By Alan Taylor
The leaders of the American Revolution made three great gambles.
First, they sought independence from the powerful British Empire,
becoming the first colonies in the Americas to revolt and seek
independence from their mother empire. Second, they formed a union of
thirteen states, which was also unprecedented, for the colonies had long
histories of bickering with one another. Third, the revolutionaries
committed their new states to a republic, then a radical and risky form
of government.
In a republic, the people were the sovereign—rejecting
the rule of a monarch and aristocrats. Today we take for granted that
governments elected by the people can be stable, long lasting, and
effective. But the Americans in the new nation were not so sure, given
the lessons of history. In 1789, the United States was the only large
republic in the world; the others were a handful of small city-states
scattered in Europe, and none of the larger republics in the history of
the world had lasted very long. Like the ancient republic of Rome, they
had collapsed and reverted to some form of tyranny, usually by a
military dictator.
Any one of those three gambles was an enormous risk. The miracle was
that the revolutionaries pulled off all three of them, winning their war
against the British, and securing a generous boundary in the peace
treaty of 1783: west to the Mississippi, south to Florida, and north to
the Great Lakes, with the Atlantic Ocean as the eastern boundary.
During the mid-1780s, however, the new nation seemed about to
collapse as quickly as it had been created. The first constitution of
the United States was the Articles of Confederation, adopted in 1781. It
proved too weak to control the powerful state governments. Unable
directly to tax people, the confederation lacked its own revenue and
could not afford an army or a navy, or even to pay the interest on its
massive war debt. American Indians defied the confederation, and the
Europeans insisted that no republic could endure on such a big
geographic scale.
Plus the states were roiled by social conflicts between the wealthy
gentlemen and the common people over issues of credit or debt. Gentlemen
faulted the state governments for pandering to common voters by
offering to relieve debtors at the expense of their creditors, those
gentlemen who had loaned them money and goods. The gentlemen concluded
that the state governments were too democratic, which meant too
responsive to public opinion. And when a rare state government did favor
the creditors, it provoked resistance from armed farmers.
In 1787 alarmed gentlemen gathered in Philadelphia for a
constitutional convention meant to shift power away from the states in
favor of the nation. After a heated political debate between the
Federalists (in favor of the Constitution) and the Antifederalists in
state ratification conventions, eleven of the thirteen states ratified
the new Constitution in 1787 and 1788. The laggard two would join within
the following three years, once promised a bill of rights to amend the
Constitution.
Brief and often vague, the US Constitution left much to the
interpretation of the leaders who implemented the new government. Today,
we celebrate the Constitution as if it put the nation on autopilot to
greatness. In fact, the new federal government would rise or fall,
become strong or remain weak, depending on the decisions made by the
leaders and voters.
In 1789 the new American republic seemed to teeter between future
greatness and imminent collapse. Unlike present-day Americans, the
leaders of the early republic could not comfort themselves with a long
and successful history of free and united government. Although endowed
with an immense potential, the United States was then a new and weak
country in a world of more powerful empires deeply suspicious of
republican government.
The American experiment in independence, union, and republicanism
seemed especially unstable because the thirteen states were so
different. The commercial states of the North contrasted with the
agricultural South, and the new settlements west of the Appalachians
feared domination by the old eastern communities of the Atlantic
seaboard. Many observers expected the union and republic would
eventually but inevitably collapse in some civil war either between the
North and South or between the East and West.
When the newly elected Congress and President gathered to implement
the Constitution, the federal government benefitted from extraordinary
leadership at the top. The dignified president, George Washington, was
revered for commanding the Revolutionary army to victory over the mighty
British. His vice president, John Adams, had a genius for political
theory. The new Cabinet included Alexander Hamilton, high-strung but the
leading financial genius in the nation, as well as the mercurial Thomas
Jefferson, who served as the secretary of state. The primary author of
the new Constitution, James Madison, became the Speaker of the House of
Representatives. Madison, Washington, and Jefferson came from Virginia,
the largest state in territory, population, and wealth. Adams hailed
from Massachusetts and Hamilton from New York.
But the new leaders soon divided into rival political parties, a
development that shocked them all, for they had designed the
Constitution to discourage organized partisanship. Washington, Adams,
and Hamilton claimed the name of Federalists, while Jefferson and
Madison organized an opposition known as the Democratic-Republicans, or
Republicans (which should not be confused with the Republican Party of
today).
The two parties polarized over four big issues: political economy,
foreign policy, how to interpret the Constitution, and the proper nature
of a republic. First, the Republicans sought to preserve the nation’s
agricultural economy out of a conviction that it alone could sustain a
relatively simple and equal class structure for white men. The
Federalists, however, hoped to accelerate industrial development, which
might enrich the nation as a whole but produce greater extremes of
wealth and poverty, power, and powerlessness.
Second, the two parties divided over how to react to the renewed
warfare between the two superpowers of the age: France and Britain.
