India’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy: Lessons for Malaysia – Part 1
Counter-terrorism requires more than strong legislation and arrests. It demands intelligence coordination, effective institutions, public cooperation and safeguards against the misuse of state power.
India’s evolving approach offers Malaysia an opportunity to
examine these priorities, particularly following the introduction of PRAHAAR,
India’s National Counter-Terrorism Policy and Strategy, in February 2026.
PRAHAAR establishes a framework built around seven pillars: preventing attacks, responding proportionately, coordinating government capabilities, upholding human rights and the rule of law, addressing conditions conducive to terrorism, strengthening international cooperation, and building societal resilience.
Its relevance to Malaysia lies not in copying
Indian institutions, but in assessing whether existing Malaysian arrangements
translate national policy into effective outcomes.
Malaysia already has its own framework. The Malaysia Action Plan on Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism, known as MyPCVE, covers 2024–2028.
Launched in September 2024, it
seeks to coordinate efforts against violent extremist ideologies through four
pillars: prevention, enforcement, rehabilitation and reinforcement.
These pillars address different but complementary objectives. Prevention promotes awareness and collaboration to reduce vulnerability to extremist ideologies. Enforcement focuses on law enforcement, legal improvements and legal awareness.
Rehabilitation emphasises
engagement, lifelong learning, sustainability and assessment. Reinforcement
supports education, family and community development, religious and moral
values, coordinated communication and foreign relations.
MyPCVE recognises that violent
extremism cannot be addressed through security operations alone. PRAHAAR
therefore offers a comparative framework for evaluating implementation, rather
than evidence that Malaysia needs an entirely new national strategy.
India’s experience has been
shaped by major security incidents, including the 2001 Parliament attack and
the 2008 Mumbai attacks. These incidents highlighted the importance of
intelligence-sharing, emergency preparedness, coordinated responses and infrastructure
protection. They also demonstrate why security failures should generate
institutional learning rather than temporary reactions.
Malaysia should draw a practical lesson from this experience. Intelligence concerning recruitment, suspicious financial transactions and cross-border networks must reach relevant agencies promptly.
Police, intelligence authorities, financial regulators, immigration
officials and cybersecurity specialists need clear procedures for sharing
information and coordinating investigations. The priority should be to identify
operational gaps rather than create additional bureaucracy.
The legal comparison is equally
instructive. Malaysia’s Penal Code was historically derived from the Indian
Penal Code of 1860, although both jurisdictions have since developed distinct
legal systems. India replaced its original Penal Code with the Bharatiya Nyaya
Sanhita 2023, which came into force on 1 July 2024. Section 113 addresses
terrorist acts, while the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act 1967 remains its
principal specialised counter-terrorism statute.
Malaysia’s framework includes terrorism-related provisions in the Penal Code, the Security Offences (Special Measures) Act 2012 (SOSMA) and the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2015 (POTA).
These instruments serve different purposes, covering criminal offences, special
investigative and procedural measures, and preventive arrangements. Their
effectiveness must be assessed within Malaysia’s constitutional and
institutional framework.
India’s approach also highlights
the need to disrupt the wider infrastructure sustaining terrorism.
Investigations must extend beyond direct perpetrators to financiers, recruiters
and logistical facilitators. Malaysia should strengthen links between terrorist-financing
investigations, money-laundering enforcement, organised-crime investigations
and digital evidence analysis.
However, tougher laws do not
automatically produce greater security. Judicial oversight, access to legal
representation and meaningful remedies are important safeguards against abuses.
Lawful political dissent, religious expression and peaceful community
participation must not be confused with involvement in terrorism.
The central lesson is that
Malaysia should evaluate how effectively its existing laws and MyPCVE
initiatives operate together. PRAHAAR provides useful strategic principles, but
the next challenge is to improve coordination, measure outcomes and ensure security
measures remain accountable. Effective counter-terrorism depends on preventing
violence while preserving the rule of law and public confidence.
18.10.2026
Kuala Lumpur.
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