Making Malaysia’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy Work – Part 2
Malaysia does not need to
replicate India’s counter-terrorism institutions to learn from its experience.
The introduction of PRAHAAR, India’s National Counter-Terrorism Policy and
Strategy, instead raises a more practical question: how can Malaysia strengthen
the implementation of its own security framework?
The Malaysia Action Plan on Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (MyPCVE) 2024–2028 already provides a national framework built around four pillars: prevention, enforcement, rehabilitation and reinforcement.
It recognises that violent extremism requires
coordinated action by government agencies, civil society and other
stakeholders. The priority now should be to ensure these pillars produce
measurable results.
Five policy measures could
strengthen implementation.
First, Malaysia should conduct a
whole-of-government coordination audit. The Royal Malaysia Police, intelligence
authorities, Bank Negara Malaysia, the National Anti-Financial Crime Centre,
immigration authorities and relevant cybersecurity agencies have different
responsibilities, but their work can intersect in complex investigations.
The government should assess how
quickly relevant information is shared, whether agencies have clear
responsibilities and where investigative delays occur. Common operating
procedures, secure information-sharing protocols and joint threat assessments
could improve coordination. New institutions should be considered only where an
assessment demonstrates a genuine need.
Second, Malaysia should review
its counter-terrorism legislation without assuming that stronger laws
necessarily produce better outcomes. The Penal Code, the Security Offences
(Special Measures) Act 2012 and the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2015 should be
assessed for legal clarity, operational effectiveness, overlap and safeguards.
Any proposed amendments should
address demonstrated shortcomings rather than respond reflexively to individual
incidents. Parliamentary scrutiny, judicial oversight and access to legal
remedies must remain meaningful. Security measures should target demonstrable
threats while protecting lawful political expression and religious activity.
Third, Malaysia should strengthen
its capacity to disrupt terrorist financing and digital networks. Terrorist
operations require resources, communications, recruitment and logistical
support. Investigators must be able to trace suspicious transactions, examine
cross-border transfers and preserve digital evidence within clear legal
boundaries.
Financial institutions, regulators and enforcement agencies should cooperate more effectively in identifying transactions that warrant investigation. Particular attention should be given to links between terrorist financing, money laundering and organised crime.
Digital investigations should also address online recruitment
and extremist propaganda without treating ordinary political discussion or
religious activity as evidence of criminal conduct.
Fourth, MyPCVE’s prevention and
rehabilitation pillars should be supported by measurable performance
indicators. Prevention should include appropriate early interventions, public
awareness and cooperation with credible community organisations. Rehabilitation
should address disengagement from violent extremism, personal development and
reintegration following detention.
Educators, psychologists, social
workers and relevant enforcement agencies can contribute complementary
expertise. Programmes should be evaluated through indicators such as successful
reintegration, sustained participation in support services and reduced
reoffending where reliable data are available. Evaluation must also consider
unintended consequences, including community stigmatisation.
MyPCVE’s fourth pillar, reinforcement, deserves particular attention. It focuses on strengthening identity and character through education and socialisation, especially during childhood and youth.
Properly implemented, this pillar can complement prevention
by promoting social resilience and respect for Malaysia’s diverse communities.
It should not become a mechanism for labelling lawful differences in political,
cultural or religious opinion as extremism.
Fifth, Malaysia should
institutionalise independent evaluation and public accountability. An annual
assessment could report, subject to legitimate security restrictions, on threat
trends, prosecutions, financial investigations, prevention initiatives and
rehabilitation outcomes. Relevant parliamentary scrutiny should examine whether
public resources are being used effectively and whether shortcomings are being
addressed.
Implementation should proceed in
phases. The first stage should review existing laws, institutions, programmes
and coordination procedures. The second should establish common protocols,
specialised training and measurable indicators aligned with MyPCVE’s four
pillars. Subsequent reviews should identify weaknesses, assign responsibility
for corrective action and publish progress where appropriate.
Regional cooperation must
complement domestic reforms. Terrorist financing, online recruitment and
digital evidence can cross national boundaries rapidly. Malaysia should
strengthen information-sharing, mutual legal assistance and cooperation with
regional partners while ensuring investigations comply with applicable legal
safeguards.
India’s PRAHAAR offers useful strategic lessons, but Malaysia should judge its own progress against the objectives of MyPCVE rather than the number of laws enacted, arrests made or programmes announced.
More meaningful indicators include timely identification
of credible threats, disruption of supporting networks, fair prosecutions and
demonstrable progress in prevention and rehabilitation.
Ultimately, MyPCVE provides Malaysia with an existing foundation. The task is to connect its four pillars through effective coordination, transparent evaluation and accountable enforcement. National security and the rule of law should reinforce each other.
A strategy that prevents violence while sustaining public trust is more likely
to remain effective over the long term.
References
Government of India. (2023). The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita,
2023 (Act No. 45 of 2023). India Code. https://indiacode.gov.in/items/4bb3e636-ed67-4731-8fb1-7ebfd83e1584
Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India. (2026).
National counter-terrorism policy and strategy (PRAHAAR). https://www.mea.gov.in/images/pdf/PRAHAAREnglish_23022026.pdf
Ministry of Home Affairs, Malaysia. (n.d.). Malaysia action
plan on preventing and countering violent extremism (MyPCVE) 2024–2028. https://www.moha.gov.my/utama/images/laporan/MALAYSIA_ACTION_PLAN_ON_PREVENTING_AND_COUNTERING_VIOLENT_EXTREMISM_2024_2028.pdf
18.10.2026
Kuala Lumpur.
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