India’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy: Lessons for Malaysia – Part 1

 

Counter-terrorism requires more than strong legislation and arrests. It demands intelligence coordination, effective institutions, public cooperation and safeguards against the misuse of state power. 

India’s evolving approach offers Malaysia an opportunity to examine these priorities, particularly following the introduction of PRAHAAR, India’s National Counter-Terrorism Policy and Strategy, in February 2026.

PRAHAAR establishes a framework built around seven pillars: preventing attacks, responding proportionately, coordinating government capabilities, upholding human rights and the rule of law, addressing conditions conducive to terrorism, strengthening international cooperation, and building societal resilience. 

Its relevance to Malaysia lies not in copying Indian institutions, but in assessing whether existing Malaysian arrangements translate national policy into effective outcomes.

Malaysia already has its own framework. The Malaysia Action Plan on Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism, known as MyPCVE, covers 2024–2028. 

Launched in September 2024, it seeks to coordinate efforts against violent extremist ideologies through four pillars: prevention, enforcement, rehabilitation and reinforcement.

These pillars address different but complementary objectives. Prevention promotes awareness and collaboration to reduce vulnerability to extremist ideologies. Enforcement focuses on law enforcement, legal improvements and legal awareness. 

Rehabilitation emphasises engagement, lifelong learning, sustainability and assessment. Reinforcement supports education, family and community development, religious and moral values, coordinated communication and foreign relations.

MyPCVE recognises that violent extremism cannot be addressed through security operations alone. PRAHAAR therefore offers a comparative framework for evaluating implementation, rather than evidence that Malaysia needs an entirely new national strategy.

India’s experience has been shaped by major security incidents, including the 2001 Parliament attack and the 2008 Mumbai attacks. These incidents highlighted the importance of intelligence-sharing, emergency preparedness, coordinated responses and infrastructure protection. They also demonstrate why security failures should generate institutional learning rather than temporary reactions.

Malaysia should draw a practical lesson from this experience. Intelligence concerning recruitment, suspicious financial transactions and cross-border networks must reach relevant agencies promptly. 

Police, intelligence authorities, financial regulators, immigration officials and cybersecurity specialists need clear procedures for sharing information and coordinating investigations. The priority should be to identify operational gaps rather than create additional bureaucracy.

The legal comparison is equally instructive. Malaysia’s Penal Code was historically derived from the Indian Penal Code of 1860, although both jurisdictions have since developed distinct legal systems. India replaced its original Penal Code with the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita 2023, which came into force on 1 July 2024. Section 113 addresses terrorist acts, while the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act 1967 remains its principal specialised counter-terrorism statute.

Malaysia’s framework includes terrorism-related provisions in the Penal Code, the Security Offences (Special Measures) Act 2012 (SOSMA) and the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2015 (POTA). 

These instruments serve different purposes, covering criminal offences, special investigative and procedural measures, and preventive arrangements. Their effectiveness must be assessed within Malaysia’s constitutional and institutional framework.

India’s approach also highlights the need to disrupt the wider infrastructure sustaining terrorism. Investigations must extend beyond direct perpetrators to financiers, recruiters and logistical facilitators. Malaysia should strengthen links between terrorist-financing investigations, money-laundering enforcement, organised-crime investigations and digital evidence analysis.

However, tougher laws do not automatically produce greater security. Judicial oversight, access to legal representation and meaningful remedies are important safeguards against abuses. Lawful political dissent, religious expression and peaceful community participation must not be confused with involvement in terrorism.

The central lesson is that Malaysia should evaluate how effectively its existing laws and MyPCVE initiatives operate together. PRAHAAR provides useful strategic principles, but the next challenge is to improve coordination, measure outcomes and ensure security measures remain accountable. Effective counter-terrorism depends on preventing violence while preserving the rule of law and public confidence.

18.10.2026

Kuala Lumpur.

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