Long before September 11, 2001 strategists recognized that prevention was a priority
among concepts of national security. Military strategy had generally accepted “forward
deployment” of assets and influence as core tactics to deter opponents from taking
aggressive actions and quickly interrupting them once they began. Law enforcement
strategy has developed more slowly in adopting a preventive approach. Still, at least by
the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s, the presidential directives of both Republican
and Democratic administrations had ordered law enforcement agencies to deploy
resources abroad to intercept and disrupt threats as far from the U.S. border as feasible.
Under those directives, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Drug Enforcement
Agency (DEA), and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), among other
domestic law enforcement agencies, initiated overseas operations and deployments.
The events of 9/11 pushed prevention to new prominence in both military and civilian
law enforcement strategies. Forward deployment became active preemption, including
regime change, as military forces landed in Afghanistan and Iraq. Domestically,
Congress rushed to create The USA PATRIOT Act, granting law enforcement authorities
greater investigative powers to search and pre-empt a terrorist attack from within the
United States.
The Bush Administration revised its national security and
counterterrorism strategies explicitly to elevate prevention to the Nation’s first priority.
Despite the significance that Congress and the president attached to the concept,
however, prevention remains one of the least understood dimensions of the Nation’s new
security strategy. Nowhere is this more evident than in the Nation’s efforts to transform
its approach to border security. Within two months of 9/11, the president issued
Homeland Security Presidential Directive #2 (HSPD-2) seeking to strengthen and shift
border security strategies. The president returned to the topic of border security in at
least three subsequent Presidential Directives. Yet, the role of prevention in border
security strategies remains elusive.
The purpose of this article is to examine several of the primary border security reforms
taken since 9/11 to understand and gauge progress toward making prevention the top
priority. Not surprisingly, the violation of border controls that made the 9/11 attacks
possible caused the nation’s leaders to accelerate existing border program reforms. The
Presidential Directives served to a large extent to wrench current border projects that had
stalled amidst the nation’s polarization over immigration policies from previous
bureaucratic and political entanglements. Still, few of these rescued border initiatives
satisfied the compelling requirements that making prevention a national priority
demanded.
The Challenge
Post-9/11 border security strategies suffer from a familiar policy tale. In recovering from
a crisis, institutions try to correct mistakes that led to the earlier events, only to ignore the
potential for future, somewhat different ones. With the exception of a few illustrative
initiatives, recent border security policies have attempted to accelerate and fully
implement programs designed before 9/11. Valuable in their own terms, when complete
the projects may well help to solve problems with international travel, visa and
immigration policy, and crossborder commerce. The question is whether they address the
new risks and threats of the post-9/11 age of terror.
Given the nature of the 9/11 attack, and the weaknesses of border security that it
exploited, moving first to close the obvious gaps in border security was entirely
understandable. These early steps, however, reinforced an earlier reactive orientation in
border security policies and competed against proposals for more prevention-oriented
reforms. For example, HSPD-2, released on October 29, 2001, aimed at changing
immigration policies by creating a capacity to deny entry, detain, prosecute and deport
aliens associated with or suspected of engaging in terrorist activity.
Federal agencies responded to the Directive by accelerating efforts to track,
investigate, and prohibit activities inside the United States. The Department of Justice set
up the Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force. Border security agencies expanded their
investigative participation in FBI-led Joint Terrorism Task Forces. The INS barred
international students already studying in the United States from courses that involved
sensitive material. The Presidential Directive also urged agencies to develop and use
advanced technologies to locate and apprehend suspected terrorists, or supporters of
terrorism, inside the United States, even if existing legal restrictions on the use and
analysis of data had to be overcome.
At this early date, perhaps the only forward-leaning prevention initiative involved the
Directive’s reference to developing “North American Complementary Immigration
Policies.” HSPD-2 called for immediate negotiations with Canada and Mexico “to assure
maximum possible compatibility of immigration, customs, and visa policies.” The goal
was to establish a North American screening perimeter in which border agencies from all
three countries would use comparable, if not the same, standards for inspecting
individuals seeking to enter the region. Having secured the perimeter, subsequent action
could facilitate movements across the two “internal” borders separating the United States
from Mexico and Canada.
