A future terrorist threat could emerge in Minnesota, Mogadishu, or perhaps both simultaneously.
In a recent case, the FBI investigated what had
become of a group of young Somali-American men who lived in the
Minneapolis
area and disappeared. Relatives said they had
abruptly left the country to join a suspected terrorist organization in
Somalia.
If that is true, the men might train with
terrorists and then join local operations in Somalia or return to the
United States
on their American passports.
This case demonstrates how a sharp debate
between two terrorism experts has significant implications for state,
local and
tribal law enforcement agencies in the United
States. Bruce Hoffman and Marc Sageman — two of the nation's preeminent
terrorism
experts — disagree about the nature of the
threat. Hoffman, a professor at Georgetown University and a former
senior executive
of the RAND Corp., says the primary threat lies
with al-Qaida slowly reconstituting itself in Pakistan. Sageman, a
scholar-in-residence
at the New York Police Department and a former
case officer with the CIA, contends that the threat has shifted to
radicalized
individuals forming groups in the United States
and Europe.
Although Hoffman and Sageman focus mainly on the
threat from al-Qaida and Islamic terrorism, the issues they raise are
not
limited to these groups. Both men touch on
factors common to all terrorist groups, such as recruitment and
organization.
The debate between Hoffman and Sageman presents
law enforcement agencies with a challenge and an opportunity. The
challenge
is deciding which analysis of terrorism is
correct. At its core, the debate concerns terrorist recruitment and
organization.
Therefore, agencies will form their community
protection strategies based on the more accurate point of view. The
difference
between radicalization within a community and
radicalization directed from abroad creates the difference between
investing
in counterterrorism programs that stress
community outreach and those that stress intelligence sharing.
The opportunity, however, is equally great. Law
enforcement agencies have a critical role to play in contributing to the
debate
because their observations of how terrorists
recruit, radicalize, organize and train people are prime drivers of how
counterterrorism
efforts will unfold in the future.
The Nature of the Threat
Both Hoffman and Sageman are prominent,
well-published researchers who often consult with security and law
enforcement agencies
on terrorism issues. Critics and colleagues
alike agree that their books are influential, and, in fact, they are
among the
most often cited in terrorism studies.
Hoffman says the main threat from terrorism lies
with the core of al-Qaida, which he believes is gradually rebuilding
itself
in Pakistan to attack targets in the United
States and Europe. "Al-Qaida is much like a shark, which must keep
moving forward,
no matter how slow or incrementally, or die ...
The group's capacity to survive is also a direct reflection of both its
resilience
and the continued resonance of its ideology," he
said.
Sageman sees the threat of terrorism originating
not from a centralized core but from the "bottom up." Although Sageman
agrees
that al-Qaida's core group in Pakistan remains a
danger, he believes it is effectively contained. For Sageman, the
future
of terrorism is more diffuse, with the primary
risk of attack coming from smaller groups of radicalized individuals who
find
one another in the community (often through the
Internet). Sageman believes that al-Qaida's ideology — not its
organization
— binds these groups. "The threat from al-Qaida
and its progeny has evolved over time," Sageman said. "The process of
radicalization
is still going on but now proceeds in a hostile,
post-Sept. 11, wired environment, resulting in a social structure
comprised
of disconnected groups."
When and Where Does Radicalization Occur?
Radicalization occurs when recruits align their
existing worldview with the ideology of a group and commit themselves to
using
violence to achieve the group's goals. To
understand this alignment is to understand what drives a person to
commit terrorism.
Hoffman and Sageman agree that understanding
radicalization is vital to understanding terrorism. However, they
strongly differ
on where radicalization takes place. For
Hoffman, radicalization occurs in a centralized core of terrorist elites
who oversee
recruitment and training programs housed in
clandestine facilities or in lawless regions of the globe such as the
Afghanistan-Pakistan
border. Sageman, on the other hand, argues that
radicalization is diffuse — or leaderless — and occurs through groups of
loosely
associated radicals found within American and
European communities.
If Hoffman's theory is correct, law enforcement
officials would expect to find radicals trained through organized
programs,
most often overseas. To identify and counter
this threat, the best strategy would be to track foreign-born or
domestic radicals
through intelligence fusion centers or other
interagency task forces.
