Summary
In its 40 years of existence, the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) has played well above its collective weight in world
politics, though its reputation for effective diplomacy was seriously
tarnished by an inability to resolve the region?s 1997- 98 financial
crisis and other political challenges in the 1990s, including East
Timor?s secession from Indonesia, annual forest fire haze from
Indonesian Borneo that creates a regional public health hazard, and the
1997 Cambodian coup that overturned an ASEAN-endorsed election. The
primary explanation for ASEAN?s political weakness has been its
attachment to the principle of noninterference in its members? domestic
affairs. Much of ASEAN?s political effort in the early 21st century is
devoted to overcoming this weakness.
The primary impetuses for ASEAN moving beyond sovereignty protection
are transnational challenges, particularly terrorism, the exploitation
of ocean resources, and maritime security, all of which require
international cooperation. Secessionists from southern Thailand and the
southern Philippines flee to northern Malaysia and Borneo respectively;
illegal arms trafficking moves from Cambodia and Thailand to insular
Southeast Asia; and radical Islamists go back and forth between
Indonesia and the Philippines. Porous borders, suspicious border guards,
inadequate coast guards, and armed forces that rarely collaborate
beyond bilateral exercises are all counterproductive with respect to
transnational challenges.
ASEAN states are attempting to overcome these deficits. Trilateral
maritime cooperation in the Malacca Strait by its littoral members
(Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia) to patrol for pirates and terrorists
receives technical assistance from Japan and the United States.
Anti-terrorist collaboration has expanded through ASEAN states? law
enforcement and intelligence communities, with significant technical
support and training from the United States and Australia. Moreover, in
2007 ASEAN tabled a draft charter that alters the association?s
noninterference principle and, for the first time, promotes democracy as
a regional goal.
On broader security matters, ASEAN declared Southeast Asia to be a
nuclear weapons free zone via treaty in 1995. Concerned about nuclear
weapons proliferation in Northeast and South Asia, ASEAN desired to
separate itself from the nuclear standoffs of its Asian neighbors.
Moreover, ASEAN sees the nuclear free zone treaty to be an extension of
its 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) that prohibits the use of
force in settling international disputes. Signing the TAC has become
the prerequisite for joining Asia?s latest security discussion forum,
the East Asia Summit (EAS) which held its first annual meeting in
December 2005. Inspired by ASEAN and its Northeast Asian partners (the
Republic of Korea [ROK], Japan, and China), India, Australia, and New
Zealand have also joined, but so far not the United States. Some in
Washington are concerned that ratifying the TAC could limit U.S.
military actions in the Pacific, though the treaty?s advocates point out
that America?s closest Asian allies?Japan, the ROK, and Australia?are
EAS members and do not believe their security obligations toward the
United States have been jeopardized.
Asia?s largest security discussion body is the ASEAN Regional Forum
(ARF) consisting of all East Asian states, the European Union, the
United States, and Canada. While the great powers dominate ARF
discussions, its structure and procedures are modeled on ASEAN?s. Both
ASEAN and the ARF emphasize security transparency such as the
publication of national white papers on defense that include both order
of battle and doctrine. The ARF looks forward to preventive diplomacy
and even conflict resolution? though neither of these future action
categories has been implemented. The ARF has attained some success in
anti-terrorist collaboration involving terrorist finances and the
sharing of information among national financial intelligence units.
Given ASEAN and ARF deficiencies, it is not surprising that the
United States continues to rely primarily on bilateral security
relationships in Southeast Asia. Nevertheless, with the creation of the
EAS and ASEAN negotiating a new charter that includes designating the
association a Security Community, Washington would be wise to rethink
its multilateral diplomacy. ASEAN, the ARF, and the EAS could well
become prominent political and economic actors in the 21st century. The
United States should not let this parade pass it by.
Most Southeast Asians believe their security is best maintained in
the early 21st century not by isolating the region from great power
activities, as originally envisaged in the 1970s Zone of Peace Freedom
and Neutrality, but rather by engaging them in multilateral endeavors,
such as the ASEAN post-ministerial conferences, ASEAN Plus Three, and
the ARF. While these measures were initially directed toward keeping
China and the United States involved in assuring the region?s security,
ASEAN also welcomes participation by India and Japan.
India and Japan have exchanged high-level visits with virtually every
Southeast Asian state. ASEAN members welcome India?s efforts to
strengthen ties with Burma as a way of balancing China?s influence.
Also, India is involved in the ASEAN PMC. Although Delhi has not been
able to turn ASEAN Plus Three into ASEAN Plus Four, it has been accepted
into the ARF and the new East Asian Summit.
