instead of those problems which arise solely in the minds of ideologues.
Law based on standards and fault
The second facet of the liberal concept of justice is that a person should not be disadvantaged or punished except for fault (intentional, reckless or negligent wrong doing, strict liability applying in exceptional circumstances). The idea of fault is the golden thread that runs through the fabric of the legal order. The Magna Carta contains one of its early manifestations. But the whole of the common law relating to crimes, civil obligations and property rights is characterised by the notion that fault underlies punishment or deprivation. A system of sanctions based on fault presupposes known and pre-existing standards of conduct which bind the community.
The Australian industrial relations system is fundamentally structured on notions of distributive justice and undefined policy. It enables tribunals to vitiate contracts, to penalise certain classes and to reward others on the basis of unpredictable considerations, although in recent times employers have become their predictable victims. Consumer protection laws similarly disregard contractual rights and obligations in compensating losses incurred by consumers. In the field of family law, fault has been all but rendered irrelevant in the annulment of marriages, grant of custody, award of maintenance and the settlement of property. The examples can be multiplied.
The idea of commutative justice which has characterised the laws and customs of most civilised societies is now being progressively replaced by distributive justice. Commutative justice aims at correcting the violation of pre-existing rights. It seeks to give back to one what has been taken away from him or to give him adequate compensation in lieu of it. Distributive justice on the other hand aims at distributing wealth according to egalitarian schemes. In practice, distributive justice results in the creation of new rights and liabilities in substitution for those traditionally enjoyed or suffered under the law. These rights are created in accordance with the ideologies, prejudices, or subjective opinions of individual bureaucrats or members of tribunals who make decisions. Powerful pressure and interest groups influence those making the decisions. The law is particularised and rendered uncertain, thus undermining the foundations of justice and liberty.
Due process
The third feature of the liberal concept of justice is the emphasis on procedures. The liberal does not believe in the possibility of achieving equality, democracy, justice, the public good and other ideals through legislative and prescriptive action. Such a task is too complex for the human imagination, conception and execution. An emphasis on procedure is one of the foundations of the rule of law. Procedures provide for limitations on power. Procedures provide that before judicial, legislative or executive decisions are taken, a series of checks and balances are in place to mitigate against the possibility that the decisions will not be hasty, ill-conceived or based on corruption, passion, ideology or eccentricity.
The key institutional and procedural characteristics of a liberal legal order include rights which ensure that a person is not disadvantaged except according to rules of procedure and evidence established by law, which ensure a fair trial. These institutional safeguards give protection to the cluster of personal liberties associated with the criminal process, such as the right not to be imprisoned or held without trial, the right to be informed of charges and the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty. The rules of procedure, evidence and natural justice also protect individuals from arbitrary governmental action and illegal deprivation of private rights. They are essential to the protection of individual rights of personal freedom and private property.
Analyses of the rule of law will not generally refer to the moral dimension. There is in education, media, politics and even from within the church and its agencies an attack on traditional morality. The conflict is not between traditional morality and values neutrality. It is between one moral order and another — the values of the new moral order include: autonomy for the individual, equality and social justice. If law is not based on morality on what can it be based? The traditional moral values within a society are being replaced by a new set of values. The rule of law and the common law are in retreat because their moral base is being undermined.
An Overview of Natural Law Theory
Natural law theory is one of the most important theories in the philosophy of Classical Realism. It is also widely misunderstood by many who have either not taken the time to study it or have heard of it and dismissed it as a "medieval" relic. What I want to do here is merely sketch out a general presentation of natural law theory, with the hope that the reader will become interested enough to pursue further study of it. I will provide a link to more in-depth resources at the end of this essay.
Before we get into an overview of the nature of natural law theory itself, let's take a brief look at some history.
The concept of natural law has taken several forms. The idea began with the ancient Greeks' conception of a universe governed in every particular by an eternal, immutable law and in their distinction between what is just by nature and just by convention. Stoicism provided the most complete classical formulation of natural law. The Stoics argued that the universe is governed by reason, or rational principle; they further argued that all humans have reason within them and can therefore know and obey its law. Because human beings have the faculty of choice (a free will), they will not necessarily obey the law; if they act in accordance with reason, however, they will be "following nature."