Although the direction was promising, the programmatic response was reserved and
disappointing. Border agencies crafted a Smart Border Initiative, which essentially
repackaged a list of incomplete immigration and customs projects started in the 1990s
and reset accelerated schedules for deployment. The goal of most of the Initiatives’
specific projects was to strengthen or “harden” the physical and virtual borders between
the United States and its two neighbors. Little progress was made to standardize
screening procedures among the three countries or even to begin to negotiate
coordination of efforts.
Part of the problem in beginning to transform border security strategies was due to
ambiguities in defining prevention. Prevention at the border called for tough choices
about relationships with neighboring countries, which few were willing to take on in the
absence of clearly defined goals and objectives. Before 9/11, prevention at the border
typically meant interdiction — searching, locating, and physically stopping an effort to
cross or to carry something across the border. Interdiction was the priority — physically
impede any incursion while it was occurring. Within a broader scope of prevention,
however, interdiction represented only one of several ways in which attacks or illegal
behavior could be stopped.
Prevention, for instance, also refers to preemption — detecting and stopping an attack
before it is attempted. In border security terms, active screening of information related to
travelers and cargo is a routine pre-emptive measure. For decades the U.S. Customs
Service has employed cargo screening tactics as a way to intercept illegal shipments,
weapons, people, or other illicit cargo within containers before they are shipped toward
the United States.
Prevention at the border also refers to deterrence, although what is meant by
deterrence has also been confusing. Generally speaking, in border security terms,
deterrence means that because of an action taken, a potential violator did not plan or even
attempt an illegal entry. Deterrence is by far the most valued form of prevention. Yet
few agencies embrace it fully because of the inherent difficulty of defining and
measuring deterrence in tactical and operational terms. The problem is not restricted to
border agencies. Law enforcement personnel across the globe face similar challenges.
They struggle to find a way to demonstrate the effectiveness of a deterrence approach
when what appears to be required is to show that an illegal act did not occur because of a
law enforcement agency’s actions. Does the fear of arrest and detention, for instance,
deter someone from deciding to leave their home, pay a smuggler, and attempt to cross
the border illegally?
Border security strategies, before and after 9/11, have involved some measure of each
of these three dimensions of prevention. Each has guided border security agencies
toward different policy and operational outcomes. Together or separately, however, none
has evolved into a comprehensive, prevention-oriented approach to border security. The
discussion in the following sections highlights the limitations of each approach and
identifies steps that could transform policies toward a more prevention-centric strategy.
Border Interdiction
In the early 1990s, the U.S. Border Patrol revised its strategic plan to emphasize a new
objective -- “prevention through deterrence.”
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The new plan changed the strategic focus
from a traditional policing model in which the object was to maximize the number of
arrests of people who had already crossed the border illegally. The new objective was to
ensure that no one crossed the border in the first place, stopping them physically right at
the border if need be, or inhibiting their attempts to cross by increasing the expectation
among potential crossers that they would be caught immediately. The intent was clearly
to move away from a reactive, responsive-oriented approach toward a more pro-active,
prevention strategy.
The new strategic plan began to change border control tactics. The Border Patrol
launched a series of highly-publicized border operations during the 1990s — Operation
Hold-the-Line, Gatekeeper, Safeguard, etc. — which involved “forward deployment” of
agents and equipment as close to the international boundary as feasible. Rather than
waiting for crossers to enter the United States and then physically interdicting them, the
Border Patrol placed officers in high visibility locations close to the border, deployed
lights in otherwise darkened areas that formerly were places of illegal entry, and
broadcasted publicly the intent to dismantle crossborder smuggling activities.
