The Indo-Pacific Conflict: Can ASEAN Preserve Regional Peace?
The Indo-Pacific is increasingly
becoming a strategic theatre where military competition, geopolitical rivalry
and competing security interests are converging.
The question is no longer whether
the region will experience greater strategic confrontation, but whether
regional institutions, particularly the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN), possess the diplomatic capacity and political determination to prevent
competition between major powers from escalating into armed conflict.
The conclusion of Exercise
Malabar 2026, involving India, the United States, Japan and Australia, deserves
particular attention. Conducted in Yokosuka, Japan, from November 5 to 12, the
annual multilateral naval exercise brought together four countries whose
strategic interests increasingly converge around maritime security and
maintaining a favourable balance of power in the Indo-Pacific.
According to India's Ministry of
Defence (2026), the exercise involved anti-submarine warfare, maritime
interdiction, gunnery exercises, replenishment operations and cross-deck
landings. These activities demonstrate growing interoperability and operational
coordination among the participating navies. More importantly, they reflect the
increasing sophistication of maritime cooperation among countries concerned
about regional security.
Nevertheless, military
interoperability should not automatically be interpreted as preparation for
war. Maritime exercises can strengthen deterrence, improve operational
readiness and protect freedom of navigation.
However, when viewed against
intensifying US-China strategic competition, Taiwan Strait tensions and
continuing disputes in the South China Sea, their broader geopolitical
implications cannot be ignored.
The Indo-Pacific is therefore
facing a strategic dilemma: military cooperation intended to preserve stability
could also contribute to a security environment in which competing powers
become increasingly suspicious of one another.
The Indo-Pacific's emerging
strategic fault lines
The danger is that the
Indo-Pacific could become a theatre of confrontation involving several
interconnected flashpoints. Taiwan remains particularly sensitive because any
military confrontation across the Taiwan Strait would have consequences
extending far beyond China and Taiwan.
The United States could become
directly involved, while Japan's geographical proximity and security
commitments would make it difficult to remain detached. Australia, meanwhile,
would face considerable strategic pressure as a security partner of Washington.
For Southeast Asia, the
consequences would be immediate. The South China Sea, the Strait of Malacca and
surrounding maritime routes are indispensable to international commerce, energy
transportation and global supply chains. A regional conflict could disrupt
shipping, increase insurance premiums, undermine investor confidence and expose
ASEAN economies to severe economic shocks.
The Lowy Institute's Hunter
Marston (2026), in Can ASEAN Agree on a Playbook for Indo-Pacific Security?,
highlights a fundamental weakness in ASEAN's existing security architecture.
Although the organisation
possesses numerous institutions for crisis management, insufficient
coordination, political trust and preparedness undermine its capacity to
respond effectively.
A Taiwan contingency would be
especially challenging, including the protection and evacuation of
approximately one million ASEAN nationals living there.
This assessment deserves serious
attention. ASEAN cannot assume that diplomatic declarations and summit
communiqués will be sufficient when a major military crisis develops. The
organisation must prepare for contingencies before they materialise.
The question is therefore not
whether the Indo-Pacific will become the next theatre of geopolitical
confrontation, but whether its countries can prevent strategic competition from
developing into an uncontrollable military crisis.
ASEAN's strategic autonomy
must be protected
ASEAN's greatest diplomatic
advantage is its ability to maintain relationships with competing powers
without becoming formally aligned with either side. However, strategic autonomy
must not be confused with political indecisiveness or passive neutrality.
The ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute's
State of Southeast Asia 2026 Survey Report provides an important
indication of regional sentiment. Some 55.2 per cent of respondents favoured
strengthening ASEAN's resilience and unity to withstand pressure from the
United States and China. Another 24.1 per cent supported maintaining a position
of not siding with either power. Only 6.3 per cent believed ASEAN should choose
between the two (Lin et al., 2026).
These findings demonstrate that
Southeast Asian countries do not want their economic prosperity and national
security sacrificed to competing geopolitical ambitions.
China remains an indispensable
economic partner for ASEAN, while the United States continues to play an
important role in regional security, investment and technological development.
Japan, India, Australia, South Korea and the European Union also contribute to
the region's strategic and economic environment.
