Introduction
5.In this section we consider the six potential threats which the MoD must address in the SDSR. Given their unpredictability, we have deliberately not ranked them in order of priority. Instead, they are listed alphabetically.
Cyber-attack and espionage
6.Hostile attacks upon the UK by other states and large-scale cyber-crime were listed in the last National Security Strategy as a Tier 1 threat. Evidence to our inquiry has made clear that the threat has not decreased in the subsequent five years.
7.Nigel Inkster, Director of Future Conflict and Cyber Security, International Institute for Strategic Studies, told us that the UK was now dependent on information communications technology in every facet of everyday life, and as such was open to a wide variety of threats. He explained that threats from cyber could vary greatly in terms of severity, impact and intention.3 The Royal Society went further and suggested that cyber had now become a “domain” of battle, alongside land, maritime and air.4
8.Cyber-attacks and espionage are relatively inexpensive to carry out, when compared to the cost of using conventional military hardware.5 Attribution can be difficult to prove and cyber operations can be mounted both by states and non-state actors, with targets ranging from governments to corporations and individuals. Several witnesses noted that cyber-attacks might be used in concert with other capabilities rather than as a standalone technique.6 The result is a spectrum of threats from Chinese state-sponsored industrial espionage (such as the alleged theft of aircraft designs for the F357), to alleged Russian attacks upon the internet services of other states (e.g., Estonia in 2007, Georgia in 2008 and Crimea in 2014), to low-level cyber-attacks carried out by DAESH (such as the hacking of the Twitter feed and YouTube Channel of US CENTCOM).8
9.According to Jim Lewis, Director and Senior Fellow of the Technology and Public Policy Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the perpetrators of cyber-attacks will often have a higher tolerance of risk and less vulnerability to a retaliatory attack than their targets, making a credible and proportional deterrent threat harder to establish.9 Peter Roberts, Senior Research Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), agreed. He told us that cyber threats will need to be countered, not just with conventional responses, but also by using political or economic tools.10 This position was supported by Edward Schwarck, Research Fellow, Asia Studies at RUSI, who emphasised the importance of UK cyber resilience in deterring cyber-threats:
It is important to make the point that deterrence is not only about punishment. You can also have deterrence by denial. In the case of the threat posed by China, that would primarily come in the form of hardening our IT infrastructure—making it more secure and improving the cyber-knowhow of the UK commercial sector. I think measures like these would make the UK a much less desirable target, as China would see it, for cyber-espionage. Here one might use the analogy of a burglar considering which house to rob on a street. The house with strong locks and sophisticated alarms is much less likely to be targeted than the one without. I think the UK should be focusing most of its efforts here.11
10.The importance of the threat of cyber-attack has been highlighted by the fact that responsibility for it was recently transferred to the Ministry of Defence.12
11.It is clear that potential cyber-attacks pose a serious threat to UK security. They could be mounted by a wide range of state and non-state actors. Therefore, we expect cyber resilience—alongside offensive and defensive capabilities—to be a key feature of the SDSR.