For the United States, ASEAN and the ARF security deficiencies are
not a significant drawback. Washington?s security strategy in East Asia
continues to rely on bilateral relations and has developed a mix of
bilateral and multilateral endeavors in Southeast Asia. In the war
against terror, the strongest bilateral tie is with the Philippines
where U.S. military assistance and training, now in their 8th year, are
designed to enhance the Philippine armed forces? ability to suppress the
Abu Sayyaf group in Mindanao.
On the multilateral dimension, little has been accomplished because
neither ASEAN nor the ARF have been willing to tackle the core security
issues affecting the region, be they external support for insurgencies,
major refugee flows, or disputes over sovereignty of islands. Inclusive
memberships in both organizations and the ASEAN consensus principle work
against their security effectiveness.Thus, Washington?s only multilateral initiative in Southeast Asia is
quite modest: the offer to fund a regional antiterrorism training center
in Malaysia, which would focus on law enforcement and intelligence
exchange, but not involve military training. As Stephen Leong of
Malaysia?s Institute of Strategic and International Studies said, not
only would the center show that ASEAN was involved in the antiterror
struggle, but it ?will also help to boost the confidence for foreigners
who want to invest or travel in the region especially after the Bali
bombing.? More recently, the United States seems to be paying greater
attention politically to ASEAN, when in the summer of 2006, Washington
announced that it would appoint an ambassador to ASEAN as an
organization, though no one has been appointed to that office by early
2007.
Most Southeast Asians believe their security is best maintained in
the early 21st century not by isolating the region from great power
activities, as originally envisaged in the 1970s Zone of Peace Freedom
and Neutrality, but rather by engaging them in multilateral endeavors,
such as the ASEAN post-ministerial conferences, ASEAN Plus Three, and
the ARF. While these measures were initially directed toward keeping
China and the United States involved in assuring the region?s security,
ASEAN also welcomes participation by India and Japan.
India and Japan have exchanged high-level visits with virtually every
Southeast Asian state. ASEAN members welcome India?s efforts to
strengthen ties with Burma as a way of balancing China?s influence.
Also, India is involved in the ASEAN PMC. Although Delhi has not been
able to turn ASEAN Plus Three into ASEAN Plus Four, it has been accepted
into the ARF and the new East Asian Summit.
For the United States, ASEAN and the ARF security deficiencies are
not a significant drawback. Washington?s security strategy in East Asia
continues to rely on bilateral relations and has developed a mix of
bilateral and multilateral endeavors in Southeast Asia. In the war
against terror, the strongest bilateral tie is with the Philippines
where U.S. military assistance and training, now in their 8th year, are
designed to enhance the Philippine armed forces? ability to suppress the
Abu Sayyaf group in Mindanao.
On the multilateral dimension, little has been accomplished because
neither ASEAN nor the ARF have been willing to tackle the core security
issues affecting the region, be they external support for insurgencies,
major refugee flows, or disputes over sovereignty of islands. Inclusive
memberships in both organizations and the ASEAN consensus principle work
against their security effectiveness.Thus, Washington?s only multilateral initiative in Southeast Asia is
quite modest: the offer to fund a regional antiterrorism training center
in Malaysia, which would focus on law enforcement and intelligence
exchange, but not involve military training. As Stephen Leong of
Malaysia?s Institute of Strategic and International Studies said, not
only would the center show that ASEAN was involved in the antiterror
struggle, but it ?will also help to boost the confidence for foreigners
who want to invest or travel in the region especially after the Bali
bombing.? More recently, the United States seems to be paying greater
attention politically to ASEAN, when in the summer of 2006, Washington
announced that it would appoint an ambassador to ASEAN as an
organization, though no one has been appointed to that office by early
2007.
Security regionalism in Southeast Asia remains, therefore, a weak
reed. Absence of interoperability among the region?s armed forces,
embedded suspicions about neighbors? motivations, and an unwillingness
or inability to set up effective arrangements to cope with transnational
challenges all tend to move security cooperation by default to the
bilateral?or at most trilateral?level where more effective collaboration
exists. This principle appears equally true for U.S. security
arrangements in Southeast Asia. Bilateral military exercises and
bilateral antiterrorist and law enforcement collaboration dominate.
Multilateral exercises, such as Cobra Gold in Thailand, while valued,
are viewed by Southeast Asians as less useful than bilateral security
links to the United States. There is no evidence that this situation will change.
Source: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/summary.cfm?q=793
By Dr. Sheldon W. Simon
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