Although the difference between deterrence and interdiction was minimized by the
short physical distance at the border between officers deployed close to the international
line and the potential crosser in front of them, the changed tactics began to have visible
impacts in the areas of high operational concentration. Border Patrol apprehensions
(“arrests”) declined, smuggling rings were visibly disrupted, community perceptions of
the safety of border neighborhoods improved, and local leaders increased their support of
the security strategy. The prevention orientation also reduced public perceptions of the
prevalence of social disorder and chaos along the border. In turn, improved security
opened opportunities for greater cooperation among agencies across the border.
For instance, building upon the realities and perceptions of increased border security,
the Border Patrol’s parent agency, the INS, was able to expand legal immigration
initiatives. It expanded and improved border infrastructure that expedited legal crossings
and reduced the long lines of vehicles and pedestrians waiting at ports of entry for
inspection. The INS was also able to strengthen cooperation with Mexican and Canadian
officials on these positive commercial initiatives and gain assistance on additional antismuggling
prevention measures.
These prevention measures, however, stimulated criticism and opposition from diverse
stakeholders. One of the lessons learned from the general law enforcement community
when it has tried to implement similar prevention measures is that opposition comes
initially from those who believe the strategy is too weak as well as from those who
perceive it to be too intrusive in community affairs.
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Hard-line opponents resist the
concept that a decline in arrests can be a good outcome. In contrast, some community
activists believe that the Border Patrol has no business enforcing immigration laws
anywhere except along the physical line of the border.
The public controversy about the border strategy became part of a general criticism of
the performance of the INS and other border security agencies. By 2000, the pace and
effectiveness of the new Border Patrol strategy had slowed, having reached only the
urban areas of El Paso, San Diego, Brownsville, and Nogales. Although the new strategy
was still in force, the execution of the strategy waned. Previously disrupted smuggling
rings retrenched in new areas along the border, cooperation with Mexico declined, and
public support quieted. Even before 9/11, long lines returned at the ports of entry and
arrests of illegal crossers between the ports of entry increased as border agencies returned
to old tactical habits.
After 9/11, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) faced the daunting task of
reinvigorating the border strategy on both the Mexican and Canadian borders. Under
mounting public pressures, the new Agency launched initiatives in Arizona to counter the
weakest spot along the border — the area where execution of the earlier strategy had
stalled. These new efforts, however, have not been successful in reducing the illegal flow
or changing its composition and character. Part of the reason is that the Border Patrol
and its new parent, Customs and Border Protection, have concentrated on interdiction
rather than prevention. New performance incentives have reinforced the value of tactics
that increase, not decrease, the number of arrests. The agencies’ attention has also
returned to efforts to track, locate, and detain illegal immigrants, and to maximizing the
physical removal of unauthorized crossers after they have been prosecuted.
Reports of Al Qaeda’s interests in smuggling terrorists or weapons across the
Southwest border have only very recently begun to challenge the inherent limits of these
latest border control strategies. An enforcement posture focused on intercepting
smuggled persons after they have reached U.S. soil, and often after they have made it to
an interior urban area, offers little protection and reassurance. Rather, it reinforces public
perceptions that the border is “out of control” more generally.
A prevention-first strategy, especially for the Southwest border, should include a
dramatic reinvigoration of the full, comprehensive approach to the border initiated with
the 1994 Border Patrol Strategic Plan. Further improvement in the capacities of the
Border Patrol is necessary, and they may come with the new American Shield Initiative
(ASI) already embraced by Congress in the 2006 budget. Yet ASI or other operations
will simply not suffice if they remain rooted in an approach preoccupied with interdiction,
detention and removal rather than deterrence and prevention in general. A
comprehensive plan requires renewed cooperation with Mexican officials on prevention,
aggressive bilateral attacks on smuggling rings on both sides of the border, and a new
spirit of engagement in promoting the economic well-being of residents all along the
border.
Border Screening
Border security strategies rooted in “prevention through preemption” primarily
involve the use of information screening techniques. The purpose of screening is to
identify and stop those who are in the act of committing a border-related violation before
they have a chance to start. Federal border security agencies have long conducted
screening of cargo and people approaching the United States through sea and air. These
efforts expanded dramatically during the 1990s and were extended to travel and
transportation routes that approached the border by land. In the early 1990s, for instance,
the U.S. Customs Service and the INS merged separate screening initiatives into a single,
advanced passenger information system to obtain and review information on travelers
before they landed in the United States. The database and the core technology created for
this system still serves border agencies today.
