In order to designate a country as a State
Sponsor of Terrorism, the Secretary of State must determine that the
government of such country has repeatedly provided support for acts of
international terrorism. Once a country has been designated, it
continues to be a State Sponsor of Terrorism until the designation is
rescinded in accordance with statutory criteria. A wide range of
sanctions are imposed as a result of a State Sponsor of Terrorism
designation, including:
- A ban on arms-related exports and sales.
- Controls over exports of dual-use items, requiring 30-day Congressional notification for goods or services that could significantly enhance the terrorist-list country's military capability or ability to support terrorism.
- Prohibitions on economic assistance.
- Imposition of miscellaneous financial and other restrictions.
CUBA
Cuba was designated as a State Sponsor of Terrorism in 1982. Current
and former members of Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) continue to
reside in Cuba. Three suspected ETA members were arrested in Venezuela
and deported back to Cuba in September 2011 after sailing from Cuba. One
of them, Jose Ignacio Echarte, is a fugitive from Spanish law and was
also believed to have ties to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
(FARC). Reports suggested that the Cuban government was trying to
distance itself from ETA members living on the island by employing
tactics such as not providing services including travel documents to
some of them. Press reporting indicated that the Cuban government
provided medical care and political assistance to the FARC. There was no
indication that the Cuban government provided weapons or paramilitary
training for either ETA or the FARC.
The Cuban government continued to permit fugitives wanted in the
United States to reside in Cuba and also provided support such as
housing, food ration books, and medical care for these individuals.
The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) has identified Cuba as having
strategic AML/CFT deficiencies. Despite sustained and consistent
overtures, Cuba has refused to substantively engage directly with the
FATF. It has not committed to FATF standards and it is not a member of a
FATF-style regional body, although in 2011 it did attend a Financial
Action Task Force on Money Laundering in South America meeting as a
guest and prepared an informal document describing its anti-money
laundering/counterterrorist financing system.
IRAN
Designated as a State Sponsor of Terrorism in 1984, Iran remained an
active state sponsor of terrorism in 2011 and increased its
terrorist-related activity, likely in an effort to exploit the uncertain
political conditions resulting from the Arab Spring, as well as in
response to perceived increasing external pressure on Tehran. Iran also
continued to provide financial, material, and logistical support for
terrorist and militant groups throughout the Middle East and Central
Asia. Iran was known to use the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods
Force (IRGC-QF) and terrorist insurgent groups to implement its foreign
policy goals, provide cover for intelligence operations, and support
terrorist and militant groups. The IRGC-QF is the regime's primary
mechanism for cultivating and supporting terrorists abroad.
In 2011, the United States discovered that elements of the Iranian
regime had conceived and funded a plot to assassinate Saudi Arabia's
Ambassador to the United States in Washington D.C. Mansour Arbabsiar, an
Iranian-born U.S. dual-national working on behalf of the IRGC-QF, was
arrested in September 2011 for his role in the plot; also indicted in
the case was an IRGC-QF officer who remains at large. Arbabsiar held
several meetings with an associate whom Iranian officials believed was a
narcotics cartel member. This associate, in fact, was a confidential
source for U.S. law enforcement. The thwarted plot underscored anew
Iran's interest in using international terrorism – including in the
United States – to further its foreign policy goals.
Despite its pledge to support the stabilization of Iraq, Iran
continued to provide lethal support, including weapons, training,
funding, and guidance, to Iraqi Shia militant groups targeting U.S. and
Iraqi forces, as well as civilians. Iran was responsible for the
increase of lethal attacks on U.S. forces and provided militants with
the capability to assemble explosives designed to defeat armored
vehicles. The IRGC-QF, in concert with Lebanese Hizballah, provided
training outside of Iraq as well as advisors inside Iraq for Shia
militants in the construction and use of sophisticated improvised
explosive device technology and other advanced weaponry.
Qods Force provided training to the Taliban in Afghanistan on small
unit tactics, small arms, explosives, and indirect fire weapons, such as
mortars, artillery, and rockets. Since 2006, Iran has arranged arms
shipments to select Taliban members, including small arms and associated
ammunition, rocket propelled grenades, mortar rounds, 107mm rockets,
and plastic explosives. Iran has shipped a large number of weapons to
Kandahar, Afghanistan, in particular, aiming to increase its influence
in this key province.
