Orientalism and Power Politics in Global Rivalries

The enduring relevance of Edward Said’s Orientalism lies in its central claim: the “West” constructs the “Orient” as irrational, unstable, and in need of control. This discourse is not merely cultural; it legitimizes geopolitical strategies, economic containment, and military intervention.

Today, Said’s framework helps explain three major tensions shaping world politics: the confrontation involving Iran, Israel, and the United States; the U.S.–China trade war; and Washington’s strategic anxiety over the rise of India. In each case, Orientalist narratives shape perceptions, justify policy, and influence global alignments.

First, the Iran–Israel–U.S. confrontation reflects a classic Orientalist logic. Iran is frequently portrayed in Western political discourse as ideologically irrational, inherently aggressive, and incapable of responsible state behaviour.

Such framing reduces complex domestic politics, regional rivalries, and security calculations into a civilizational narrative: a “radical” East threatening a “democratic” West. This representation helps legitimize sanctions, diplomatic isolation, and military posturing.

Yet, from a strategic perspective, Iran’s behaviour: support for proxies, missile development, and deterrence strategies can also be interpreted as rational responses to encirclement, regime insecurity, and historical intervention.

The Orientalist lens becomes more evident when comparing how different actors are judged. Israel’s security doctrine, including pre-emptive strikes and deterrence, is framed as defensive and rational. Similar actions by Iran are described as destabilizing and extremist.

Said argued that Orientalism produces this asymmetry: Western-aligned actors are treated as rational subjects, while non-aligned Eastern actors are cast as irrational objects. The consequence is a policy environment where escalation becomes easier to justify.

Military confrontation is not simply strategic; it is narrated as a necessary defence of civilization against chaos. This discourse reduces diplomatic space and entrenches zero-sum thinking.

Second, the U.S.–China trade war illustrates how Orientalism adapts to economic competition. China is often described in Western policy debates as opaque, authoritarian, and unfair: an economic actor that cannot play by “rules-based” norms.

While some concerns about state subsidies, intellectual property, and industrial policy are legitimate, the rhetoric frequently shifts from economic critique to civilizational suspicion. China’s technological rise is portrayed not only as competition but as a systemic threat. The narrative echoes Orientalist assumptions that non-Western modernization is inherently dangerous or deceptive.

This framing justifies tariffs, export controls, and technological containment, particularly in semiconductors, AI, and telecommunications. The conflict becomes less about trade imbalances and more about preserving Western dominance.

Said’s insight is clear here: Orientalism sustains power hierarchies by presenting Western leadership as natural and Eastern advancement as disruptive. China’s Belt and Road Initiative, for instance, is often depicted solely as coercive expansion, while similar Western-led economic influence historically has been normalized as development assistance. The discursive asymmetry reinforces strategic competition and deepens geopolitical fragmentation.

Third, the U.S. response to India’s rise presents a more complex variation of Orientalism. India is not framed as a threat in the same way as China, but rather as a “manageable” rising power that can be integrated into Western strategic frameworks. This reflects selective inclusion within the Orientalist hierarchy.

India is encouraged as a counterweight to China, yet scepticism remains about its strategic autonomy, economic nationalism, and independent diplomacy. When India pursues non-alignment; buying Russian energy, maintaining ties with Iran, or resisting Western pressure, it is often criticized as unreliable.

This reveals another dimension of Orientalism: acceptance is conditional. Non-Western powers are welcomed when aligned with Western interests but questioned when acting independently. India’s rise challenges traditional hierarchies, yet the discourse attempts to shape it into a partner rather than an equal pole.

Said’s theory helps explain how narratives of “shared democracy” coexist with unease about India’s sovereign decision-making. The result is a balancing act: cooperation combined with subtle pressure to conform.

Across these three cases, Orientalism operates not as overt cultural prejudice but as a strategic narrative. It constructs hierarchies of rationality, legitimacy, and acceptable power. States aligned with Western interests are portrayed as responsible actors; those outside the framework are depicted as destabilizing.

Economic competition becomes ideological confrontation. Military deterrence becomes civilizational defence. The persistence of these narratives influences public opinion, diplomatic options, and alliance formation.

For Malaysia, the lesson is critical. As a middle power in Southeast Asia, Malaysia must avoid internalizing binary narratives of West versus East. Strategic autonomy requires recognizing how great-power discourse shapes policy choices.

Malaysia should resist being drawn into ideological camps, whether in U.S.–China competition or Middle Eastern alignments. Instead, it should emphasize multilateralism, non-alignment, and pragmatic engagement. Blindly adopting Western security narratives risks undermining regional stability and ASEAN centrality.

Malaysia must also be cautious about economic alignment. The U.S.–China trade rivalry pressures smaller states to decouple supply chains or adopt restrictive policies. A Said-inspired perspective suggests evaluating interests independently rather than accepting narratives of “trusted” versus “untrusted” partners. Malaysia benefits from diversified economic relations, technological cooperation with multiple partners, and avoiding securitization of trade.

Finally, Malaysia should invest in intellectual independence. Orientalism operates through knowledge production: media framing, policy analysis, and academic discourse. Developing local perspectives on global conflicts helps prevent external narratives from dominating policy thinking. Malaysia’s diplomacy has historically emphasized neutrality and dialogue; maintaining this tradition is essential in an era of intensifying great-power rivalry.

Edward Said’s insight remains powerful: global conflicts are not only struggles over territory or trade but also contests over representation. The Iran–Israel–U.S. confrontation, the U.S.–China trade war, and the management of India’s rise all reveal how narratives shape power. Recognizing these dynamics allows smaller states like Malaysia to navigate geopolitical competition with caution, autonomy, and strategic clarity.

06.04.2026

Kuala Lumpur.

© All rights reserved.