After the French Revolution created a radical republic, the Republicans
favored France, while the Federalists preferred the more conservative
government of Britain.
Third, the two parties disagreed over whether the Constitution should
be read narrowly or broadly. Federalists insisted that the document
contained broad implicit powers that would enable the federal
government to subordinate the states. But the Republicans insisted on a
limited and literal interpretation that reserved to the states all of
the powers not specifically assigned by the Constitution to the federal
government. This clash of interpretations appeared in 1791, when
Hamilton proposed a national bank to manage the economy. The Republicans
opposed the bank as a measure that would strengthen the federal
government at the expense of the states, and they could find no specific
authorization for a national bank in the Constitution. In this case,
Hamilton prevailed.
Fourth, the two parties clashed over the proper definition of a
republic. Republicans supported a democratic vision of the republic
where the public opinion of common men guided their leaders. The
Federalists, however, defended a more traditional republic, where the
common people deferred to the judgment of wealthier and better-educated
gentlemen. They asserted a subtle but important distinction between a
republic, which they supported, and a democracy, which they feared. A
Massachusetts congressman, George Cabot, described the ideal republic as
“a perfect whole in which the general harmony is preserved, each one
learning his proper place and keeping to it.” In the Federalists’
republic, the common men were supposed to vote for the right sort of
people—the wealthy and well born—and between elections the people were
supposed to keep quiet and stay home, permitting the elected to govern
as they saw fit.
Where Federalists spoke of themselves as “Fathers of the People,” the
Republicans preferred the more egalitarian identity as “Friends of the
People.” While the Federalists offered social stability, the Republicans
promised social mobility. During the 1790s, most Americans preferred
stability, but the majority would swing at the start of the new century.
Like the Federalist leaders, the prominent Republicans were
well-educated gentlemen, but they felt more comfortable with appealing
to common voters. The Federalists denounced the leading Republicans as
rogue gentlemen, as unprincipled “demagogues” who pandered to the common
people with flattery and hollow promises. Such demagogues sought power
by warning the common people to reject the Federalists as British-style
aristocrats who wanted to ruin the republic so that they could install a
king. Of course, the Federalists insisted that they defended the
republic against the lies and the greed of the demagogues.
The Republicans cared primarily for the rights of free white men, who
alone could vote in most of the states. The Republicans catered to the
desires of common white men to preserve their legal rights over their
wives and their slaves. And the Republicans promised to provide farms
for the next generation by taking western land from the American
Indians. The paternalism of the Federalists led them to offer a little
more protection to the rights of free blacks and a little more room for
women to express themselves in politics. Because free blacks generally
voted Federalist, they usually lost the franchise when Republicans
rewrote state constitutions. The same happened to widows in New Jersey,
the one state in which women could vote until the Republicans came to
power there. And, although the Federalists shared the national goal of
western expansion, they proceeded more cautiously and slowly, treating
the Indian nations with a little more diplomatic respect and generosity
than did the Republicans.
Each party saw the other as bent on destroying the republic. In their
bitter conflict with one another, they might have done so. Hostile to
the concept of political parties, neither group accepted the legitimacy
of the other. Both the Federalists and the Republicans believed that
their party alone represented the public will and defended the public
good. Consequently, their opponents had to be insidious conspirators
determined to destroy both freedom and union. The partisans were so
shrill because the stakes seemed so high: nothing less than the survival
of free government in the United States, deemed the last, best hope for
liberty in the world.
The United States in 1790
In 1790 the federal government took the first census of the new
country. The census takers found a population of four million people:
fewer than the superpowers of the day, for the British had nearly
fifteen million people and the French numbered twenty-six million.
One-fifth of the Americans (800,000) were African Americans held in
slavery. The small US population was dispersed over the eastern third of
an entire continent, for the nation stretched 1,000 miles east-to-west,
from the Atlantic to the Mississippi, and about 2,000 miles from
Florida, on the south, to the Great Lakes, on the north.
This vast country had only five cities (Philadelphia, New York,
Boston, Baltimore, and Charleston) that exceeded 10,000 people, and the
largest, Philadelphia, had barely 50,000. More than 90 percent of the
people lived in the countryside on scattered farms and plantations.
Thoroughly agricultural, the nation lacked much manufacturing except for
a few small ironworks and many shipyards. Americans exported their
surplus farm produce to pay for manufactured goods imported from
Britain, which had industrialized. Most American farms barely supported
the large families that lived on them. Along the Atlantic coast, the
land seemed well cultivated, but in the hilly hinterland the settlements
became small and stumpy pockets in a heavily forested land. The
settlers slowly cleared away the forest with hand tools: axes, hoes, and
shovels.
