A Court Must Protect Those Without Capacity

 

The Melaka High Court has made an important and, in my view, entirely correct decision in refusing to immediately record a proposed RM1.7 million settlement involving a permanently disabled road accident victim. Judicial Commissioner K Raja Segaran’s decision is significant because it demonstrates that a court is not merely a passive institution for rubber-stamping agreements reached between litigants and their lawyers.

According to Free Malaysia Today’s report, the accident victim, Sultan Nur Mohamad, suffered severe traumatic brain injuries and permanent disabilities following a motorcycle collision on March 2, 2024. He subsequently pursued his claim through his wife, Sharifah Nizamuddin, as his litigation representative.

The Sessions Court had found the motorcycle rider wholly liable and the registered owner vicariously liable, awarding Sultan RM1.87 million in damages, interest and costs. While an appeal was pending, the parties agreed to settle for RM1.7 million, together with RM170,000 in costs.

The High Court, however, declined simply to record the consent judgment. That was the right approach.

The crucial point is that this was not an ordinary settlement between parties of equal legal capacity. Sultan was unable to manage his own affairs. Consequently, the court had a protective jurisdiction.

Order 76 rule 10 of the Rules of Court 2012 provides that a settlement or compromise involving a person under disability is not valid without court approval. Order 22B rule 7 reinforces the principle by providing that an acceptance of an offer to settle by a person under disability is not binding until approval is obtained under Order 76 rule 10.

This distinction is fundamental. The consent of a litigation representative is necessary, but it cannot replace the independent judgment of the court.

As reported by FMT, Raja Segaran stated that “the consent of the litigation representative is a necessary condition of a compromise on the patient’s behalf” but “it is not a sufficient one”. He further emphasised that “the court is not a registry of agreements”.

Those observations go to the heart of the rule of law.

The Constitution and protection of the individual

Part II of the Federal Constitution establishes Malaysia’s fundamental liberties, including liberty of the person under Article 5, equality under Article 8 and property rights under Article 13.

It would, however, be incorrect to suggest that the Judicial Commissioner decided the settlement issue directly under these constitutional provisions. The immediate legal foundation of his decision was the Rules of Court 2012, particularly Order 76 rule 10. The constitutional significance is instead broader.

The constitutional commitment to liberty, equality and protection of individual interests provides an important normative context for a legal system in which vulnerable persons are not left entirely dependent upon the decisions of representatives.

Article 8's conception of equality is particularly relevant in a broader sense: formal equality before the law does not mean treating a person who lacks capacity as though he possesses the same ability to protect his interests as a fully capable litigant.

The court's intervention therefore represents substantive protection rather than preferential treatment.

Dicey's rule of law in practice

The decision also illustrates A V Dicey's classic conception of the rule of law.

Dicey's first proposition was the absence of arbitrary power. Public authority must operate according to law rather than personal discretion. His second proposition emphasised equality before the ordinary law and the jurisdiction of ordinary courts. His third proposition linked constitutional principles to judicially recognised legal rights.

Raja Segaran's approach reflects the first two propositions particularly strongly. His discretion was not arbitrary because it was exercised within an express procedural framework. He did not invent a new requirement simply because he personally considered the settlement inadequate. Instead, he insisted upon compliance with a rule that Parliament's delegated rule-making process had already placed within the Rules of Court.

This is an important distinction. Judicial discretion does not mean judicial freedom from legal constraints. A judge exercises discretion within law.

The common-law tradition expressed in Entick v Carrington [1765] similarly demonstrates that legal authority must be found in law rather than assumed from convenience or established practice. In the present case, the High Court's authority to scrutinise the settlement flowed from the Rules of Court, not from an unfettered judicial power.

Was there possible misuse?

The facts reported by FMT should not be interpreted as establishing that Sultan, his wife or his lawyers misused the judicial process. There is no sufficient basis to make such an allegation.

Nevertheless, the court was correct to identify circumstances requiring explanation.

The proposed RM170,000 costs were particularly noteworthy because the Sessions Court had previously awarded RM40,608. FMT reported that the Judicial Commissioner required the solicitors to explain how the substantially larger figure had been calculated. The draft consent judgment also contained inconsistencies concerning withdrawal of the appeal, payment deadlines, enforcement and the treatment of the Sessions Court judgment.

These are precisely the circumstances in which judicial scrutiny becomes necessary.