Growing instability in the Middle East and North Africa
12.In 2010, the National Security Strategy identified “major instability, insurgency or civil war overseas which creates an environment that terrorists can exploit to threaten the UK” as a Tier 2 threat.13 In the subsequent five years, the Middle East and North African regions have seen the emergence (or re-emergence) of four war zones—in Libya, Syria, Iraq and Yemen. Both regions also suffer from wider areas of instability with a number of countries still recovering or adapting to events which took place as part of the 2011 Arab uprisings. Of particular relevance are current events in North Africa where Islamist groups controlling areas in Egypt and Libya have now sworn allegiance to DAESH. Both the US 2015 National Security Strategy and the MoD’s Global Strategic Trends—Out to 2045 highlight the area as being at risk of growing instability resulting from “religious extremism, rejection of democratic reforms, a decline in natural energy resources and the effects of climate change”.14
13.Dr Alia Brahimi, Visiting Fellow at the Oxford University Changing Character of War Programme, told us that although she considered DAESH to be the principal threat emanating from the region, poor governance and the spread of armed conflict were the key drivers of terrorism there.15 She suggested that armed conflict was being used as a tactic to delay reform and political evolution and that this could result in even greater instability. Dr Brahimi stressed that the UK lacked capacity to counter this threat:
Currently we have no fully functioning and effective counter-terrorism partner in the Middle East and North Africa [and] the internal stability of the UK’s allies is more precarious at a time when the threat from terrorism is rising.16
14.In written evidence Professor Rosemary Hollis from City University, London also highlighted the difficulty of identifying allies in the region with whom we could work:
Herein lies the conundrum for European governments, the British included. Prior to the Arab uprisings, which began in December 2010, both their counter-terrorism strategies and migration controls were operated with the cooperation of dictatorial regimes, the very regimes challenged by their populations in the uprisings. Such cooperation continues or has been resumed with the governments of Egypt, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Jordan, as well as with the Arab Gulf states. The problem derives from the failed states, notably Libya and Syria. The message implicit here is that dictators, or rather those prepared to do deals with Britain and other European states on controlling migration and countering terrorism, are preferable to failed states and chaos.17
15.Jon Marks, Chairman of Cross-border Information Ltd, noted that even those countries which managed to retain stability after the Arab uprisings still had a number of unresolved issues that were likely to be brought to the fore through the process of political succession. In Algeria, for example, the recent arrest of senior military figures together with terrorist activity and inter-ethnic fighting raised concerns about the potential instability which could arise upon the succession process for the Presidency. Mr Marks told us that:
What we have seen across the region is that while we are all focused on one conflict, there is room for another. […] Succession in several countries could trigger political disputes, and there are conflicts, such as that in Western Sahara, that people have not looked at. People did not look at the Tuareg uprisings and the problems that flared up into Mali and led to the projection of European forces, including British support. So there is plenty of that and with the influence of climate change being felt on the rise of Boko Haram, for example, there is plenty to worry about. 18
16.The growing instability in the Middle East and North African region is a significant threat to the UK and its interests. The increased threat of international terrorism was brought into stark relief by the horrific terrorist attacks in Paris on 13 November 2015 and represents a very real danger to the UK. The civil wars in Libya and Syria are also the cause of mass refugee movements into neighbouring countries and the European Union and the subsequent strain that such migration places on natural resources and state infrastructure is severe.
17.The SDSR will have to address the threats arising from the growing instability in the Middle East and North Africa. In particular, it will need to demonstrate that the UK will have the capability to recognise both the existing and emerging threats from these areas, and the capacity to formulate a coherent strategy to counter them both at home and abroad.
Increases in extremism, radicalisation and other enablers of terrorist activity
18.In evidence to this inquiry, Dr Alia Brahimi suggested that as well as the drivers of terrorism being present in the Middle East and North Africa, so too were the enablers—spaces, weapons, money and ideas.19 She observed that the millenarian tendencies of the leadership of DAESH made it more dangerous than previous incarnations, particularly in its choice of weaponry.20 However, Jon Marks cautioned against an over-concentration on that specific terrorist group. He argued that, while radical Islamism may remain the dominant ideology and threat over the next five years, it had the capacity and potential to evolve still further. Thus, the threat in future might not be DAESH but a different incarnation.21