Though the infrastructure may be outdated, the concept of advanced passenger or
cargo information remains sound. Such initiatives clearly serve to forwardly deploy the
analytical capacities of border agencies. The more information on cargo and people
destined for the United States that is received and analyzed before departure from the
country of origin, the more effective and efficient processing of the decision to admit or
not can occur. These advanced information systems also help to increase U.S. security
influence abroad by framing international agreements that foster cooperation to enforce
common standards for travel documents and cargo manifests.
During the 1990s, U.S. border agencies also began to collect biometric information on
border crossers. Initially, the initiative involved fingerprinting apprehended illegal
border crossers through a system known as IDENT. The system provided a twofingerprint
identity check the INS used to identify criminals among apprehended illegal
migrants. In 1996, Congress also required the INS to begin to develop an Entry-Exit
system that could match the identity of a person when he entered and left the United
States. Both systems would substantially increase the ability of border security agencies
to track international travelers and intercept anyone of special interest. Before 9/11, these
systems had merged to form the backbone of the US-VISIT program, a widely
proclaimed border inspection system that compares the fingerprints of international
travelers upon entry to the United States with the same biometric taken upon their
departure.
After 9/11, Congress and the Administration embraced US-VISIT as the primary
innovation to create a border security screen against terrorism. Although the system was
not designed for that mission, Congress and DHS accelerated its deployment from
airports to land ports-of-entry. In 2004, the 9/11 Commission’s recommendations
reinforced support for the program.
The Commission noted that US-VISIT helped to
establish a sequence of “checkpoints” through which potential terrorists and terrorist
supporters would have to pass on their way to and from the United States.
Without further review of the potential value of US-VISIT for this new anti-terrorism
mission, the Administration fully embraced the Commission’s recommendations. It
issued another Presidential Directive, HSPD-11, that pushed DHS to demonstrate a
resolve to fulfill the Commission’s proposals by creating a comprehensive anti-terrorist
screen.
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Building on HSPD-6, which had already called for creation of and use of
screening information, HSPD-11 called for development of a plan to build
comprehensive, coordinated procedures to detect, identify, track, and interdict people,
cargo, conveyances, and other entities and objects that posed a threat to homeland
security.
Some of the proposals for the collection and use of screening information have
sparked considerable public controversy, and support for screening efforts may have
begun to dwindle significantly. Recently, both Senate and House Appropriations
Subcommittees have deleted funding in the 2006 Budget for DHS’ planned Office of
Screening Coordination and Operations. The Office was designed specifically to manage
information collection, coordination, screening, and risk assessment activities.
One reason for this decline in support is that border agencies have failed to convince
Congressional and public stakeholders that these systems and activities are effective.
Proponents inside the government often do not understand the limits and purposes of the
advanced screening techniques and have oversold their promised effectiveness. Critics of
information-based screening systems have also generally misrepresented their expected
value in two ways. First, critics and proponents alike have concentrated on the value of
these systems for border interdiction and overstated the expectation that they can target
specific terrorists. Screening systems, such as US-VISIT, actually have a very low
chance of detecting a specific target, partly because the number of terrorists is so small,
compared to the entire population of international travelers or domestic air passengers,
and partly because they are not built to make precise determinations of individual
behavior. If a screening system as analytically immature as US-VISIT actually could
identify specific terrorists with effectiveness, the nation would be in much less danger
than most observers believe.
Second, critics in particular have misunderstood the more valuable preemptive and
deterrent role of screening systems such as US-VISIT.