Because the best-built and largest houses tend to survive (while the
typical small houses are torn down or rot away), we imagine that the
early Americans led lives of gracious leisure among future antiques. In
fact, the large families of the early nation crowded into tiny,
unpainted houses of log or clapboard, measuring 18 by 20 feet, with two
rooms on the ground floor and a sleeping loft overhead. Few people
enjoyed any privacy. Glass windows and stone chimneys were luxuries. Of
course, the houses had no electricity, no plumbing, and no heating
except for what an open fireplace could provide. Keeping those fires
going meant long hours cutting and hauling firewood. Insects swarmed
through the doors kept open for ventilation in the warm months. Calls of
nature meant a walk to a crude, wooden privy.
The good news was that almost everyone, except the slaves, had plenty
to eat, although the diet depended heavily on salted meat (usually
pork) washed down with whiskey made from corn. Americans took immense
pride in how much they could eat, how fast they could eat it, and at the
amount of salt and of animal fat that they could consume.
By law, a married woman was a “femme covert,” which meant
subordination to her husband, who owned any property that she brought
into the marriage. Married women could not sue or be sued in the courts.
They could not draft wills, make contracts, or buy and sell property.
If they earned any wage, the money legally belonged to their husbands.
Even if a husband absconded for a time, his wife remained bound by
coverture, and so he could claim any business she conducted or money she
earned during his absence.
It was more than law and custom that denied women political and
social equality; it was also the long and exhausting work that left them
little time and energy. Women tended chickens, milked cows, made meals
for their large families, and cleaned houses that kept filling with dirt
trekked in from the fields. They had to make by hand most of the
clothing worn by the family and wash that clothing by hand with soap
they also had to make from scratch. Because there was virtually no
artificial birth control, married women spent the first fifteen to
twenty years of their marriages either pregnant or nursing.
But the Revolution did generate some new ideas that began, very
slowly, to open new opportunities for women to escape the constrictions
of the traditional household. Abigail Adams and other thoughtful women
articulated a new concept of women as Republican mothers. They noted
that the republic depended on a virtuous citizenry of men. Virtue meant
an ability to put the public good ahead of self-interest. Women noted
that a young man’s character depended on his rearing by his mother, who
instilled the values of virtue. In 1791, Judith Sargent Murray wrote
that God had “assigned the care of making the first impressions on the
infant minds of the whole human race, a trust of more importance than
the government of provinces and the marshaling of armies.”
Republican motherhood offered a larger place for women in society,
but it also reinforced their domestic position. The promoters of
Republican motherhood continued to think that women should only work in
and around the home. Rather than seek the right to vote, they primarily
wanted respect for their contributions to their families. Consequently,
women claimed a right and a duty to speak out on public issues that
affected their children, so that they could better raise virtuous sons.
To that end, they sought greater legal protections from abusive and
drunken husbands, and eventually the right to own property and to speak
in public.
The Contentious Issue of Slavery
In 1776, slavery was legal and present in every state, but far more
slaves lived in the South, where they had become essential to the
plantation economy. Raising tobacco, rice, and indigo depended on slave
labor. Cotton joined that list after 1793, when Eli Whitney invented his
cotton gin, which improved ten-fold over hand labor the pace of
removing seed husks from the cotton balls. Thereafter cotton cultivation
and slavery expanded rapidly in tandem across the South.
The Revolution led some leaders, including Jefferson, Madison, and
Washington, to discern the hypocrisy of preaching liberty while
practicing slavery, but they felt stymied by the economic importance and
political popularity of slavery to most white southerners. The founders
recognized that the southern states would accept no union without at
least implicit protections for slavery—a position embraced by the
federal Constitution. Congress did bar slavery in the Northwest
Territory (north of the Ohio River), but allowed it in the Southwest
Territory. Congress also abolished the importation of slaves from
abroad, but did not do so until 1807. The federal government did nothing
to stem the much larger interstate trade in slaves and had no authority
to abolish slavery in the states.
The federal impotence on slavery left the issue to the states. During
the 1780s and 1790s, the northern states gradually began to abolish
slavery. State court decisions freed the slaves in New Hampshire and
Massachusetts, but most of the northern states eliminated slavery
gradually and by legislative enactment. For example, in 1799 New York
stipulated that freedom would come to slaves once a woman reached
twenty-five years and a man twenty-eight years.
It was relatively easy to abolish slavery in the northern states,
where slaves comprised only 5 percent of the population. But slaves
accounted for 40 percent of the southern population. No southern state
would emancipate the slaves for fear that abolition would damage the
plantation economy and that free blacks would seek revenge for their
long sufferings under slavery. Thomas Jefferson insisted, “We have a
wolf by the ears, and we can neither hold him nor safely let him go.
Justice is in one scale and self-preservation on the other.”
During the early 1780s, Virginia and Maryland did allow owners
individually to free slaves through a process known as manumission.
Consequently, the free black population in those two states grew from
almost none in 1775 to 94,000 in 1810. Most African Americans, however,
remained enslaved in Virginia and Maryland, and the other southern
states discouraged manumissions.
