This
report provides an overview of transnational security issues related to
patterns of interaction among international terrorist and crime groups. In
addition, the report discusses the U.S. government’s perception of and response
to the threat. It concludes with an analysis of foreign policy options.
In
recent years, the U.S. government has asserted that terrorism, insurgency, and
crime interact in varied and significant ways, to the detriment of U.S. national
security interests. Although unclassified anecdotal evidence largely serves as
the basis for the current understanding of criminal-terrorist connections,
observers often focus on several common patterns.
Partnership
Motivations and Disincentives: Collaboration can serve as a force multiplier
for both criminal and terrorist groups, as well as a strategic weakness. Conditions
that may affect the likelihood of confluence include demand for special skills
unavailable within an organization, greed, opportunity for and proclivity
toward joint ventures, and changes in ideological motivations.
Appropriation
of Tactics: Although ideologies and motivations of an organization
may remain consistent, criminals and terrorists have shared similar tactics to
reach their separate operational objectives. Such tactics include acts of violence;
involvement in criminal activity for profit; money laundering; undetected
cross-border movements; illegal weapons acquisition; and exploitation of
corrupt government officials.
Organizational
Evolution and Variation: A criminal group may transform over time to
adopt political goals and ideological motivations. Conversely, terrorist groups
may shift toward criminality. For some terrorist groups, criminal activity remains
secondary to ideological ambitions. For others, profit-making may surpass
political aspirations as the dominant operating rationale. Frequently cited terrorist
organizations involved in criminal activity include Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), Al
Qaeda’s affiliates, D-Company, Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK), Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), Haqqani Network, and Hezbollah.
To
combat these apparent criminal-terrorist connections, Congress has maintained a
role in formulating U.S. policy responses. Moreover, recent Administrations
have issued several strategic documents to guide U.S. national security,
counterterrorism, anti-crime, and intelligence activities. In July 2011, for
example, the Obama Administration issued the Strategy
to Combat Transnational Organized Crime,
which emphasized, among other issues, the confluence of crime and terrorism as
a major factor in threatening the U.S. global security interests.
While
the U.S. government has maintained substantial long-standing efforts to combat
terrorism and transnational crime separately, Congress has been challenged to
evaluate whether the existing array of authorities, programs, and resources
sufficiently respond to the combined crimeterrorism threat. Common foreign
policy options have centered on diplomacy, foreign assistance, financial
actions, intelligence, military action, and investigations. At issue for
Congress is how to conceptualize this complex crime-terrorism phenomenon and
oversee the implementation of cross-cutting activities that span geographic
regions, functional disciplines, and a multitude of policy tools that are
largely dependent on effective interagency coordination and international cooperation.
Source: US Congress 2012
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