Christian philosophers readily adapted Stoic natural law theory, identifying natural law with the law of God. For Thomas Aquinas, natural law is that part of the eternal law of God ("the reason of divine wisdom") which is knowable by human beings by means of their powers of reason. Human, or positive, law is the application of natural law to particular social circumstances. Like the Stoics, Aquinas believed that a positive law that violates natural law is not true law.
With the secularization of society resulting from the Renaissance and Reformation, natural law theory found a new basis in human reason. The 17th-century Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius believed that humans by nature are not only reasonable but social. Thus the rules that are "natural" to them -- those dictated by reason alone -- are those which enable them to live in harmony with one another. From this argument, by the way, Grotius developed the first comprehensive theory of international law.
Natural law theory eventually gave rise to a concept of "natural rights." John Locke argued that human beings in the state of nature are free and equal, yet insecure in their freedom. When they enter society they surrender only such rights as are necessary for their security and for the common good. Each individual retains fundamental prerogatives drawn from natural law relating to the integrity of person and property (natural rights). This natural rights theory provided a philosophical basis for both the American and French revolutions. Thomas Jefferson used the natural law theory to justify his trinity of "inalienable rights" which were stated in the United States Declaration of Independence.
During the 19th century natural law theory lost influence as utilitarianism and Benthamism, positivism, materialism, and the historical school of jurisprudence became dominant. In the 20th century, however, natural law theory has received new attention, partly in reaction to the rise of totalitarianism and an increased interest in human rights throughout the world. With this contemporary interest in mind, let's now turn to our attention to the natural law theory as understood by the tradition of Classical Realism.
What do we mean by "natural law"? In its simplest definition, natural law is that "unwritten law" that is more or less the same for everyone everywhere. To be more exact, natural law is the concept of a body of moral principles that is common to all humankind and, as generally posited, is recognizable by human reason alone. Natural law is therefore distinguished from -- and provides a standard for -- positive law, the formal legal enactments of a particular society.
Since law must always be some dictate of reason, natural law also will be some dictate of reason. In fact, it is law discovered by human reason. Our normal and natural grasp of the natural law is effected by reason, that is, by the thinking mind, and in this service reason is sometimes called "conscience." We, in all our human acts, inevitably see them in their relation to the natural law, and we mentally pronounce upon their agreement or disagreement with the natural law. Such a pronouncement may be called a "judgment of conscience." The "norm" of morality is the natural law as applied by conscience. Lastly, we can say that the natural law is the disposition of things as known by our human reason and to which we must conform ourselves if we are to realize our proper end or "good" as human beings.
To sum it up, then, we can say that the natural law:
- is not made by human beings;
- is based on the structure of reality itself;
- is the same for all human beings and at all times;
- is an unchanging rule or pattern which is there for human beings to discover;
- is the naturally knowable moral law;
- is a means by which human beings can rationally guide themselves to their good.
It is interesting to note that virtually everyone seems to have some knowledge of natural law even before such knowledge is codified and formalized. Even young children make an appeal to "fair play," demand that things be "fair and square," and older children and adults often apply the "golden rule." When doing so, they are spontaneously invoking the natural law. This is why many proponents of the natural law theory say it is the law which is "written upon the hearts of men." These are examples of what is called "connatural knowledge," that is, a knowledge which:
- follows on the "lived experience" of the truth;
- is the living contact of the intellect with reality itself;
- is not always given expression in concepts;
- may be obscure to the knower;
- is overlaid with elements from the affective or feeling side of man's nature.
Now, our reflection on our own conduct gives rise to the explicit formulation of the precepts of the natural law. We as human beings put our "commonsense" notions of natural law under "critical examination." In other words, our natural impulses toward "fair play," justice, and so on are subject to a rigorous investigation and rationalization. And our understanding of natural law becomes more precise as we consider and codify the principles or precepts of natural law. The primary precept of natural law will be the most basic principle about human action that can be formulated.