White southerners dreaded a deadly uprising by their slaves. Their
nightmare nearly became reality in and around Richmond, Virginia, in
1800. A blacksmith named Gabriel recruited at least 500 fellow slaves to
seize arms from the state arsenal and dictate emancipation to the
governor. They planned to strike on the night of August 30, 1800, but a
thunderstorm suddenly flooded roads and bridges, making it tough to
assemble the rebels. Tipped off, the white authorities rallied the
militia and hunted down the rebel leaders. Virginia hanged twenty-seven
rebels including Gabriel. A traveler reported that one of the rebels
(unnamed in the record) declared, “I have nothing more to offer than
what General Washington would have had to offer had he been taken by the
British and put to trial. I have adventured my life in endeavouring to
obtain the liberty of my countrymen, and am a willing sacrifice in their
cause.” It chilled white southerners to hear their Revolutionary
rhetoric turned against them.
Rather than reconsider slavery, the Virginians decided that they had
been too soft on their slaves and had allowed them too much leeway to
move around without proper passes. The leaders concluded that free
blacks set a bad example, inspiring slaves to think that they could and
should be free as well. In 1806 the Virginia legislature required any
newly freed slave to leave the state, which discouraged further
manumissions. Rejecting the libertarianism of the Revolution, southern
leaders gradually adopted an aggressive defense of slavery, which
insisted that blacks were racially inferior and unfit for freedom.
Only the most liberal of the southern planters could imagine some
plan of gradual emancipation, but even they would not allow freed blacks
to remain in America. Deporting freed men and women to Africa was
prohibitively expensive, however, and the plantation economy was too
profitable for most slaveholders to forsake. Finally, almost all the
slaves had been born in America, spoke English, and had, over the
generations, developed an African American culture. Despite the racism
of American life, few wanted to risk an uncertain future on a distant
continent. Richard Allen, a black Philadelphia minister, insisted, “This
land which we have watered with our tears and our blood is now our
mother country.” African Americans wanted to be free and equal in
America.
Because the South rejected any program of emancipation, slavery
expanded westward into Tennessee, Kentucky, Alabama, Florida,
Mississippi, and (after 1803) Missouri, Arkansas, Louisiana, and Texas.
The slave population nearly doubled from 676,601 in 1790 to 1,165,405 in
1810. The United States became divided into two regions, a North
characterized by the absence of slavery and a South staunchly committed
to slavery. But the racism of white supremacy prevailed in both regions,
enabling a political union to survive despite the regional differences.
The Northwest Territories and the American Indians
To the west, the fertile soil beckoned, but the wretched roads over
the mountains discouraged westward migration of people and the eastward
flow of trade from the new settlements. The settlers found it easier to
float their produce in boats down the western rivers to the Mississippi
and on to the port of New Orleans, which then belonged to Spain.
Consequently, easterners feared that the western settlers might soon
break away from the new country to seek some association with the
Spanish, a prospect promoted by Spanish agents.
American Indian nations resisted the expansion of the United States.
Although relatively few—about 70,000 in the territory between the Great
Lakes, the Gulf of Mexico, and the Mississippi—the Natives were skilled
at the guerrilla warfare of the frontier. During the 1780s the nations
north of the Ohio River created a confederacy pledged to sell no land
and to attack any settlers who crossed that river. The Indians obtained
guns and ammunition from the Spanish in Louisiana and from the British,
who kept forts along the Great Lakes, some of them within the American
boundary in defiance of the peace treaty that ended the Revolutionary
War. By helping the Indians, the Spanish and the British hoped to keep
the American settlements small, weak, and on the defensive.
Indian resistance threatened the fiscal solvency of the new United
States, which needed to sell western lands to raise revenue. Since
speculators would not buy land where it was too dangerous for settlers
to live, the United States also needed to defeat the Indians to impress
the western settlers. If the federal troops failed, the settlers might
reject the union as irrelevant and try to govern themselves or submit to
the Spanish or British. If the national leadership could wage and win
the western war, however, they could turn the West into the republic’s
greatest asset rather than its worst menace.
After suffering heavy defeats in 1790 and 1791, the US Army routed
the American Indians at Fallen Timbers, Ohio, in 1794. Disgusted by a
lack of British help at the critical moment, the Natives dissolved their
confederacy and made peace as separate nations. The United States
acquired two-thirds of Ohio and the right to establish forts in the rest
of the western country. Meanwhile the British agreed in the Jay Treaty
of 1794 to surrender their forts within the American line. The transfer
came during the summer of 1796 and further strengthened the American
hold over the western country.
In 1795, the Americans also negotiated a favorable deal with the
Spanish. Fearing a British attack on New Orleans, the Spanish suddenly
sought improved relations with the United States and allowed Americans
to export their goods through New Orleans without paying any duties. The
Spanish also withdrew from their forts within the American boundary
line. As trade down the Mississippi to New Orleans boomed, more settlers
moved west to exploit the fertile lands. Federal land sales soared,
generating revenues for the federal government. In sum, between 1794 and
1796, the United States dramatically gained control over its long
western frontier.