During the wave of pro-democracy demonstrations in Syria, Iran
provided weapons and training to assist the Asad regime in its brutal
crackdown that has resulted in the death of more than 5,000 civilians.
Iran also continued to provide weapons, training, and funding to Hamas
and other Palestinian terrorist groups, including the Palestine Islamic
Jihad and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General
Command. Since the end of the 2006 Israeli-Hizballah conflict, Iran has
assisted in rearming Hizballah, in direct violation of United Nations
Security Council Resolution 1701. Iran has provided hundreds of millions
of dollars in support of Hizballah in Lebanon and has trained thousands
of Hizballah fighters at camps in Iran.
In 2011, Iran remained unwilling to bring to justice senior AQ
members it continued to detain, and refused to publicly identify those
senior members in its custody. It also allowed AQ members to operate a
core facilitation pipeline through Iranian territory, enabling AQ to
carry funds and move facilitators and operatives to South Asia and
elsewhere.
Since 2009, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) has called for its
members and the international community to institute countermeasures to
protect their respective financial sectors as well as the global
financial system from the risks – in particular the terrorist financing
threat – posed by Iran. In October 2011, the FATF strengthened its
language and again called for countermeasures against Iran. Iran has had
some limited engagement regarding anti-money
laundering/counterterrorist finance and has responded to overtures by
multilateral entities such as the UN's Global Programme against Money
Laundering, but it has failed to criminalize terrorist financing and
require that financial institutions and other obliged entities file
suspicious transaction reports. It has not engaged with FATF and is not a
member of a FATF-style regional body.
SUDAN
Sudan was designated as a State Sponsor of Terrorism in 1993. In
2011, Sudan was a cooperative counterterrorism partner of the United
States.
Elements of several designated terrorist groups including al-Qa'ida
(AQ)-inspired terrorist groups remained in Sudan. The Government of
Sudan has reportedly taken steps to limit the activities of these
organizations and worked to disrupt foreign fighters' use of Sudan as a
logistics base and transit point for violent extremists going to Iraq
and Afghanistan. However, gaps remained in the Government of Sudan's
knowledge of and ability to identify and capture these individuals.
There was some evidence to suggest that former participants in the Iraqi
insurgency have returned to Sudan and are in a position to use their
expertise to conduct attacks within Sudan or to pass on their
knowledge. There was also evidence that Sudanese extremists
participated in terrorist activities in Somalia, activities that the
Government of Sudan has also reportedly attempted to disrupt.
In addition, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and Hamas maintained a
presence in Sudan and Hamas has increased its presence there since late
2011. Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal visited Khartoum in November 2011, and
Hamas political chief Ismail Haniyeh led a delegation of Hamas
officials to Khartoum in late December during a regional tour. In
addition, Haniyeh was President Bashir's guest of honor at the Sudanese
independence celebrations on December 31. With the exception of Hamas,
whose members the Government of Sudan does not consider to be
terrorists, the government does not openly support the presence of
terrorist elements within its borders.
Khartoum also has maintained a relationship with Iran. In 2011,
President Bashir and the Sudanese Ambassador to Iran both met with
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to discuss bolstering political
and economic ties between Khartoum and Tehran.
In June of 2010, four Sudanese men sentenced to death for the January
1, 2008 killing of U.S. diplomat John Granville and his Sudanese
driver, escaped from Khartoum's maximum security Khobar Prison. That
same month Sudanese authorities confirmed that they recaptured one of
the four convicts and a second escapee was reportedly killed in Somalia
in May 2011. The whereabouts of the other two convicts remained
unknown.
Two cases stemmed from the murder of the two U.S. Embassy employees:
in the first, the Sudanese Supreme Court was deliberating on an appeal
filed by defense attorneys for the three surviving men convicted of the
two murders requesting that their death sentences be commuted. The
second case was the trial against five people allegedly involved in the
escape of the four convicts from Khobar prison. The last court session
on this case was held on November 22.
Sudan is a member of the Middle East North Africa Financial Action
Task Force, a Financial Action Task Force (FATF)-style regional body.
