In the Trans-Sahara region, al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)
took advantage of a renewed Tuareg rebellion in northern Mali and a coup
d’état in Bamako to overrun northern Mali by joining with violent
extremist mercenary fighters returning from Libya in the wake of the
revolution there. Alongside regional efforts to contain and marginalize
AQIM and its allies in northern Mali, the international community urged
Mali’s interim government to restore an elected government to Mali,
negotiate with groups in northern Mali that reject terrorism and accept
Mali’s territorial integrity, and respond to the humanitarian crisis.
Conflict in Nigeria continued throughout the northern part of the
country, with hundreds of casualties as indigenous terrorist attacks
increased. The Nigerian violent extremist group, Boko Haram, claimed
responsibility for some of these attacks.
In East Africa, the Somalia-based terrorist group al-Shabaab
remained the primary terrorist threat. Along with progress on government
formation, Somalia saw significant progress in 2012 on security as
Somali National Security Forces and the AU Mission in Somalia along with
Ethiopian and allied Somali militia forces battled al-Shabaab and drove
them out of many population strongholds in south-central Somalia. Most
notably, Kenyan forces gained control of the port city of Kismayo in
late September. Al-Shabaab continued to employ indirect assaults and
asymmetric tactics in Somalia, as well as claim credit for some attacks
in Kenya.
Various East African countries continued to enhance domestic and
regional efforts to bolster border security; detect, deter, disrupt,
investigate, and prosecute terrorist incidents; and create integrated
and dedicated counterterrorism practitioners.
TRANS-SAHARA COUNTERTERRORISM PARTNERSHIP (TSCTP)
Established in 2005, the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership
(TSCTP) is a U.S.-funded and implemented multi-faceted, multi-year
effort designed to counter violent extremism and contain and marginalize
terrorist organizations. TSCTP’s core goals are to enhance the
indigenous capacities of governments in the pan-Sahel (Mauritania, Mali,
Chad, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, and Burkina Faso), to confront the
challenge posed by terrorist organizations in the trans-Sahara, and to
facilitate cooperation between those countries and U.S. partners in the
Maghreb (Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia).
TSCTP has been successful in building capacity and cooperation
despite setbacks caused by coups d’état, ethnic rebellions, and
extra-constitutional actions that have interrupted work and progress
with select partner countries. For example, U.S. training and equipment
have assisted Mauritania to monitor its border with Mali and sustain
professional units during operations against AQIM, similarly, training
and equipment have supported Niger’s efforts to protect its borders and
interdict terrorists attempting transit through its territory. Several
TSCTP programs have worked to counter the pull of violent extremism on
youth, including educational and training courses in Algeria and Morocco
in the Maghreb, and extensive youth employment and outreach programs,
community development and media activities in Niger and Chad.
In March 2012, assistance to Mali under TSCTP was suspended
following a military coup that overthrew Mali’s democratically elected
government.
THE PARTNERSHIP FOR REGIONAL EAST AFRICA COUNTERTERRORISM (PREACT)
PREACT, formerly known as the East Africa Regional Strategic
Initiative, is the East Africa counterpart to the Trans-Sahara
Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP). First established in 2009, PREACT
is a U.S.-funded and implemented multi-year, multi-faceted program
designed to build the counterterrorism capacity and capability of member
countries to thwart short-term terrorist threats, counter violent
extremism, and address longer-term vulnerabilities. It uses law
enforcement, military, and development resources to achieve its
strategic objectives, including reducing the operational capacity of
terrorist networks, expanding border security, enhancing and
institutionalizing cooperation among the region’s security
organizations, improving democratic governance, and discrediting
terrorist ideology. PREACT member countries include Burundi, Comoros,
Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, South Sudan,
Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda. In 2012, in concert with political
developments in Somalia and elsewhere in the region, the U.S. government
continued to help PREACT member countries to address near-term threats
as well as build strategic counterterrorism capacities and bolster
international counterterrorism cooperation.
NIGERIA
Overview: The militant sect “People Committed to the
Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad,” better known by its
Hausa name Boko Haram (BH), conducted killings, bombings, kidnappings,
and other attacks in Nigeria, resulting in numerous deaths, injuries,
and the widespread destruction of property in 2012. The states where
attacks occurred more frequently included Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe,
Kaduna, Kano, Kogi, Plateau, Taraba, and Yobe, as well as the Federal
Capital Territory. No terrorist attacks occurred in the southern states
of Nigeria. Suspected BH attackers killed Nigerian government and
security officials, Muslim and Christian clerics, journalists, and
civilians. Of particular concern to the United States is the emergence
of the BH faction known as “Ansaru,” which has close ties to AQIM and
has prioritized targeting Westerners – including Americans – in Nigeria.
President Goodluck Jonathan appointed a new National Security
Adviser (NSA) in June, with the mandate to improve the Nigerian
government’s coordination, communication, and cooperation on
counterterrorism matters, both domestically and internationally. Most
operations to counter BH were headed up by the military-led Joint Task
Force, some members and units of which committed indiscriminate and
extrajudicial use of force, including killings of civilians and BH
suspects. The Nigerian government’s efforts to address grievances among
Northern populations, which include high unemployment and a dearth of
basic services, continued to fail, as did the security forces’ efforts
to contain BH. The United States called on the Nigerian government to
employ a comprehensive security strategy that is not predicated on the
use of force, and that also addresses the economic and political
exclusion of vulnerable communities in the north.