The typical, overused criticism
of border screening systems is that they merely produce a “bubble effect” along the
perimeter of the United States. Enforcement in one area, critics argue, simply displaces
the problem, creating greater pressure in another location. The “border as balloon”
metaphor may have been useful in a security situation where the threat was a
homogeneous, relatively constant pressure. Today, however, the threats facing the border
are highly differentiated, disconnected, and fragmented. They are often well-informed by
organized, intelligent groups that have a capacity to strike or smuggle, but only in
particular places against specific targets. Border security is now much more an
intelligent environment demanding advanced risk assessment tools and strategic
operations than traditional encounters of mass force pressuring an outnumbered
interdiction force.
The value of US-VISIT and other screening systems is not so much as a targeting tool
or a broad physical screen against a large number of intruders as it is a source of
information for effective analytical and intelligence work. Its primary value is to help
assess and prepare the environment to give U.S. security agencies a much greater ability
to preempt and deter potential aggression.
The biometric requirements for the system,
for instance, aid U.S. consular officers abroad in their efforts to establish the identity and
perform background clearance checks for visa applicants while they remain abroad. The
recently reported drop in visa applications in some countries of concern apparently
reflects, at least in part, fraudulent applicants abandoning their intended course of action.
DHS’ Cargo Security Initiative (CSI) is another example of a screening system that
can be used in limited fashion as a targeting tool or more expansively as part of a
comprehensive prevention strategy.
The U.S. Customs Service began in the 1980s and
1990s to inspect cargo at the point of origin to intercept items of concern before they
reached the United States. The expansion of this initiative to its current form forwardly
deploys U.S. agents and influence abroad both to inspect cargo as it is loaded on ships
and to collect and analyze information on the cargo at each point in the global
transportation supply chain.
The compression of time and processing requirements along the U.S. northern and
southern borders, of course, makes it difficult for information-based screening to be much
more than an interdiction tool. The result is that the demand for timely inspection and
facilitated movement across borders puts extreme pressure on efforts to stop each truck,
car or person for inspection. Security, in this sense, interferes with crossborder
commercial interests even when information collection and screening is intended as a
prevention measure. The pressure is then to build more infrastructure, increase the
number of inspectors, and use more intrusive technology to accelerate inspection.
Even in these situations, however, alternate, effective screening can be designed more
as deterrence and preemption than interdiction at the physical point of border crossing.
Pilot programs show that trucks and people can be inspected well before they reach the
land port-of-entry. Technology can help provide credentials for pre-clearance, and
expanded cooperation with neighboring countries can allow much of this pre-border
crossing preparation to occur long before the issue becomes interdiction at the border.
Yet faced with the perception that the border is out of control and screening systems are
ineffective in targeting, the current policy response is to push for more interdiction
capacity, requiring ever increasing personnel to physically close the border.
Interior Enforcement as Deterrence
A third strategic focus of border security involves an effort to achieve deterrence by
making enforcement actions inside the United States a decisive disincentive to those who
wish to cross the border without authority. The USA PATRIOT Act, for instance,
provides new authorities to use immigration violations to help in its pre-emptive
investigations of terrorism support networks and financial ties. The objective is to
eliminate the ways in which immigration can foster and provide safe haven to potential
terrorists.
In practice, however, the USA PATRIOT Act has further complicated the already
hopelessly entangled relationships between counterterrorism actions and immigration
enforcement. According to public reports, most terrorist investigations in the United
States have not resulted in terrorist-related convictions, but ended with the use of
immigration authorities to remove a person from the country.
Unquestionably, the
capacity to remove a terrorist supporter from the United States is a valuable tool to say
the least. Yet the public appearance and understanding of these cases is that federal
authorities are using the extraordinary powers granted under the PATRIOT Act primarily
to achieve immigration enforcement.
This entanglement of anti-terrorism and border control strategies is counterproductive
because it undermines the preemptive focus of PATRIOT Act investigations. FBI
Director Robert Mueller recognized the potential problem and went out of his way to
reach out to immigrant communities to reassure them of the distinction between these
security objectives. Yet the problem persists, primarily because domestic immigration
enforcement — as traditionally conducted — focuses more on arrest and punishment than
on creating a prevention-oriented deterrence strategy. Immigrant communities, rather
than serve as sources of good information about potential activities, close up in fear of
immigration authorities.