19.Mr Marks also warned that radicalisation in the region did not result solely from religion: poor governance in the Middle East had resulted in people becoming radicalised “both in an economic and social sense, as well as in an Islamist sense”.22 Furthermore, Dr Brahimi noted, the rise of sectarianism was leading to an increase in the number of proxy armies and non-state actors engaging in conflicts. As an example, she argued that that the Saudi/Iranian relationship was “a political rather than doctrinal axis, which recommends non-state actors as a way of projecting that conflict”.23
20.The freedom of movement afforded to terrorist groups in North Africa has often been assisted by porous borders in the region. In Libya, the death of Colonel Gaddafi and the subsequent fighting between factions has led to an outflow of heavy weaponry across the whole of North Africa. Illegal trafficking in the local economy remains significant but has evolved in recent years from cigarette smuggling to the smuggling of arms and people.24 In many cases, traffickers have also adopted a terrorist ideology meaning that the activities of traffickers and terrorists are now mutually supportive.25
21.The numbers of terrorist attacks on foreign interests in North Africa have increased in recent years, with the attack on the In Amenas gas plant in Algeria in 2013, the July 2015 murder of tourists on a beach in Sousse in Tunisia, and the apparent sabotage of the Russian Metrojet flight from Sharm el Sheikh to St Petersburg on 31 October 2015, being notable examples. Jon Marks told us it was clear that “the spread of the groups that have joined up with the IS franchise in Libya”, demonstrated the expansion of extremism and terrorism activity over “a larger and larger territorial piece of land”. He added that:
In North Africa as well you have the potential for there to be a real governed space, rather than an ungoverned space; you may not like who is governing it, but the fact is that it is still there in North Africa, just as we have had in Syria/Iraq.26
22.Although this inquiry received evidence only on the growing threat of extremism and radicalisation in the Middle East and North Africa, it is important to note that the previous five years have also seen indications of other varieties of extremism. The 2011 attacks carried out by Anders Brevik and the October 2015 attack on Kronan school in Sweden demonstrate the continuing issue of far-right extremism. Closer to home, the Northern Ireland Secretary Rt Hon Theresa Villiers MP confirmed to the House that:
All the main paramilitary groups operating during the troubles are still in existence, including the Ulster Volunteer Force, the Red Hand Commando, the Ulster Defence Association, the Provisional IRA and the Irish National Liberation Army.27
Whilst examples of European extremism may not present the same scale of threat as the other enablers of terrorism referred to earlier, they remain matters which the SDSR will need to consider. The SDSR must also address the threat exemplified by recent attacks in Paris of insurgents seeking to use terrorist attacks on our streets to weaken our resolve and to bring conflicts being played out in the Middle East into the UK.
23.Increases in extremism and radicalisation are allowing terrorist groups to expand both their capabilities and the geographical areas where they can operate. This clearly represents a major threat to the UK and its interests. The SDSR must determine how the UK is to respond, particularly in terms of countering any further evolution of the threat posed by international terrorism and its underlying doctrine. We expect clear roles to be assigned to the Armed Forces in response to this threat, and to see evidence of appropriate adaptation of their capabilities and organisation as distinct from those of the civilian police, anti-terrorist police and the security services.
Non-state actors and hybrid warfare undermining the international rules-based order
24.The engagement of non-state actors and hybrid warfare (the use of both conventional and asymmetric tactics by state and non-state actors alike), whilst not new, have recently become more prevalent. Global Strategic Trends—Out to 2045 gave the following assessment of this threat:
Globalisation, in particular the spread of technology, information and ideas, is likely to give an increasing number of people (both state and non-state actors) access to sophisticated and technologically advanced capabilities. This is likely to increase the opportunity for unconventional attacks on technologically sophisticated nations, including by terrorists.28
25.Professor Malcolm Chalmers, Research Director and Director of UK Defence Policy Studies at RUSI, reinforced this view:
In relation to both terrorism and other sub-conventional threats, those challenges are often arising precisely because of western conventional superiority. Our potential adversaries do not want to take on the United States in particular or US-led alliances at the conventional level, because they know they will lose. They therefore try sub-conventional or, in some cases, as with Putin’s declaratory policy over the past year and a bit, raising the spectre of nuclear escalation, which, again, is a response to NATO’s conventional superiority.29
26.ADS, the umbrella body for the defence industry, suggested that the faster proliferation of technology and the fragmentation of unitary, sovereign states would result in additional security threats to the UK and its interests. ADS went on to state that this could also result in threats which were “increasingly asymmetric in nature”; and therefore, future conflicts would be “less predictable”.30
27.The conflicts in Libya, Syria, Iraq, Yemen and Ukraine all feature non-state actors, including proxy armies backed by states. Dr Alia Brahimi noted that the lack of friendly state forces on the ground, had led to non-state actors playing a key role in the fight against DAESH. In that respect she highlighted the role of the YPG, the Kurdish militia groups in Syria, the role of the Iranian-backed popular mobilisation units in the recapture of Tikrit in Iraq and Hezbollah pushing back DAESH from Qalamoun in Lebanon. Dr Brahimi concluded that “increasingly, non-state actors are probably going to come to define themselves as counter-terrorism partners, for better or worse”.31
