Law & Paneir: Realisation of Our Rights

  Malaysia’s decision to prohibit civil servants from using Waze raises a larger question: should Chinese-manufactured electric vehicles face similar restrictions because of their potential to collect sensitive information? The answer requires more than geopolitical suspicion. It demands a consistent national-security framework that evaluates technology, foreign legal obligations, access to data and the consequences of possible exploitation. The government’s Waze directive, issued on 20 October 2026 following a National Cyber Security Committee meeting, prohibits civil servants from using the navigation application while performing official duties. Authorities cited concerns about location data and the potential exposure of sensitive government information to foreign jurisdictions. The principle is understandable: information about where officials travel, which facilities they visit and how frequently they move can have intelligence value. However, applying that principle t...

  The warning by Tan Sri Ayob Khan Mydin Pitchay that terrorist recruiters are targeting Malaysian children through online gaming platforms should serve as a wake-up call.  His allegation that children aged 12, 14 and 15 had been recruited through Roblox, indoctrinated and taught to carry out attacks highlights a disturbing evolution in extremist recruitment.  The danger is not that gaming itself produces terrorists, but that familiar digital environments can become gateways to manipulation, radicalisation and violence. The changing face of terrorist recruitment Traditional terrorist recruitment often depended on personal connections, physical gatherings and direct ideological instruction. Digital platforms have transformed these opportunities, allowing recruiters to approach young people within environments where they feel comfortable, socially connected and relatively independent of adult supervision. The alleged movement from gaming interactions into private chat...

Malaysia does not need to replicate India’s counter-terrorism institutions to learn from its experience. The introduction of PRAHAAR, India’s National Counter-Terrorism Policy and Strategy, instead raises a more practical question: how can Malaysia strengthen the implementation of its own security framework? The Malaysia Action Plan on Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (MyPCVE) 2024–2028 already provides a national framework built around four pillars: prevention, enforcement, rehabilitation and reinforcement.  It recognises that violent extremism requires coordinated action by government agencies, civil society and other stakeholders. The priority now should be to ensure these pillars produce measurable results. Five policy measures could strengthen implementation. First, Malaysia should conduct a whole-of-government coordination audit. The Royal Malaysia Police, intelligence authorities, Bank Negara Malaysia, the National Anti-Financial Crime Centre, immigration au...

  Counter-terrorism requires more than strong legislation and arrests. It demands intelligence coordination, effective institutions, public cooperation and safeguards against the misuse of state power.  India’s evolving approach offers Malaysia an opportunity to examine these priorities, particularly following the introduction of PRAHAAR, India’s National Counter-Terrorism Policy and Strategy, in February 2026. PRAHAAR establishes a framework built around seven pillars: preventing attacks, responding proportionately, coordinating government capabilities, upholding human rights and the rule of law, addressing conditions conducive to terrorism, strengthening international cooperation, and building societal resilience.  Its relevance to Malaysia lies not in copying Indian institutions, but in assessing whether existing Malaysian arrangements translate national policy into effective outcomes. Malaysia already has its own framework. The Malaysia Action Plan on Preventing a...

Saudi Arabia’s security faces a critical test as Houthi missile and drone attacks expose the limitations of military superiority without effective regional coordination. The Mecca Joint Defence Agreement, signed by Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan on 7 August 2026, offers a framework for collective security. However, whether it can genuinely safeguard the kingdom depends less on the symbolism of the agreement than on the signatories’ willingness to translate their commitments into practical military capabilities, intelligence cooperation and conflict prevention. The agreement establishes that an armed attack against one signatory should be regarded as an attack against all three. This principle strengthens collective deterrence and signals that Saudi Arabia is seeking alternatives to an overreliance on external security guarantees. Nevertheless, the agreement’s effectiveness must be measured against a difficult question: can it prevent Houthi attacks, or merely improve Saudi Ar...

Saudi Arabia’s  vulnerability to repeated attacks on its civilian infrastructure exposes a deeper crisis than the failure of air defences. It raises questions about whether international institutions can prevent regional conflicts from escalating when powerful states pursue competing strategic interests. The reported Houthi attack on Riyadh’s King Khalid International Airport on 10 October 2026, which Saudi authorities said killed 12 people and injured more than 300, underscores the human cost of a conflict that continues to resist diplomatic containment. The central question is no longer whether the United Nations can condemn attacks. It is whether the UN, particularly its Security Council, can translate condemnation into effective measures that prevent further violence. The ongoing wars involving Iran and the United States, and Russia and Ukraine, have intensified doubts about the organisation’s ability to uphold collective security consistently. Saudi Arabia’s Security Cri...