Rather than treat the western territories as colonies, the United
States steadily integrated them into the union as new states admitted as
the equals of the original states. During the 1780s Congress had
adopted two ordinances to regulate the process. The Northwest Ordinance
of 1785 set up the ground rules for settling the land. The federal
government would employ surveyors to divide the frontier land into a
grid of square townships subdivided into 640-acre sections for sale to
land speculators, who would make profits by reselling the lands to small
farmers in smaller lots: usually 160 acres, a good size for a farm. The
Northwest Ordinance of 1787 established rules for making western
territories into future states. Once a federal territory reached 60,000
people, it could hold a convention to frame a state constitution. If
approved by Congress, the territory became a state, a status achieved by
Ohio in 1803. Many more western states would follow.
National and International Debate
During the angry politics of the 1790s, the Republicans gradually
proved the best match for American society. They insisted that a
republic needed vigorous debate and public criticism of its leaders.
Madison reminded Congress that in a republic “the censorial power is in
the people over the government, and not in the government over the
people.” The Republicans despised the Federalist efforts to suppress
political dissent outside of the halls of Congress, particularly by
private clubs and newspapers. Possessing less confidence in the judgment
of uneducated voters, the Federalists feared that unregulated political
criticism would undermine respect for the government and lead to a
violent anarchy that would destroy the republic.
During the early 1790s, western settlers violently resisted a new
federal excise tax levied on whiskey stills. Washington and Hamilton
regarded the resistance as a critical test of the new government’s
credibility. In 1794 the Washington administration sent 12,000
militiamen into western Pennsylvania to suppress the so-called “Whiskey
Rebels.” Declining to fight, most ran away and hid, enabling the federal
government to enforce the new tax. The President angrily blamed the tax
resistance on a set of Republican political clubs known as “the
Democratic Societies,” which he declared “the most diabolical attempt to
destroy the best fabric of human government and happiness.” The
Federalists denounced the societies as “self-created,” in contrast to
the government, which had a constitution ratified by the people. The
Federalists dreaded any political activity by privately organized groups
outside of the constitutional structure. Of course, the Republicans
disagreed, for they had much greater faith in the ability of common
white men to make rational decisions if they had free access to
political information.
The debate over free speech became more heated and dangerous in 1798,
during a foreign policy crisis with France. Irritated by the growing
American trade with Great Britain, the French seized American merchant
ships on the high seas. Adding insult to injury, the French demanded
bribes and tribute from American diplomats in Paris, in a controversy
known as the XYZ Affair. Exploiting popular outrage, the
Federalist-dominated federal government prepared for war and denounced
the Republicans as French sympathizers. Congress criminalized dissent,
particularly when expressed by newly arrived immigrants. Most came from
Ireland and supported the Republicans, who shared their hatred of the
British Empire. To reduce their political influence, Congress extended
the period for naturalization as a citizen to fourteen years from the
previous five. Congress also authorized the President to expel any
unnaturalized alien deemed “dangerous to the peace and safety of the
United States.”
Congress also passed a Sedition Act, which applied to citizens as
well as aliens. The Sedition Act made it a federal crime to utter or
publish “any false, scandalous, and malicious writing or writings
against the government of the United States or the President of the
United States, with intent to defame . . . or to bring them into
contempt or disrepute.” The government pressed seventeen sedition cases,
primarily against the editors of Republican newspapers. Ten resulted in
conviction and punishment.
The Alien and Sedition Acts outraged the Republicans as further proof
that the Federalists meant to stifle debate and dissent. In late 1798
the Republican-dominated state governments of Kentucky and Virginia
adopted resolutions written by Jefferson and Madison respectively. Those
resolutions denounced the Alien and Sedition Acts as unconstitutional.
They further hinted that states could nullify enforcement of such laws
within their bounds. The other state legislatures, however, blanched at
the doctrine of nullification and rejected the Kentucky and Virginia
resolves.
Instead, the election of 1800 would decide the fate of the federal
republic and of its union. If the Federalists retained power, Jefferson
threatened that Virginia and Kentucky would “sever ourselves from that
union we so much value, rather than give up the rights of self
government . . . in which alone we see liberty.” He valued the union but
only if led by Republicans, whom he saw as alone dedicated to freedom
and states’ rights.
In the election, the Republicans prevailed because the Sedition Act
and federal taxes proved so unpopular. After a heated race Jefferson won
the presidency by seventy-three electoral votes to sixty-five for the
Federalist John Adams. The Republicans captured control of Congress as
well. In subsequent elections, the Republicans would build their
majority, as the Federalists faded. The Friends of the People had
triumphed over the Fathers of the People. But their people were white:
Jefferson’s new postmaster general fired all the free blacks working in
his department.
