The recent arrest of 36 Bangladeshi nationals in Malaysia linked to Islamic State (IS) ideology, recruitment operations, and fundraising to overthrow the Bangladeshi government highlights a disturbing security development: foreign workers, once perceived mainly through the lens of economic necessity, are increasingly becoming targets and tools for transnational terrorist networks.
This case is not an isolated
incident. It reflects a growing trend where foreign terrorist elements exploit
migrant vulnerabilities to infiltrate host nations like Malaysia and to
propagate violent ideologies among diaspora communities.
The implications are severe not
just for Bangladesh but also for Malaysia, where the manipulation of identity
politics and religion commonly referred to as 2R issues (race and religion) could be weaponised to inspire domestic and regional terrorism.
The primary motivation for these
migrant radicals to bring extremist ideology into Malaysia stems from their
grievances rooted in homeland politics and religious identity. Many Bangladeshi
migrant workers, particularly those from blue-collar backgrounds, face
isolation, discrimination, and economic marginalisation in foreign countries.
These conditions make them
vulnerable to radical messaging that promises justice, belonging, and purpose.
In both Singapore and Malaysia, radicalised Bangladeshis often do not aim to
attack the host country, but rather use it as a base to propagate jihadist
ideology, recruit fellow nationals, and plan subversive actions back home.
The goal is frequently to topple
the Bangladeshi government in Dhaka, which they see as corrupt, secularist, and
hostile toward Islamists. These workers carry the psychological baggage of a
deeply polarised Bangladesh where the persecution of Islamist political
figures, corruption, and repression have created a narrative of systemic
injustice.
Violent ideologies then exploit
these narratives, offering “jihad” as a moral duty to defend the ummah and
restore Islamic governance.
Malaysia becomes an attractive
staging ground for several reasons. First, the country’s large foreign
workforce includes hundreds of thousands of Bangladeshis, creating a potential
recruitment base.
Second, Malaysia’s multicultural,
majority-Muslim character allows extremist rhetoric to be disguised as
legitimate religious expression, especially when authorities struggle to
differentiate between conservative preaching and incitement.
Third, enforcement gaps particularly
along porous borders and through the employment of undocumented labour facilitate
covert radical activity.
Some of the recently arrested
suspects were legally documented workers, while others operated in the shadows
without formal papers, illustrating that both legal and illegal pathways can be
used to infiltrate terrorist ideology.
Crucially, Malaysia must
recognise that the threat is no longer confined to foreigners intending to
affect only their homeland.
Extremist groups increasingly
seek to co-opt local issues to recruit Malaysians into their causes by
weaponising race, religion, and royalty.
The “2R” narrative is already
being manipulated online to allege the persecution of Muslims domestically and
abroad, and to promote the idea of a caliphate as a just alternative.
Social media becomes a fertile
ground for indoctrination, where Malaysian youths disillusioned with political
corruption, social inequality, or religious marginalisation are easy targets
for radicalisation.
This is why Home Minister Datuk
Seri Saifuddin Nasution Ismail has warned that imported extremism poses a
serious threat to national security. It blurs the line between foreign and
domestic radicalism and risks catalysing homegrown terrorism in a country
already sensitive to identity politics.
Malaysia must respond to this
multi-layered threat with a comprehensive and proactive strategy. One of the
most important measures is strengthening border security and intelligence
cooperation.
The Malaysian Border Control and
Protection Agency (AKPS) is uniquely positioned to lead this effort.
As a centralised body bringing
together the resources and capabilities of various border-related agencies such
as Immigration, Customs, and police units, AKPS can play a pivotal role in
monitoring cross-border movements, vetting foreign workers, and preventing the
entry of individuals flagged for extremist affiliations.
To be effective, AKPS must deepen
its collaboration with the Royal Malaysian Police’s Special Branch and the
Malaysian External Intelligence Organisation (MEIO). Intelligence sharing
should be real-time and guided by predictive analytics using biometric data,
travel histories, and behavioural profiling.
The case of Amir Hamza in
Singapore where the preacher entered using a passport not linked to his
identity in security databases shows that traditional border controls are no
longer sufficient.
AKPS must adopt an
intelligence-driven model that can flag not just known suspects, but also
individuals showing patterns consistent with radical activity.
Furthermore, routine screenings
should be institutionalised at key points like airports, ports, and migrant
processing centres, using a centralised watchlist accessible to all enforcement
arms.
In addition to enforcement,
Malaysia must strengthen migrant engagement and deradicalisation efforts. A
security-first approach without social support can alienate migrant communities
and drive radical elements further underground.
Regular outreach programs at
dormitories, work sites, and community centres should be launched to educate
migrants about the legal consequences of extremist activities and provide
psychological support for those struggling with identity and isolation.
Employers must be held
accountable for reporting suspicious behaviour while also ensuring fair
treatment of their workers.
Integration efforts that respect
cultural diversity while promoting civic responsibility can help migrants build
a positive connection with Malaysia, rather than viewing it as a mere launching
pad for external ideological battles.
Digital surveillance and content
moderation must also be prioritised. Many radicalisation pathways now begin
online, where charismatic recruiters, propaganda videos, and religious
misinformation flourish.
Malaysia must enhance its cyber
capabilities to monitor jihadist communication, both in English and in
languages like Bengali and Urdu.
Platforms promoting hate speech
and incitement must be taken down swiftly, and radical content creators
prosecuted under existing security laws.
Finally, legislative tools such
as the Security Offences (Special Measures) Act (SOSMA) and the Prevention of
Terrorism Act (POTA) must be refined not weakened to allow swift intervention
while safeguarding civil liberties.
Preventive detention, if
justified by credible intelligence, remains a necessary measure for
neutralising threats before they become active plots.
The presence of radicalised
migrants on Malaysian soil is not merely a foreign policy concern—it is a
direct challenge to national security.
The ideological spillover from
homeland conflicts and transnational jihadist agendas threatens to exploit
Malaysia’s racial and religious sensitivities.
The trend, if left unchecked,
could see a fusion of imported terrorism and domestic radicalism, turning the
country into both a sanctuary and a launchpad for extremist operations.
Malaysia’s response must be
layered: combining smart intelligence, hardened borders, integrated
enforcement, and community-level prevention.
Only with this holistic approach
can the nation shield itself from becoming the next battleground in the global
jihadist playbook.
Kuala Lumpur.
28.06.2025
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