Through the FATF's International Cooperation Review Group process, Sudan
has made significant progress in the establishment and development of
its Anti-Money Laundering/Counterterrorist Finance (AML/CTF) regime.
Toward the end of 2011, Sudan introduced an inspection program for
banks. Sudan has not yet implemented adequate procedures for identifying
and freezing terrorist assets, or ensured an effective supervisory
program for AML/CTF compliance. Sudan's Financial Intelligence Unit is
not fully functional.
SYRIA
Designated in 1979 as a State Sponsor of Terrorism, Syria continued
its political support to a variety of terrorist groups affecting the
stability of the region and beyond, even amid significant internal
unrest. Syria provided political and weapons support to Hizballah in
Lebanon and continued to allow Iran to resupply the terrorist
organization with weapons. The external leadership of Hamas, the
Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ), the Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine (PLFP), and the Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC), among others, were based in
Damascus and operated within Syria's borders though Hamas began leaving
the country in late 2011 over disagreements regarding Syria's use of
violence against protestors. Statements supporting terrorist groups like
Hamas and Hizballah consistently permeated government speeches and
press statements.
There was a decline in the number of foreign fighters entering northern Iraq from Syria in 2011.
President Bashar al-Asad continued to express public support for
Palestinian terrorist groups as elements of the resistance against
Israel. Damascus provided exiled individuals safe haven in Syria.
Added to the terrorist operatives calling Damascus home, Iraqi
Baathists continued to congregate in the Syrian capital with some of
them calling for violence against the Iraqi government, Iraqi civilian
targets, and American and coalition forces within Iraq. Al-Rai
Television, a television station owned by wanted international fugitive
and U.S. Specially Designated National (SDN) Iraqi Baathist Mishaan
al-Jaburi, broadcast from a suburban Damascus location, and transmitted
violent messages in support of terrorism in Iraq throughout the year.
Syria was mired in significant civil unrest for most of 2011. Terrorist
attacks have gradually increased on Syrian soil during this period,
culminating in twin suicide attacks in Damascus on December 23. On April
29, armed assailants fired upon three police officers in the city of
Homs, killing one and wounding two. On August 2, an attack in Idlib
Province killed a political figure.
In none of these instances did any group claim responsibility. These
and other attacks during the period of unrest have elicited responses
from the government pointing toward al-Qa'ida involvement in Syria. As
part of a broader strategy during the year, the regime has attempted to
portray Syria as a victim of terrorism rather than a purveyor of it.
Syria has laws on the books pertaining to counterterrorism and
terrorist financing, but it largely used these legal instruments against
opponents of the regime, including political protesters and other
members of the growing oppositionist movement. Furthermore, these laws
were not enforced against Hamas, Hizballah, or the various Palestinian
rejectionist groups based in Damascus.
Syria continued its strong partnership with fellow state sponsor of
terrorism, Iran . Asad continued to be a staunch defender of Iran's
policies. Iran also exhibited equally energetic support for Syrian
regime efforts to put down the growing protest movement within Syria.
Syria remained a source of concern regarding terrorist financing.
Industry experts reported that 60 percent of all business transactions
were conducted in cash and that nearly 80 percent of all Syrians did not
use formal banking services. Despite Syrian legislation that required
money-changers to be licensed by the end of 2007, many money-changers in
2011 continued to operate illegally in Syria's vast black market,
estimated to be as large as Syria's formal economy. Regional hawala networks
remained intertwined with smuggling and trade-based money laundering
and were facilitated by notoriously corrupt customs and immigration
officials.
This raised significant concerns that some members of the
Syrian government and the business elite were complicit in terrorist
finance schemes conducted through these institutions.
Syria is a member of the Middle East North Africa Financial Action
Task Force, a Financial Action Task Force (FATF)-style regional body. It
has been in the FATF International Cooperation Review Group process,
under which it has made progress on its Anti-Money
Laundering/Counterterrorist Finance (AML/CTF) regime. In 2011, Syria was
named in the FATF Public Statement for its lack of progress on
implementing adequate procedures for identifying and freezing terrorist
assets, ensuring that financial institutions are aware of and comply
with their obligations to file suspicious transaction reports in
relation to AML and CTF and ensuring that appropriate laws and
procedures are in place to provide mutual legal assistance.
Source: www.state.gov
Comments