28.Jon Marks warned that the role played by non-state actors had the potential to undermine the international rules-based order upon which the UK places a high value. While noting the benefits of working with the Kurdish Peshmerga he questioned whether: “building policy around working with a large number of private armies” was desirable.32 He continued:
That comes back to the degree to which we are looking to make policy that will still depend on the state and the international order we have had since the end of the second world war, or whether there will be a recognition that there is a change. […] Playing with proxies is a very dangerous game. 33
29.The utilisation of non-state actors in these conflicts contributes to the complexity of the conflicts—in that a political, as well as a military solution, was required. Dr Brahimi highlighted the difficulty that international organisations, such as the UN, faced in trying to resolve these sorts of crises:
For the UN, it is going to be harder to deal with chapter VII threats under international peace and security in the conventional way. Because these bodies fracture and then split conflicts into very small pieces, the UN, as León has demonstrated with Libya, has a role to play in bringing all those disparate actors together. If that is successful—I would not hold my breath—it could present a model of sorts.34
30.The French have suggested that one option may be the voluntary commitment of the P5 members not to veto resolutions which are designed to halt mass atrocities. However, given the reluctance on the part of the Russian, Chinese and US Governments, this is unlikely to solve the current credibility issue.35
31.The international rules-based order is also facing a serious challenge from the use of sub-conventional tactics, particularly on the part of Russia. Examples include the alleged use of offensive cyber capabilities and provocative actions against NATO countries.
32.The Russian use of cyber warfare against opponents has been well demonstrated over the past decade. Cyber-attacks against banking systems, power distribution networks, government sites and even the internet infrastructure were the hallmarks of Russian-attributed (but denied) attacks in Estonia in 2007 and Georgia in 2008. More recently, the 2015 cyber-attacks against TV5 Monde in France (disguised as a cyber-attack by an Islamic group) and an attack against several German Government sites, as well as the Lower Parliament of the German Bundestag,36 prior to a visit by the Ukrainian Prime Minister, were attributed to Russia. Again, Russian officials denied responsibility for the attacks and in both cases, Russia-based groups (rather than the Russian state) have been blamed. However, there have been strong suggestions that several Russian groups responsible for cyber-attacks do have links to the Russian Government.37
33.Russian provocative actions, intended to undermine NATO, have included Russian military aircraft entering the airspace of member countries prompting interception by those countries’ Air Forces.38 The RAF has also intercepted Russian military flights which have come close to UK airspace.39 The recent sighting of a suspected Russian submarine in UK waters required the engagement of maritime patrol aircraft—a key deficiency in the UK national armoury—from France, America and Canada.40
34.There has also been evidence of hybrid warfare both in the annexation of Crimea and especially in the conflict in Eastern Ukraine. Professor Chalmers suggested that while our awareness of the sub-conventional threat has increased as a result of Russian actions in Ukraine, the difficulty lay in devising an acceptable response to it:
It is not credible to respond to small-scale subversion or cyber threats by deploying a NATO division. That is just not going to be credible, so you have to have something that tackles that edge.41
Nigel Inkster also highlighted the particular difficulty of responding in the case of a cyber-attack:
In the cyber domain in particular there is the problem that there are no agreed definitions of what equates to an armed attack or a use of force as defined in the UN charter, so devising an acceptable response is quite challenging. If a cyber-attack generates physical damage or deaths then that might be a rather different story, but most of the time such attacks do not.42
35.The difficulty posed by the use of hybrid warfare therefore lies not in its effect but rather in devising an adequate response to it—both as an individual state and as part of the network of international organisations, such as NATO or the UN. In his written evidence to this inquiry, Lt General (retd) Sir Paul Newton, Professor of Strategy and Director of the Strategy and Security Institute at Exeter University emphasised that:
The MOD’s assessment of the Future Character of Conflict (FCOC, 2009) introduced the notion of ‘hybrid’ threats; a toxic cocktail of traditional and novel risks, manifesting concurrently. However, Whitehall seems to view hybrid threats mainly through the prism of a ‘rules based’ international system made up of at least semi-functioning states, when the reality is of an increasingly disorderly neighbourhood where the ‘unthinkable’ is already happening.43
36.In the face of unorthodox and irregular forces operating deniably and in defiance of normal international relations, the SDSR must signal an intention to develop doctrines for unconventional responses, including the use of counter-propaganda to expose the hidden links of covert aggression.