On the other hand, if Sageman's theory is valid —
that terror groups form within local communities without the help of
organized
training programs — law enforcement officials
would focus on identifying and countering sources of radicalization
within their
communities. For example, correctional
facilities are one place where radicalization can occur. A 2007 National
Institute
of Justice study found that prisoner
radicalization was indeed happening in prisons, mostly through personal
inmate relationships. The study found that radicalization often began with a prisoner's
religious conversion and continued with extremist religious
teachings, eventually leading individuals to
undertake political violence. Similar to what Sageman holds, the NIJ
study found
the threat arose from small groups of "true
believers" who were motivated to commit terrorist acts.
Although Hoffman and Sageman disagree on where
radicalization occurs, they believe outreach programs are important in
combating
radicalization. Community policing builds
bridges of trust between community members and police, providing an
important link
to understanding when potential radicals might
be active within a community.
A 2006 NIJ study found that although an
increased prevalence of hate crimes against Arab-American communities
and heightened
levels of alienation within these communities
followed the Sept. 11 attacks, outreach programs helped rebuild trust. Community policing served as a bulwark against radicalization.
Relationships between community members and authorities helped
dampen or remove the grievances that often lead
to radicalization, such as perceptions of bias or hate crimes. Such
relationships
and trust could also yield information on
trained radicals arriving in communities.
The study further showed that these communities
responded more favorably to outreach efforts from state and local
agencies
than to those from the federal level. This
affirms the critical role of local law enforcement in combating
radicalization
and terrorism.
How Do Terrorists Organize?
Another significant dispute between Hoffman and
Sageman concerns how terrorist groups organize. Hoffman's analysis
suggests
the most dangerous terrorist groups organize
around a center-periphery model. In this model, the leadership and
best-trained
cells remain in safe havens such as Afghanistan,
drawing information, money and practical assistance from support cells
working
in target countries. When it is time to strike,
the attack cells quickly enter, attack and exit the target country with
the
aid of the already-embedded support cells.
Organizational control remains centralized with the leadership cells,
which give
orders to the other groups.
Sageman, on the other hand, sees the most
dangerous terrorist organizations centered in small groups that provide
their own
support. The groups do not travel overseas for
specialized training; rather, they educate themselves using sources such
as
Web postings. Sageman's groups are more
autonomous than the cells that Hoffman describes in that they conduct
their preparations
and attacks from within the community, keeping
their own organizational control.
NIJ's research on organizational learning and
the role of the Internet has found merit in both positions, suggesting a
complex
reality. A 2005 NIJ study examined terror
groups' organization, especially how they get, interpret and disseminate
information.
The study identified evidence supporting both
models of terrorist organization, concluding that how these groups adapt
to
changing conditions will influence which
counterterrorism strategies are most effective. If, for example,
terrorists responsible
for collecting and analyzing information are in
the community, law enforcement agencies would have to adopt a more
active
surveillance and investigation plan than if the
terrorists were abroad. Agencies would also have to help identify safe
havens
that terrorist groups use, such as warehouses,
ranches or even houses in suburban areas.
Continuing NIJ studies on extremism on the
Internet may also help further clarify this discussion. For example, one
study
is examining the content of extremist Web sites
to identify the location of people who contribute to the sites.
Meanwhile, state and local law enforcement
agencies are already bringing this discussion into sharper focus. Many
have collected
information about specific terrorist groups and
shared it with other agencies. This has led to a better understanding
about
how terrorist groups organize in communities and
how best to counter them. In addition, agencies are paying closer
attention
to online extremism, another important way to
understand terrorist organization. Continued information gathering and
vigilance
from counter-terrorism agencies will inform the
Sageman-Hoffman debate and will influence how the nation develops
counter-terrorism
measures.
A Two-Way Street
History will decide who won this debate. Now,
however, the differing opinions offer a superb example of how complex
issues
evolve into policy choices. Whether
radicalization happens here or abroad is an important question, but for
law enforcement
agencies, the academic debate translates into
how to provide the most effective community outreach in the effort to
prevent
terrorist attacks.
Law enforcement agencies are not passive
bystanders in the discussion — they are key contributors. Their efforts
offer valuable
insights into how terrorists recruit and
organize. This give-and-take between research and practice will yield
greater clarity
and improved decision-making for
counterterrorism efforts.
Source: http://www.nij.gov/journals/264/future-terrorism.htm
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