Because the election of 1800 swept the Federalists from power,
Jefferson called his victory the “Revolution of 1800.” His victory
vindicated the principle that the republic’s rulers should attend
carefully to public opinion and should avoid preaching deference to the
common people. The Sedition Act expired and Jefferson pardoned prisoners
convicted under that law. Congress also appealed to immigrants by
reducing the period of naturalization from fourteen years back to just
five. In practice, however, Jefferson and his fellow Republicans proved
inconsistent as civil libertarians. In 1804 the new president explained,
“While we deny that Congress have a right to controul the freedom of
the press, we have ever asserted the right of the states, and their
exclusive right to do so.” Indeed, Jefferson urged Republican governors
to prosecute the Federalist editors in their state courts.
Jefferson also rejected the more regal style of the Federalist
presidents, Washington and Adams, who had staged elaborate rituals, worn
expensive clothes, and held fancy receptions. The Federalists believed
that shows of power helped to build public respect for the government.
Of course, the Republicans insisted that these displays sought to dazzle
the people into gradually accepting a monarchy and an aristocracy.
As president, Jefferson eliminated most of the rituals and
receptions. He sold the presidential coaches, horses, and silver
harnesses. On public occasions, he walked to Congress, and he often wore
drab, simple clothing. The British ambassador felt insulted when the
President received him wearing a bathrobe and slippers. Although quite
wealthy, Jefferson made a show of his common touch, setting a tone
followed by later presidents.
Jefferson’s symbolic reform benefitted from the relocation of the
national capital, just before his election, from the cosmopolitan city
of Philadelphia to a woody new town on the Potomac—Washington, DC.
Jefferson regarded this rustic setting as perfect for the weak federal
government that he desired, for he sought to decentralize power by
reducing the power of the federal government to give a greater share to
the states, which he saw as more democratic because they were closer to
the people. Jefferson rejected the Federalist vision of a powerful and
centralized nation, like those in Europe.
To weaken the federal government, Jefferson sought to pay off and
eliminate the national debt, which Hamilton had regarded as an essential
bond of the union. The Republicans cut the national debt in half, from
$80 million in 1800 to $40 million in 1810. At the same time, Jefferson
reduced taxes and eliminated the hated whiskey tax. Jefferson
accomplished this goal, in part, by reducing federal government to a
bare minimum, and by cutting back on the Army and the Navy. He limited
the American foreign service to just three countries: the ambassadors to
France, Spain, and Great Britain. But he primarily reduced the debt
thanks to a great increase in federal revenue from two sources: a surge
in imports increased the funds generated by the tariff, and an
acceleration of western migration enhanced the sale of federal lands.
Jefferson sought to provide frontier farms for a growing American
population that doubled every twenty-five years. He insisted that a
republic needed a broad distribution of property in the hands of many
small farmers. Only by taking more land from American Indians could the
Republicans prolong America’s relatively egalitarian social structure
(save, of course, for slavery).
Jefferson expected American migration to overwhelm the Spanish
empire, which claimed Florida and the immense territory west of the
Mississippi known as Louisiana, but the Spanish threatened that vision
by selling Louisiana to the French in 1800. A ruthless general, Napoleon
Bonaparte, had seized power in France, and he meant to build a global
empire.
Fortunately for Jefferson, military setbacks persuaded Napoleon to
sell Louisiana to the United States in 1803 for the bargain price of $15
million. Although the Louisiana Purchase nearly doubled the size of the
United States and averted war, it contradicted Jefferson’s commitments
to reduce the federal government through frugality. The purchase added
to the national debt that he had vowed to reduce. It also violated his
very strict and literal construction of the federal Constitution, which
did not explicitly authorize the purchase of new territory. You can
imagine Jefferson’s outrage if a Federalist president had made such a
deal. Rather than lose the prize, Jefferson set aside his constitutional
scruples and, with the support of the Senate, ratified the purchase
treaty.
Jefferson also expanded federal power to wage an overseas
war—something far beyond the ambitions of the Federalists, who had clung
to neutrality in the conflicts on the other side of the Atlantic. By
paying protection money, the Washington and Adams administrations had
bought peace with the Barbary emirates of North Africa, which deployed
pirates against the ships of non-Muslim nations. Determined to cut the
federal budget, Jefferson cancelled the payments, which reaped a war
with Tripoli. That war proved far more expensive than tribute, and it
compelled Jefferson to keep the small deepwater navy that he had wanted
to dissolve.
Jefferson expected a quick, easy, and cheap victory in “the Barbary
War.” Instead he got four years of frustrating war in the first American
conflict in the Islamic world. Making the most of their shallow waters
and heavily fortified seaport, the Tripolitans fended off the larger
American warships, and Americans reaped a logistical and financial
nightmare trying to sustain a blockading fleet in the distant
Mediterranean. In 1805 the ruler of Tripoli made a face-saving treaty
with the Americans. In return for $60,000, he released his American
prisoners and promised to leave American ships alone, without any future
payments. Americans celebrated the Tripoli war as a great school for
naval heroes and as a great victory for liberty over a land of slavery
for white men. But within a few years, the pirates resumed attacking
American ships, and did so with impunity because the United States had
been sucked into another war with Great Britain.