Those readers familiar with Classical Realism will recall that there is an absolutely first and indemonstrable principle in the speculative order of things. That is, there is an absolutely basic, self-evident truth of reality upon which we build our entire metaphysics which serves as the foundation for our view of the ultimate structure of reality. This is the Principle of Contradiction, from which we derive other basic principles such as Identity and Excluded Middle. Strictly speaking, the Principle of Contradiction cannot be "proved." It must be accepted as an absolute "intuitive" or self-evident truth, the truth of which is shown by an analysis of the terms of the Principle and the impossibility of thinking the opposite.
Natural law theory is of the "practical order" of things and the first principle of the practical order is a principle that directs human acts in all their operations, and it will be concerned with the "good," since we act in terms of what a least seems good to us. Therefore, the primary principle of the practical order -- the first precept of natural law -- is a formulation based upon the notion of the good and is stated in the following way: The "good" (according to reason) must be done, and evil (what is contrary to reason) must be avoided. The simplest statement of this precept is, of course, "Do good and avoid evil."
Although we rarely express the precept of "Do good and avoid evil" explicitly (just as we rarely state the Principle of Contradiction explicitly in daily life), nevertheless we always act in terms of such a precept. This fact points to the fundamental truth of such a precept, and indicates how it expresses something "natural" to human beings. A human being naturally inclines to seek what appears good to reason, and naturally shrinks from what appears to be evil. Hence, the justification of speaking of this basic moral law as "natural" law.
Upon further reflection, we can distinguish, within natural law, primary and secondary precepts. The primary precepts will correspond to the order of natural inclinations in human beings. The most fundamental inclination of all, "Do good and avoid evil," will give rise to other primary precepts such as the natural inclination to self-preservation, to live in society, to avoid harm to others, and to know truths about the reality we live in and our own human nature. These primary precepts are unchangeable to the extent they concern the primary ends of the natural inclinations inherent in all human beings.
The primary precepts are very general in their formulation. The secondary precepts, on the other hand, are more particular or specific and are concerned with things to which we are not inclined so immediately. Among these are such precepts as those regarding the education of children, and the stability of family life, and the demands of hospitality. On the negative side, we also have secondary precepts regarding the neglect of children, deliberate injury to others, and so on.
Do we know everything about the natural law? This is a common question asked and a good one. The answer is a simple "No." The discovery of the natural law is a continuously unfolding enterprise. Just as it took human beings a long time to separate out and clarify the laws of physical nature, so too for the laws of moral nature. The passage of time and additional philosophical reflection always raises new issues in natural law theory. For instance, slavery was once accepted as normal and natural even by many who subscribed to natural law theory. We now know that slavery violates the natural law. Society once accepted judicial torture as being normal and natural. We now know that judicial slavery violates the natural law. And, personally, I am convinced that one day our society will "discover" that capital punishment violates natural law and we will abolish it.
The obvious conclusion here is that our knowledge of natural law, particularly regarding its secondary precepts, is incomplete, and probably will always be incomplete. We, as civilized and rational human beings, will always be involved in a "critical examination" of our actions in the practical order. Out of this reflection will come new and refined "truths" regarding ethics and moral philosophy. In fact, I suspect that we are now in a time when the most important decisions we make as a society will be those in ethics and moral philosophy (think "bioethics" and "weapons of mass destruction"). This is one reason why I have no reservations about suggesting that all students in our institutions of higher education need a good dose of philosophical studies, especially, of course, in the tradition of Classical Realism.
I hope you have some general knowledge of natural law theory as a result of this brief overview. Moreover, I hope I have interested you to seek more knowledge about this fascinating theory.
Comments:I strongly believe in rule of law and natural law. We are living in a system. The system will reacts according to our intentions. If our intentions are good then we will be rewarded otherwise if have to face the consequences.
The crimes and criminals always will be punished not by the State but the law itself.
References:
http://www.radicalacademy.com/philnaturallaw.htm
http://www.ourcivilisation.com/cooray/btof/chap180.htm
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