Potential for conflict in the South and East China Seas
37.The UK presence in the Far East is limited and there have been no British military bases in the Asia-Pacific since the decision to retreat from ‘east of Suez’ in 1968. Our presence is now limited to a large fuel depot and berthing dockyards in the Sembawang port in Singapore and a Gurkha garrison stationed in Brunei. UK defence activity is now concentrated in the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) between the UK, Malaysia, Singapore, Australia and New Zealand. These arrangements have, in the near past, resulted in exercises to counter security threats in the southern South China Sea.44
38.Despite the UK’s low level presence in the region, our witnesses highlighted a number of threats to UK interests. In oral evidence, Edward Schwarck told us that these included threats to the integrity of maritime law, regional stability, nuclear non-proliferation and the non-use of coercion or force among states.45 Professor Andrew Dorman, King’s College London, argued that if the UK wanted to project a global presence then it would need to engage with such threats.46
39.The role of UK allies in the region makes this area still more significant. Following the recent voyage by USS Lassen within 12 nautical miles of the coast of a Chinese artificial island—which China claims as part of it Exclusive Economic Zone—the Australian Defence Minister released a statement highlighting support for the rights of freedom of navigation and freedom of overflight:
Australia has a legitimate interest in the maintenance of peace and stability, respect for international law, unimpeded trade and freedom of navigation and overflight in the South China Sea.47
40.Australia is currently debating whether its Navy ought to follow the US example and also enter the disputed areas. Earlier this year, the UK Foreign Secretary highlighted the large amount of trade which passes through the South China Sea and suggested that the UK would be prepared to deploy Armed Forces as part of the FPDA should its interests and alliances in the region be put at risk by regional security challenges.48 However, both Peter Roberts and Edward Schwarck highlighted the lack of UK maritime capabilities as a barrier to significant engagement in the Pacific. Peter Roberts told us that for the SDSR to address these threats, a priority of the SDSR would need to be “destroyers, frigates, submarines—particularly nuclear submarines—and re-supply vessels” along with maritime patrol aircraft and SIGINT capability platforms.49 Edward Schwarck told us that recent reductions in platforms such as destroyers, helicopter carriers and the removal of maritime patrol aircraft had already hindered the UK’s ability to contribute meaningfully to military exercises, whether alongside US in the “Rim of the Pacific” or in the annual exercises that come as part of the Five Power Defence Arrangements.50
41.We support the UK Government’s position that territorial disputes in the South and East China Seas should be settled according to international rules. However, the UK may not be able to rely upon this in the future. We will therefore measure the provision of maritime capabilities in the SDSR against the potential to deploy to a number of areas, including the Pacific.