To pay down the national debt, the Jefferson administration relied on
a great surge in American overseas commerce, which enhanced the tariff
revenue. Between 1793 and 1805, trade increased as American merchant
ships exploited their neutral status to take trade away from the two
great belligerents, France and Britain. American seaports and shipyards
boomed. The tonnage of American shipping tripled and the value of trade
soared from $43 million in 1790 to $246 million in 1807.
The booming American trade appalled the British, for it rescued the
French economy from a British blockade and, as the premier commercial
power in the world, the British resented the rise of the United States
as a formidable rival. So in 1805 the British began to seize American
merchant ships that carried goods from France or any of the French
colonies. British naval captains aggressively enforced the new hard
line, for they received a share in the auctioned value of confiscated
ships and cargo. To fill vacancies in Royal Navy crews, the captains
also seized sailors from the American ships, a practice known as
“impressment.” The British insisted that the sailors were runaway
Britons, while the Americans claimed they were American citizens. Often
the sailors were immigrants from Britain, but the British refused to
recognize any American right to naturalize British subjects. Between
1803 and 1812 the British impressed over 6,000 sailors who claimed to be
American citizens.
For want of a larger navy of expensive ships, the United States could
do little to resist the British seizures of American merchant ships and
sailors. In June 1807, a British warship attacked and captured an
American warship to impress some of its sailors. Still Jefferson balked
at an overt war with the British. Instead, he settled for an “embargo”
that ordered all American merchant ships to stay in port, barred from
trading anywhere in the world. Jefferson reasoned that the British
needed American trade more than America needed to trade with them. As an
industrializing country with many workers, the British depended on
importing food from, and exporting manufactures to, the United States.
Jefferson was mistaken. The British managed to get enough food
elsewhere and to find new markets for their exports in Latin America.
Indeed, they were delighted to see the United States suppress the very
shipping that the British resented as unwanted competition. The embargo
hurt the Americans far more than the British. It threw sailors and
laborers out of work, bankrupted many merchants, and left farmers with
surplus crops that they could no longer export. The economic pain
revived the dying Federalist Party in the Northeast, the region hardest
hit by the embargo. The Federalist comeback spooked the Republicans in
that region. They pressured their colleagues in Congress and in the
administration to abandon the embargo. Congress did so in March of 1809
just as Jefferson left the presidency and its troubles to his friend and
successor, James Madison.
To no good end, the embargo had violated Republican principles that
sought to protect liberty by limiting government’s power. The great
proponent of minimal government, Thomas Jefferson, trapped his
administration and party in a massive contradiction. He had dramatically
expanded federal power to criminalize, for more than a year, the
overseas commerce essential to national prosperity. By enforcing that
misguided policy, Jefferson threatened thousands of Americans with
financial ruin while rewarding smugglers with windfall profits. The two
parties had reversed their positions. Jefferson used executive power
against citizens, while the Federalist governors and state legislatures
in New England threatened to nullify national laws.
The failure of the embargo left many Republicans feeling humiliated
at their inability to protect American ships and sailors. A group of
Jeffersonian congressmen known as War Hawks insisted that there was no
alternative but to declare war on Great Britain. But how was the United
States to wage war on a maritime superpower like Great Britain? The
United States had only seventeen warships compared to the 1,000 of the
Royal Navy.
The War Hawks favored attacking the British colonies in nearby Canada
by marching overland from the United States. This could be done
cheaply, without the cost of building a large navy or even, they
believed, of organizing a large, professional army. The War Hawks
boasted that the civilian-soldiers of the state militias would suffice
to conquer Canada. After all, the population of the United States
exceeded Canada’s by a ratio of 25 to 1. Caught up in this enthusiasm,
Jefferson insisted that the conquest of Canada was “a mere matter of
marching.” However, the War Hawks were not clear about how losing Canada
would force the British to make concessions about maritime issues. In
June 1812, Congress and President Madison declared war on Great Britain
anyway.
Waging war with a militia proved even more of a disaster than the
embargo had been. Because so many militiamen deserted to avoid combat,
the British and their Indian allies repeatedly repelled the invaders,
while the American professional army was too small and too badly led to
make a difference. Ironically, the little American Navy did much better,
defeating several British warships in battles on the high seas. These
unexpected naval victories boosted American morale and frustrated the
British, who were used to always winning at sea. But a few small-scale
naval victories did little to reduce the vastly superior number of
British warships.
The war took a further turn for the worse in 1814, when the British
and their European allies crushed Napoleon’s France, freeing up
thousands of British troops for deployment against the United States.
During the summer and fall of 1814, British forces went on the
offensive, invading the United States from multiple directions. They
captured eastern Maine and briefly occupied and partially burned the
national capital, Washington, DC—a great humiliation for the Madison
administration. But, in general, American forces fought better defending
their own country than they had as invaders of Canada. In September,
the Americans fended off British attacks on Baltimore, Maryland, and
Plattsburgh, New York.