Consequently, ASEAN should pursue
an inclusive Indo-Pacific architecture rather than an exclusively military or
ideological framework. Its diplomatic position must be grounded in
international law, sovereignty, peaceful dispute settlement and freedom of navigation.
This approach is consistent with
the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP), which emphasises ASEAN
centrality, inclusiveness, dialogue and cooperation rather than geopolitical
confrontation.
However, ASEAN's credibility will
ultimately depend on whether its members can translate these principles into
practical collective action.
Malaysia must become a
diplomatic stabiliser
For Malaysia, the emerging
geopolitical environment presents both a challenge and an opportunity. Its
geographical position, economic relationships and diplomatic connections place
it in a strategically important position between the Indian Ocean and the
Pacific.
Prime Minister Datuk Seri Anwar
Ibrahim's participation in the 49th ASEAN Summit in Manila, from November 15 to
17, provides an important diplomatic opportunity. According to Malay Mail
(2026), his engagements include discussions with ASEAN leaders and dialogue
partners, including China, the United States and the United Nations.
Malaysia's participation should
be directed towards strengthening regional security cooperation and preventing
major-power rivalry from undermining ASEAN unity.
Malaysia must avoid allowing its
foreign policy to become excessively dependent on any single geopolitical
partner. Its relationships with China, the United States, India, Japan and
Australia should be maintained through constructive engagement and clearly
defined national interests.
At the same time, Malaysia must
recognise that neutrality without credible national defence capabilities can
become strategic vulnerability.
The government should therefore
strengthen maritime surveillance, naval modernisation, intelligence-sharing,
cybersecurity and protection of critical infrastructure. Attention must be
given to the South China Sea, where Malaysia has legitimate maritime interests
and sovereign rights under international law.
Malaysia should also strengthen
cooperation with Indonesia, Singapore, Brunei, the Philippines and Vietnam on
maritime domain awareness, search and rescue, intelligence exchange and
mechanisms for preventing accidental military escalation.
The objective should not be to
establish another military alliance, but to ensure that Southeast Asian
countries possess sufficient collective capacity to protect their interests
independently.
Preventing the militarisation
of the Indo-Pacific
ASEAN must move beyond diplomatic
symbolism and develop practical mechanisms to prevent military confrontation.
Three initiatives deserve immediate attention.
First, ASEAN should establish a
regional maritime crisis-management mechanism involving naval commanders, coast
guards and foreign ministries. Direct communication channels and agreed
protocols for unplanned encounters at sea would reduce the possibility of
miscalculation. The existing Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES) should
be strengthened through wider regional implementation.
The CUES is a non‑binding
2014 multilateral agreement adopted by 21 Western Pacific Naval Symposium
(WPNS) nations to standardize safety, communication, and manoeuvring protocols
during unexpected naval encounters.
Second, ASEAN must accelerate
negotiations towards an effective and substantive Code of Conduct (COC) in the
South China Sea. The agreement should contain practical dispute-management
provisions, mechanisms for incident reporting and commitments to avoid coercive
activities. It must be consistent with the United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea (UNCLOS).
Third, ASEAN should develop
contingency arrangements for a Taiwan Strait crisis, including civilian
evacuation, humanitarian assistance, maritime security and protection of
essential supply chains. The Lowy Institute (Marston, 2026) rightly identifies
the absence of coordinated evacuation arrangements as a serious institutional
weakness.
These initiatives should also
involve external partners through ASEAN-led platforms, particularly the ASEAN
Regional Forum, East Asia Summit and ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting-Plus
(ADMM-Plus).
Importantly, ASEAN should not
discourage military exercises such as Malabar. Instead, it should encourage
transparency, communication and confidence-building measures among all regional
military powers. Exercises involving the United States, Japan, Australia and
India should coexist with meaningful security dialogue involving China and
other regional countries.
The objective must be to prevent
military preparedness from becoming an instrument of unnecessary provocation.
The danger of strategic
miscalculation
One of the greatest dangers in
the Indo-Pacific is not necessarily a deliberate decision by a major power to
initiate war, but an unintended escalation arising from military encounters,
intelligence failures or political miscalculations.
