The recent statement by Malaysian Defence Minister Mohamed Khaled Nordin that China supports the development of a South China Sea Code of Conduct (COC) underscores Malaysia’s cautious but strategic approach to maritime diplomacy.
Behind the diplomatic language
lies Kuala Lumpur’s balancing act by protecting its territorial sovereignty and
economic interests while maintaining stability and constructive relations with
Beijing. Malaysia’s treatment of the COC process reflects its deliberate
caution: an understanding that preserving and protecting national territory
requires both firmness and finesse.
Malaysia’s approach to the South
China Sea is defined by three interlocking objectives: safeguarding
sovereignty, preserving regional peace, and avoiding great-power entanglement.
On sovereignty, Malaysia has long
maintained that disputes must be resolved through diplomacy and international
law, particularly the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
Kuala Lumpur rejects China’s “nine-dash line” claim as having no legal basis,
but it also stops short of public confrontation.
Instead, Malaysia quietly asserts
its rights by continuing exploration and resource extraction activities within
its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim’s government
has made clear that Petronas’ offshore energy operations will continue, despite
Chinese protests. This steady assertion of maritime rights without
sabre-rattling exemplifies Malaysia’s quiet confidence in law and diplomacy.
Equally central is Malaysia’s
commitment to regional stability. As a founding member of ASEAN, Malaysia views
the South China Sea as a shared regional concern, not an arena for power
projection. It consistently stresses that the sea must not become a battleground
between the United States and China. Prime Minister Anwar has often reiterated
Malaysia’s non-aligned stance, warning that attempts to “contain China” only
heighten tensions.
Meanwhile, Defence Minister
Khaled Nordin has called continued dialogue the “surest path to peace,”
highlighting Malaysia’s belief in communication over confrontation. This
preference for dialogue reflects both strategic necessity and diplomatic
culture: Malaysia knows that sustaining calm waters requires patient
engagement.
Malaysia’s cautious stance is not
born of weakness but of realism. The nation’s maritime geography places it at
the heart of vital shipping routes and resource-rich zones, making it acutely
vulnerable to external pressure.
Its naval capacity, while
modernising, remains modest compared to China’s expanding presence. In such
circumstances, prudence is strength. Malaysia relies on multilateral diplomacy,
international law, and ASEAN’s collective weight as stabilising tools. Moreover,
economic pragmatism underpins its restraint: China is Malaysia’s largest
trading partner and a significant investor.
Alienating Beijing could
jeopardise vital sectors of Malaysia’s economy. Yet, Malaysia also recognises
that appeasement is not an option. Thus, its foreign policy is guided by
strategic ambiguity—firm in defending sovereignty, flexible in managing relationships.
A binding Code of Conduct offers
Malaysia an avenue to institutionalise this balance. Through the COC, Malaysia
seeks to embed international norms that constrain unilateral actions and ensure
freedom of navigation.
It wants the code to explicitly
recognise rights under UNCLOS, safeguard economic activities in its EEZ, and
establish mechanisms to manage incidents at sea. The COC must also reflect
ASEAN centrality, ensuring that regional voices, not external powers, shape the
maritime order.
Malaysia’s vision for the COC
thus extends beyond conflict prevention that it is about embedding fairness,
predictability, and respect for sovereignty into the South China Sea’s
governance.
For Malaysia, caution in the
negotiation process is essential because a poorly structured code could be
counterproductive. If the terms are too favourable to Beijing, Malaysia risks
legitimising encroachments that erode its maritime rights. A weak code could
fragment ASEAN’s unity, leaving smaller states vulnerable to pressure.
Moreover, overly rigid
commitments could reduce Malaysia’s strategic flexibility in responding to
changing dynamics, such as increased militarisation or foreign naval activity.
Hence, Kuala Lumpur’s negotiators tread carefully, ensuring that engagement with
China does not translate into acquiescence.
Timing also heightens the stakes.
As ASEAN seeks to finalise the COC by 2025, Malaysia is set to play a central
role as ASEAN chair to ensure that progress does not come at the cost of
principle. China’s stated willingness to accelerate the process is encouraging,
but it also introduces pressure to conclude the talks swiftly.
Malaysia’s caution acts as a
safeguard against haste. It insists that speed must not compromise substance,
that any agreement must genuinely strengthen legal order and maritime security.
This balancing act extends beyond
diplomacy into Malaysia’s broader strategic posture. By maintaining open
dialogue with Beijing while reinforcing cooperation with other partners such as
the United States, Japan, and Australia,
Malaysia seeks to diversify its
relationships without choosing sides. Its participation in multilateral defence
forums and freedom-of-navigation dialogues complements its bilateral engagement
with China. In effect, Malaysia’s approach is one of “calibrated openness”:
engaging all, aligning with none.
At the heart of Malaysia’s
cautious diplomacy is a sober understanding of geography and power. As a middle
power situated at a maritime crossroads, Malaysia cannot afford to provoke, but
neither can it afford to yield. Its strategy, therefore, rests on maintaining
agency through law, diplomacy, and regional cooperation.
The COC process, if navigated
prudently, offers Malaysia a chance to lock in legal protections for its
maritime rights and reduce the risk of escalation. But that opportunity comes
with the responsibility to resist pressures whether from Beijing or other
external actors that could tilt the code away from balance and fairness.
Malaysia’s careful handling of
the South China Sea issue shows that caution can be a form of strength. It
demonstrates that sovereignty can be defended not only by fleets and bases, but
also by patience, persistence, and principle.
As negotiations on the COC move
forward, Malaysia’s role will be pivotal. Its insistence on diplomacy grounded
in law and mutual respect could determine whether the South China Sea becomes a
sea of cooperation or contention.
In that sense, Malaysia’s
cautious steps are not hesitant, but they are deliberate. Each move is designed
to ensure that, amid the shifting tides of regional power, Malaysia’s ground
remains firm.
31/10.2025
Kuala Lumpur.
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