Weary of the war, British diplomats offered the Americans generous
terms in a peace treaty concluded at Ghent in Europe in December. The
British agreed to withdraw from the lands they had occupied in eastern
Maine, northern Michigan, and western New York. The treaty said nothing
about the maritime issues that had led to war. Having failed to conquer
Canada or compel British maritime concessions, the Republicans redefined
national survival as victory. James Monroe, the Secretary of State,
assured the Senate that “our Union has gained strength, our troops
honor, and the nation character, by the contest.”
In early February, the myth of the glorious war got a boost with the
arrival, on the East Coast, of dramatic news that American troops had
won a sensational victory near New Orleans. On January 8, in the war’s
most lopsided battle, General Andrew Jackson’s army had routed 6,000
British regulars. At a cost of only thirty minutes and seventy-one
casualties, the Americans had killed 290 Britons, wounded 1,262, and
captured 484.
In mid-February, news of the great victory merged with the
ratification of peace to shape the American memory of the war. Americans
concluded that their one big victory on land had forced the British to
abandon the war. The New Orleans and the Ghent news also coincided with
the arrival in Washington of a delegation of New England Federalists
bearing the demands of a convention they had held at Hartford,
Connecticut, to denounce the war and to demand amendments to the
Constitution. Ignored by Congress and the President, the delegates
returned home in a disgrace inflicted by the unanticipated events at New
Orleans and Ghent. Thereafter, the Hartford Convention became a synonym
for treason, and its bad reputation destroyed the Federalist revival in
the Northeast, that party’s last bastion.
So a war that had exposed the republic’s weaknesses became, in
memory, a war that had proven its strengths. Only a few Republicans
wished to look back in sorrow. In 1816, John Quincy Adams soberly (but
privately) remarked, “my countrymen . . . look too intently to their
Triumphs & turn their eyes too lightly away from their disasters.”
He felt that Americans were “rather more proud than they have reason [to
be] of the War.”
But illusions often prove paradoxically valuable. The new confidence
in the republic enabled Americans to accept the persistence of British
Canada as innocuous. The northern border also seemed more secure as the
British withdrew from supporting the American Indians within the United
States. The ultimate legacy of the war was that the empire and the
republic could safely share the continent along a border more generous
to the Americans and more confining to the British—but most ominous to
the Indians.
Although the Federalist Party died, its goals proved surprisingly
vibrant within the ostensibly Republican nation. The Republicans had
hoped to prolong the United States as an agricultural nation of small
farmers. Yet they unwittingly and ironically did more to promote
industrialization than the Federalists had. Their policies of embargo
and war had interrupted the importation of British manufactured goods,
which created opportunities for American investors to build factories to
fill the consumer demand for textiles. After the war, the Republican
congressmen from the North defended the new industries with a protective
tariff that discouraged imports from Great Britain. That protective
tariff hurt the farmers and planters of the South, who relied on
exporting their produce in exchange for British manufactures. By 1860
the American Northeast resembled Hamilton’s vision of an industrialized
country rather than Jefferson’s vision of a land of small farmers.
And although the Republicans prevailed in electoral politics, the
Federalists endured within the federal judiciary, the third branch of
the government. As the founders intended, the judiciary was not a
democratic institution, for federal judges were not elected, and they
served for life terms. The power of the federal judiciary belies any
notion of the United States as thoroughly democratic in the wake of the
Jeffersonian triumph.
In 1801, while Jefferson became president, a Federalist became the
chief justice of the United States Supreme Court. The lame-duck
Federalist president, John Adams, had appointed John Marshall, a
Virginian who despised his cousin, the new president. While Jefferson
served as president for eight years, Marshall remained chief justice for
thirty-five years, longer than anyone else in the history of that
court. Marshall maintained his influence over the Court over the years
despite the fact that most of his colleagues soon became Republican
appointees. Marshall’s charm and brilliance soon won most of them over
to his perspective.
Marshall participated in more than 1,000 Supreme Court decisions,
writing over half of them, far more than any other justice. Those
decisions came at a critical period in the development of the nation and
its economy. Marshall consistently favored four great Federalist
principles. First, he asserted that the Supreme Court had the power to
review the acts of Congress and of the President and to declare them
unconstitutional; we call this “Judicial Review.” Second, he favored
federal supremacy over the state governments by extending the right of
federal judicial review to state laws. Again we now take this for
granted, but prior to Marshall this was not an established principle.
Remember that many Republicans preferred the doctrine of the Kentucky
and Virginia resolves, which held that the state legislatures had the
right to review and nullify federal laws. Third, the Marshall Court
followed Hamilton rather than Jefferson in insisting that the
Constitution implied broad powers for the national government. Fourth,
Marshall repeatedly defended business interests against state laws by
invoking the Constitution’s protection for contracts. During the
nineteenth century, these four legal principles became widely accepted,
ensuring that our inheritance from the early republic owes as much to
the Federalists as to the Republicans.
Source: gilderlehrman.org
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