Nigerian-U.S. counterterrorism cooperation continued in 2012. In
practice, the NSA retained the lead as coordinator of the Nigerian
government’s counterterrorism strategy. In November, the Nigerian
government formally requested assistance from the United States to
develop an intelligence fusion center that would be able to streamline
coordination and information sharing on counterterrorism matters among
key agencies, including the State Security Service (SSS), the
intelligence agencies, the national police, and the military. An
inaugural working group to develop Nigeria’s intelligence fusion
capability, composed of Embassy officials and staff of the Office of the
National Security Adviser, met on December 15 to determine how the
United States can best support this initiative.
On December 31, 2011, President Jonathan declared a state of
emergency in 15 local government areas in Borno, Niger, Plateau, and
Yobe states, which remained in effect throughout most of 2012. According
to Nigerian government officials, the declaration of a state of
emergency gives the government sweeping powers to search and arrest
without warrants.
2012 Terrorist Incidents: Elements of BH increased the
number and sophistication of attacks in 10 northern states and the
Federal Capital Territory, with a notable increase in the lethality,
capability, and coordination of attacks. Notable terrorist incidents
committed by elements of BH, and factions claiming to be BH or
affiliated with BH, included:
• On January 20, multiple near-simultaneous attacks in Kano were
carried out on at least 12 targets including police stations, an
immigration office, and the Kano residence of an Assistant Inspector
General of Police. Over 150 persons were killed and hundreds wounded.
• On January 26, a German construction worker was kidnapped on the
outskirts of Kano city. On June 1, he was killed by his captors in a
raid on the house where he was being held.
• On March 8, an Italian citizen and a British citizen who were
kidnapped in May 2010 in Kebbi state, were killed in Sokoto state by
their captors during an attempted rescue by Nigerian and British special
forces.
• In April, assailants attacked Theatre Hall at Bayero University,
Kano, with improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and gunshots, killing
nearly 20 persons.
• On April 26, vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) simultaneously exploded at the offices of This Day newspaper in Abuja and Kaduna, killing five persons and wounding many.
• On June 17, attacks on three churches in Kaduna state killed
worshippers and instigated violence throughout the state. At least 10
people were killed and an additional 78 injured in the ensuing riots, as
groups barricaded roads, burned mosques, and used machetes to attack
and kill. In response, the Kaduna state government imposed a 24-hour
curfew and deployed additional security forces; however, violence
between Christians and Muslims continued for nearly one week.
• In July, the assassination of three traditional Muslim leaders was
attempted in Borno, Yobe, and Kaduna states respectively. None of the
targets was killed.
• On July 30, police stations and markets in Sokoto were attacked, resulting in the death of six persons.
• In July and August, churches were targeted in Bauchi, Kaduna, and
Kogi states. The total killed in these attacks was 22 persons.
• On December 19, a French engineer was kidnapped in Katsina state,
near the Niger border. Ansaru, considered a splinter faction of BH,
claimed the kidnapping, and the victim's whereabouts remained unknown at
year’s end.
Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: The
weakest aspect of the Prevention of Terrorism Law of 2011 is that it
does not clearly delineate the lead agency to investigate suspected
terrorist crimes.
The trial of six suspects accused of the Christmas Day 2011 bombing
of a Catholic church at Madalla in Niger state began in September and
was ongoing at year’s end.
In February, a U.S. District Court sentenced Nigerian national Umar
Abdulmutallab to life in prison for his unsuccessful attempt to detonate
an explosive aboard a U.S.-flagged air carrier approaching Detroit,
Michigan on December 25, 2009. Throughout the trial, the Nigerian
government cooperated closely with DHS, the U.S. Federal Aviation
Administration, and the International Civil Aviation Organization.
The Nigerian government actively cooperated with the United States
and other international partners to prevent further acts of terrorism in
Nigeria against U.S. citizens, citizens of third countries, and
Nigerian citizens.
Countering Terrorist Finance: Nigeria is a member of
the Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West
Africa (GIABA), a Financial Action Task Force (FATF)-style regional
body. Nigeria was publicly identified by the FATF in February 2010 for
strategic anti-money laundering/combating the financing of terrorism
deficiencies. In October 2011, Nigeria was named in the FATF Public
Statement for its lack of progress in implementing its action plan. In
2012, Nigeria made significant progress in addressing its outstanding
deficiencies, including through the adoption of amendments to its Money
Laundering (Prevention) Act.
While Nigeria regularly froze the assets of individuals and entities
designated under relevant UNSCRs, and others designated by the United
States under U.S. domestic designation authorities only, delays
sometimes occurred. All requests to freeze assets must first be sent to
the National Security Adviser, who disseminates the information to
relevant financial institutions and Nigerian government agencies.
Consequently, delays of up to four weeks occasionally occurred before
authorities would block assets. Nigeria did not monitor non-profit
organizations to prevent misuse and terrorist financing.
For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, we refer you to the 2013 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes: http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm.
Regional and International Cooperation: At the June 7
Ministerial Plenary Meeting of the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF),
Nigeria announced it would partner with Switzerland to co-host a Sahel
Working Group meeting on combating the financing of terrorism in early
2013. In January, the UN Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force
launched three projects under the Integrated Assistance for
Counter-Terrorism initiative to support Nigerian government efforts to
combat terrorism. Nigeria is a lead member of the Economic Community of
West African States and has committed ground forces and logistical
support for a possible intervention force in Mali. Through its Office of
the National Security Adviser, Nigeria has taken a lead role in
initiating a multilateral dialogue between regional countries on how
they can better coordinate their efforts to confront networks of
terrorist groups that span international borders.
Source: http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2012/209979.htm
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