A settlement of RM1.7 million may ultimately be entirely reasonable. But the question is not simply whether RM1.7 million sounds substantial. The court must ask whether it adequately reflects the victim's injuries, future medical and care requirements, litigation risks, the prospects of the appeal and the financial arrangements for protecting the compensation.

The larger issue is therefore not whether the settlement is high or low. It is whether it is fair and, in the victim’s, best interests.

Statutory interpretation and the protective jurisdiction

Raja Segaran's approach also demonstrates an important feature of common-law statutory and procedural interpretation: rules should be interpreted according to their purpose rather than reduced to mechanical formalities.

If Order 76 rule 10 merely required a judge to ask whether a litigation representative had signed an agreement, the protective purpose of the rule would be seriously weakened. The requirement of “court approval” necessarily implies an independent judicial assessment.

The judge therefore correctly distinguished between representation and approval.

The appointment of Sharifah as litigation representative did not give her unlimited authority to bind Sultan to every future settlement. Nor did the earlier Sessions Court judgment automatically constitute approval of a subsequent compromise reached during an appeal. FMT reports that the Judicial Commissioner expressly rejected both propositions.

That interpretation gives practical meaning to Order 76 rather than rendering its approval requirement almost meaningless.

A principle recognised across common-law jurisdictions

Malaysia is not alone in adopting this protective approach.

Singapore's rules similarly require court approval for settlements involving persons under disability. Singapore's Public Trustee guidance specifically states that settlements involving such persons in motor accident proceedings require court approval and that compensation recovered must be dealt with according to directions of the court.

The English position is even more instructive. Under CPR 21.10 [refers to Rule 21.10 of the Civil Procedure Rules (England and Wales)], a settlement involving a child or protected party requires court approval. The rule requires supporting material including medical evidence, details of the accident and losses, and, where appropriate, legal opinion concerning the merits of the settlement.

In Dunhill v Burgin [2014] UKSC 18, the UK Supreme Court confronted a strikingly similar problem involving a severely injured road accident victim. A settlement of only £12,500 had been embodied in a consent order even though the claimant's case was subsequently assessed as potentially worth hundreds of thousands or more. The Supreme Court held that the consent order did not itself constitute the required judicial approval and described the purpose of the rule as providing an “external check” on the propriety of the settlement.

That principle resonates strongly with the Melaka decision.

More recently, the English High Court in GJC v Walker [2024] EWHC 182 (KB) reiterated that approval of a protected-party settlement requires the court to consider the best interests of the protected person.

Judicial independence is protection, not obstruction

The Melaka ruling should therefore not be viewed as judicial interference with private settlement.

It is precisely because settlements are encouraged that safeguards are necessary when one party cannot protect himself.

The parties remain free to settle. Indeed, FMT reported that Raja Segaran stressed that the appellants' agreement remained binding while approval was pending. If the court approves the settlement, the consent order can be perfected. If approval is refused, the appeal continues.

That is not judicial obstruction. It is judicial responsibility.

The significance of Raja Segaran's decision extends beyond this RM1.7 million claim. It reminds litigants, lawyers and representatives that a court order carries constitutional and institutional weight. A judge is not a rubber stamp for private bargains.

Where an accident has left a victim permanently disabled and incapable of protecting his own interests, the court must become the final safeguard against an inadequate, unexplained or poorly structured settlement.

In that sense, the Judicial Commissioner's decision represents the rule of law at its most practical: the law protects not only those who can speak for themselves, but also those who can no longer do so.

References

Dicey, A. V. (1885). Introduction to the study of the law of the constitution. Macmillan.

Federal Constitution of Malaysia. (1957). Part II—Fundamental liberties.

Free Malaysia Today. (2026, September 14). Judge refuses to record RM1.7mil road accident settlement. V. Anbalagan.

Dunhill v Burgin [2014] UKSC 18 (UK Supreme Court).

GJC v Walker [2024] EWHC 182 (KB) (High Court of Justice, King's Bench Division).

Justice.gov.uk. (2026). Civil Procedure Rules, Part 21: Children and protected parties.

Malaysian Bar. (2012). Rules of Court 2012.

Ministry of Law, Singapore. (2024). Public Trustee: Cases involving persons under disability.

Entick v Carrington (1765) 19 St Tr 1029; 95 ER 807.

15.09.2026

Kuala Lumpur.

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