The contentious character of the enforcement of immigration laws in the interior of the
United States results primarily from intrusion into local communities. In 2004, for
instance, the Border Patrol led a series of raids in a local California community that
sparked national controversy. While the operations were legal, the community reaction
was so contentious, and the operations so ineffective, that DHS officials apologized
publicly for the action and committed to a future policy of restraint.
The controversy over how interior enforcement fits into border security strategy is
long-standing. For much of the 1990s, Congress and the Administration debated
competing approaches to interior enforcement that, for the most part, contrasted reactive
with prevention-oriented strategies. A reactive approach focused primarily on three
principles. First, enforcement at the workplace, often in the form of raids, would deter
employers from hiring undocumented workers who, in turn, without jobs, would leave
the community and return home. Second, borrowing from more general theories of law
enforcement, significant penalties, including detention and substantial sentences, would
convince migrants to return and stay home. Third, large programs of removal, and a high
expectation or certainty of deportation, would eliminate the incentive to try to find work
in the United States. Immigration enforcement, in this sense, should conform to tough
law enforcement policies, such as California’s Three Strikes law. Arrest, detention and
removal would create a deterrent to future illegal migration.
In each area, however, interior enforcement comes up short of its goals. Arrests at
worksites rarely leave migrants without other work options and many displaced workers
return to the same employer. The number of interior arrests continues to climb, but so
too does the number of illegal migrants. As both increase, the cost of detention and
removal skyrockets. Removal and deportation also fail. The recidivism rate among
deported migrants is reportedly very high. Stories from law enforcement officials tell of
migrants who are removed from a workplace and deported, only to be seen two days later
back to work at the same job.
Even illegal migrants who commit a crime while in the United States, and are
imprisoned and subsequently deported, return to the same community in a relatively short
period. In one study, over half of illegal migrant felons incarcerated in a California city’s
jail returned to the same city within two years after deportation — and were rearrested for
a newly-committed offense.
With such rampant recidivism, traditional tactics do not
affect the underlying problem but rather displace valuable resources from other strategies
that may be more effective.
The alternative prevention strategy developed in the 1990s was inspired by
community-policing innovations. Its primary goal was to deter illegal activities
throughout a community, starting with those areas in which local communities and INS
could cooperate, including local crimes, social disorder, and delinquency. As
cooperation increased, the focus could turn to problems related to drug smuggling, human
trafficking, labor abuse and fraud. Operations were also designed to protect victims of
crime regardless of their status as local residents or newcomers.
The alternative strategy also concentrated on anti-smuggling operations, especially on
U.S. residents complicit in organizing and assisting people to cross the border illegally.
With these initiatives, domestic immigration enforcement was on the path parallel with
investigations of organized crime. The objective was to hold accountable those who were
responsible for the financial and employment connections that assisted migrants. Early
investigations, using the wiretap authority granted INS by the 1996 law, demonstrated
that fairly large employers in Georgia, Texas and the Midwest were directly involved in
conspiracies to smuggle people across the Southwest border.
The alternative domestic strategy also aimed to transform the incentives and
conditions of local labor markets in the United States that sustain a silent, yet profound,
corruption of the U.S. political economy.
As deterrence, rather than a punishmentoriented
strategy, the operational focus was on changing the conditions that existed
before employers were charged and workers were arrested and deported. Employers
were given tools to improve their level of compliance with existing laws, including an
innovative information system that allowed them to check the legal status of newly-hired
workers.
Like similar prevention measures taken in border communities, these innovations
generated opposition from both sides of the political spectrum. As the history of
community policing forewarned, community activists objected to an approach that tried
to improve the relationships between local residents and immigration officials. Law
enforcement critics, in contrast, objected to actions that did not obligate INS officers to
arrest and deport individual migrants. Prevention steps appeared “too soft.”