Potential for Russian aggression in Europe and the High North and possible dilution of the commitment to Article 5
42.Russia’s military capability has been substantially strengthened in recent years. The Royal Norwegian Ministry of Defence recently warned that Russia was now operating in greater unison, with increased military readiness, mobility and range.51 Russian defence spending has steadily increased; from 3.15% of GDP in 2013 (US $66.1 billion) to nearly 3.5% (US $70 billion) in 2014. In 2015 it has witnessed a further increase on the 2014 budget of 8.1 %, to total US $84.5 billion.52
43.This ‘resurgence’ has already brought Russia back to the point where it possesses the capabilities to threaten the territorial integrity of NATO, and directly to coerce the UK itself by various means.53 The potential threats posed by Russia to the security of the UK and its interests are multi-faceted. Dr Igor Sutyagin of RUSI provided us with the following stark assessment of the Russian military:
The Russian forces are being rapidly modernised now. They have reached the end of the research and development cycle, so now they are re-arming, and, what is also interesting, they are learning in a very effective and fast way. Also, there is a combination of soft and hard kill. Their staff culture is very high. They understand how to plan situations and how to play around international law. In Ukraine, for instance, they managed to deploy a huge number of troops—up to 91,000 to 100,000—near the Ukrainian border without violating a single letter of the Vienna document. They never exceeded the 8,000 or 9,000 troops limit that is established as the limit for exercises. They managed to locate and control them in a way that is effective, but absolutely permissible. That is another strong aspect on the Russian side.54
44.Russian military doctrine has interpreted further expansion of NATO along Russia’s borders, and the attempt to secure a global role for the alliance, as military threats to Russia. Furthermore, a recent amendment to the doctrine—ratified by President Putin in December 2014—cited as a threat, any military activity close to Russia’s borders. The implication is that any defensive action by NATO could fall into the category of a ‘threat’.55
45.In written evidence, Jonathan Eyal from RUSI suggested that while current Russian antagonism could be considered opportunistic:
Broad hostility to the West will be unremitting, and will involve a mixture of dangling economic carrots while brandishing military sticks of the kind observable now in Ukraine, and in Syria.56
46.A further concern is the Russian doctrine of protecting its ‘citizens’ against what it views as repression in other countries. It was this doctrine which Russia used to “legitimise” its incursions in Georgia in 2008 and in Crimea last year. Russia recently announced that “whole segments of the Russian world” may need Russia’s protection.57 Such a trend highlights the vulnerability of the three Baltic States, all of which have significant Russian minority populations. The use of ‘little green men’ (a term used to describe soldiers or uniformed ‘volunteers’ who operate without insignia or official affiliation but, in this case, are thought to be Russian Special Forces) in Crimea and Ukraine has highlighted the difficulty in securing a political consensus on whether an armed attack is being carried out by another state (which would invoke Article 5 if the state attacked were a NATO member) or whether it is simply a local uprising and therefore not subject to the same security guarantee.
47.Russia’s use of sub-conventional tactics and deniable actions have raised concerns about the possible dilution of Article 5. Professor Chalmers, Professor Dorman and Nigel Inkster each highlighted the difficulty of countering such actions in a credible and proportionate way. Professor Dorman noted that Article 5 did not contain a legal requirement for other States to engage and did not state what constituted an armed attack. He argued that this left it subject to the interpretation of individual NATO members.58 Nigel Inkster raised the concern that low-level subversive tactics could irreparably damage the credibility of Article 5 if not dealt with in a credible manner.59
48.Dr Sutyagin went further:
If you destroy the credibility of NATO, that dissolves NATO as a whole, which means that you lose—that is exactly the divide and rule which we started with. That is how sub-Article 5 actions might lead to the destruction of the structure which is supposed to provide your defence and security via Article 5. That is why you should be concerned.60
However, Jonathan Eyal suggested that Russian policy was not to destroy NATO but to “defang” it by:
Discrediting the significance of NATO’s famed Article 5 security guarantee to its member-states through the engineering of a series of small crises which, each one when taken alone does not merit NATO’s military reaction, but when taken together put NATO in an unflattering light and raise doubts about the applicability of Article 5 security guarantees.61
49.Our predecessor Committee considered the difficulty of NATO responding to sub-conventional (or asymmetric) warfare and concluded that neither the UK nor NATO had satisfactory doctrine or capabilities to address such threats. In response to the Report, the then Government said:
At the Summit, Allied leaders agreed to ensure that NATO is able effectively to address “the specific challenges posed by hybrid warfare threats, where a wide range of overt and covert military, paramilitary, and civilian measures are employed in a highly integrated design”. This will now be taken forward in conjunction with work to improve NATO’s responsiveness through the Readiness Action Plan (RAP). The Defence Secretary also hosted a discussion with Defence Ministers at the Summit to explore the issues of Hybrid warfare which focused on where Hybrid warfare falls between Articles IV and V, in addition to how the Alliance could respond.62