The historical experience of the
Cold War demonstrates how competing military alliances, arms competition and
ideological hostility can create an environment in which individual incidents
threaten international stability.
Today, the Indo-Pacific faces a
more complicated environment because economic interdependence exists alongside
military competition. China and the United States remain deeply connected
through international trade, technology and investment, while regional
economies depend on uninterrupted maritime commerce.
The ISEAS survey demonstrates
that Southeast Asia recognises the risks of being caught between competing
powers (Lin et al., 2026). Malaysia and other ASEAN members must therefore
resist external pressure to transform the region into competing geopolitical
camps.
ASEAN also needs greater
institutional resilience. Its consensus-based decision-making process remains
valuable, but it should not become an excuse for inaction. Where unanimous
agreement is impossible, willing member states should be encouraged to advance
practical cooperation without undermining ASEAN's collective framework.
Preserving peace must become
ASEAN's priority
The strategic significance of
Malabar 2026 extends beyond naval interoperability. It illustrates how the
Indo-Pacific's security environment is evolving towards greater military
coordination among major maritime powers.
Nevertheless, the future of the
region should not be determined exclusively by naval capabilities, military
alliances or the strategic calculations of Washington and Beijing.
Malaysia and ASEAN must establish
themselves as active architects of regional stability rather than passive
observers of major-power competition.
The central lesson is
straightforward: ASEAN cannot prevent every geopolitical rivalry, but it can
reduce the likelihood that rivalry develops into armed confrontation. This
requires stronger institutions, credible defence capabilities, economic
resilience, diplomatic engagement and an unwavering commitment to international
law.
If the Indo-Pacific becomes
another theatre of superpower confrontation, the consequences will extend far
beyond the countries directly involved. Southeast Asia could become one of the
greatest casualties of a conflict it neither initiated nor desired.
The challenge facing Anwar
Ibrahim and other ASEAN leaders is therefore not simply to maintain diplomatic
relationships with competing powers. It is to ensure that the Indo-Pacific
remains a region of cooperation, commerce and peaceful coexistence.
ASEAN must not allow the
Indo-Pacific to become another battlefield for superpower ambitions. Its
strategic future must be defined by regional cooperation, not geopolitical
confrontation.
References
Indian Ministry of Defence. (2026, November 5). Indian
naval ship Sahyadri arrives at Yokosuka Naval Base, Japan for Exercise Malabar
2026. Press Information Bureau. https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=2333046
Indian Ministry of Defence. (2026, November 13). INS
Sahyadri concludes visit to Yokosuka following Malabar 2026. Press
Information Bureau. https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleseDetailm.aspx?PRID=2335989®=48&lang=2
Lin, J., Martinus, M., Fong, K., Thao, P. T. P., Aridati, I.
Z., & Gauri, S. (2026). The state of Southeast Asia: 2026 survey report.
ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute. https://www.iseas.edu.sg/frontpage-featured/the-state-of-southeast-asia-2026-survey-report/
Marston, H. (2026, September 30). Can ASEAN agree on a
playbook for Indo-Pacific security? Lowy Institute. https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/can-asean-agree-on-a-playbook-for-indo-pacific-security
Malay Mail. (2026, November 14). Anwar lands in Manila
for Asean summit before brief dash back to meet Macron. https://www.malaymail.com/news/malaysia/2026/11/14/anwar-lands-in-manila-for-asean-summit-before-brief-dash-back-to-meet-macron/243286
Rajesh, G. K., & Deshpande, M. (2025). Hedging with the
Indo-Pacific: Why Southeast Asia might benefit from embracing the construct. The
Round Table, 114(4), 463–475. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00358533.2025.2511000
Tan, E. R. L., & Fook, L. L. (2025). Assessing China's
call for "strategic autonomy" in Southeast Asia: Origins, objectives
and outcomes. ISEAS Perspective, 2025(22). ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute. https://www.iseas.edu.sg/articles-commentaries/iseas-perspective/2025-22-assessing-chinas-call-for-strategic-autonomy-in-southeast-asia-origins-objectives-and-outcomes-by-eugene-r-l-tan-lye-liang-fook
14.11.2026
Kuala Lumpur.
© All rights reserved
Comments