50.Another sub-conventional threat from Russia is its apparent focus on the potential to disrupt the sea lines of communication which allow the US to communicate with continental Europe. This threat was raised by both Dr Sutyagin63 and Dr David Blagden of Exeter University in his written evidence. They argued that Russian submarines were looking to exploit the increasingly vulnerable sea lanes of communication (SLOCs) which are vital to the UK, as a trade-dependent power.64
51.This threat has also been highlighted by US officials who have declared that Russia has been undertaking operations to assess the feasibility of interrupting the trans-Atlantic SLOCs which carry data between the US and European continent. The New York Times recently reported that Russian submarine activity along the route that the cables take has increased by 50% over the last year. These cables carry global business worth more than $10 trillion a day, and more than 95 percent of daily communications. The New York Times article cited Admiral Mark Ferguson as arguing that Russia’s emerging doctrine involved the use of space, cyber, information warfare and hybrid warfare designed to cripple the decision-making process of NATO.65
The High North
52.There are five Arctic Ocean coastal states: Canada, Greenland, Norway, Russia, and the United States. Three other states—Finland, Iceland, and Sweden—have territory above the Arctic Circle, but without Arctic Ocean coastlines. The Arctic has long been considered a potential flashpoint for hostilities between Russia and the West and the Expert Commission on Norwegian Security and Defence Policy in 2015, cited Russia as the “defining factor” of future Norwegian defence planning.66 That concern has been echoed by Denmark, Sweden and Finland in the form of the recent Nordic military alliance; the main focus of which is to provide a response to Russian military actions in the Baltic.67
53.Dr Duncan Depledge, Royal Holloway, University of London, described the UK as having a “low-level physical presence” in the High North which is concentrated in scientific research and military training. As part of this, the UK is an observer to the Arctic Council, in order to support the engagement of British scientists in a number of large-scale Arctic science research programmes run by the Council’s working groups.
54.British military training is run in co-operation with Norway and Canada, with the UK supplying Royal Marine Commandos and other units to train for cold weather operations in Canada and northern Norway. In addition the UK regularly participates in joint military exercises in Arctic waters.68
55.However, Dr Depledge notes that UK interests in this area are significant:
In 2012, Norway accounted for the supply of more than half (55 per cent) of the UK’s gas and almost half (46 per cent) of its oil imports, thus making it critically important to safeguard supply infrastructure between the UK and Norway from potential attack or disruption (a vital national security interest, as identified in the UK National Security Strategy). As Norway pushes deeper into the Arctic to develop oil and gas reserves that may well provide a proportion of future exports to the UK, the imperative to safeguard supplies will necessarily draw the attention of the defence community deeper into the Arctic as well.69
56.At present, Russia continues to participate in the Arctic Council. However, Dr Sutyagin argued that:
The ‘rules of the game’ Russia wrote for its forays into eastern Ukraine are equally applicable in the Arctic. The main one—to keep activities below the response threshold of one’s adversaries—constitutes a guiding principle. It is what has allowed Russia to buzz its Arctic neighbours’ airspace many dozens of times in recent months and to interfere with a Finnish research vessel in international waters in October 2014 without causing diplomatic ruptures or compromising Arctic Council work. It is also the sort of ‘rule’ that Arctic countries, such as Norway, fear could be used to pressure them in future: Russian fishing trawlers in Svalbard’s exclusive economic zone—challenging Norway’s interpretation of the Spitsbergen Treaty—would cause Oslo serious discomfort, but hardly justify a NATO response.70
57.Tim Reilly from the Institute of Statecraft believed that should Russia withdraw from the Arctic Council it had the potential to undermine the development of the Northern Sea Route as a new international trade route between the East and West. He believed that this could cause China to review its policy on the High North:
Under such circumstances China may well argue that as the AC’s founding mandate of a ban on strategic discussions by AC members is now clearly being challenged by an increasing NATO presence, then the twin guiding AC policies of environmental protection and sustainable development are thus irrelevant too if there is to be no globalization, and that China’s original view of the Arctic as “a zone of peace and a global commons for the benefit of all mankind” should be reviewed again. This means that subsequent views on different governance models (NATO/AC), access to resources, and presence in the Arctic would be open to discussion/debate by all-comers.71
58.The resurgence of an expansionist Russia represents a significant change in the threat picture since 2010 and has implications not only for the UK but also for our allies as well. It is therefore essential that the SDSR sets out a policy to help counter this partial reversion to Cold War politics. In particular, NATO’s conventional deterrence of Russia must be credible. This is a vital obligation which we will keep under continual review.
Source: https://www.publications.parliament.uk/
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