In the years following 9/11, DHS dropped a community-oriented approach to interior
enforcement and tilted entirely toward an arrest-and-deport strategy. Reportedly, Bureau
of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) leadership rejected the preventive
approach, calling it “social work.” In staff meetings, ICE leaders pressed agents to focus
on high-profile prosecutions and convictions of other crimes. Apparently, even though
protection against terrorism was quickly embraced as the top priority, prevention of
terrorism did not include efforts to deter illegal immigration.
DHS now has the challenge of reengaging in preventive strategies toward border
enforcement. Public pressure is mounting over both the perceived weaknesses of current
operations and their high costs. So far, DHS appears to be continuing down the path of
ever-expanding detention and removal priorities. No evidence exists, however, that this
time the path will lead to more effective outcomes.
The Administration has also proposed another familiar mitigation strategy related to
illegal workers. Current proposals call for a new guestworker program designed to solve
the workplace enforcement challenge by legalizing workers employed in certain
industries. Very little in the proposal, however, seeks to change the circumstances that
attracted employers to hire illegal workers in the first place, increase compliance with
regulations, or create alternatives for employers or legally resident workers to reduce the
demand for these workers. In the past, contract labor markets have given way, with time,
to renewed illegal immigration. Without changing the underlying conditions, current
proposals may not prevent a recurrence of existing problems.
Steps Toward Prevention
In each area of border security strategy discussed above, program development since 9/11
has consistently pulled interdiction back on the stage as the top priority, often by
replacing prevention-oriented approaches. DHS has moved back to reaction, mitigation,
and recovery. Undoubtedly, transformation to a new, different set of priorities would be
difficult and organizationally wrenching at a time when there are numerous issues
competing for leadership attention. Still, the nation is not trying to solve border security
problems of the past. It is trying hard to improve border security to help prevent the next
attacks.
The value of prevention as the nation’s first priority is not limited, of course, to an
interest in border security. Rather, transformation of a border security strategy must be
aligned with and live up to broader and more comprehensive principles of the nation’s
foreign and domestic policies. Prevention deserves its place as the nation’s top priority
because it encompasses both the necessity to achieve security and an ambition to improve
the human condition throughout the global community. Ultimately, prevention is
dependent on human freedom and, as Nobel Prize economist Amarty Sen reminds us, the
existence of viable choices to achieve basic human security.
During the Cold War, containment strategy offered the world a set of these choices.
Alliance with the free world brought participation in world trade, foreign aid, and open
cultural expression. Opposition induced blockades and boycotts. Individuals throughout
the world also understood that if they resisted Soviet-backed repression they would be
encouraged and welcomed in the West. U.S. strategy aimed not only to stop opponents
from aggression, but also consistently to encourage nations, groups, and individuals to
opt for the path of freedom.
Understandably, since September 11, 2001, strategists have focused much more on
suppression of actions than on expansion of choices. Yet, the success of the nation’s
security strategy will require taking action to create viable alternatives to the current
conditions that give rise to terrorism, illegal immigration and other illicit efforts to defeat
U.S. border controls. It will require a transformation of the nation’s security plans and
will not be achieved simply by solving challenges that face border inspectors and patrol
officers.
Positive steps toward transformation call for a bold, bipartisan approach. The current
Administration’s democracy initiative, for example, aims to expand choices in parts of
the world that for decades have enjoyed few. Regardless of how far that initiative still
must go, the objective to expand human freedom is sound. Steps toward transformation
also embody the earlier priorities of former Democratic administrations that focused on
adherence to fundamental human rights as requirements of participation with the United
States in global initiatives.
In that spirit, moving toward a prevention strategy of border security will require new
policies toward our neighbors, Mexico and Canada, and toward other migrant-sending
countries. It will require new forms of cooperation, many of which have been resisted
until now or not yet even imagined. Sending countries, for instance, will need to accept
greater responsibility for the conditions of their citizens in migrant-origin communities.
Unfortunately, current understanding of crossborder and transnational movements is
rooted in a philosophy and perspective that denies freedom and choice as essential
strategic goals. Many social scientists, policymakers and advocates, for example, believe
that the current forms of migration and border problems in general are inevitable
conditions. Some social scientists, for instance, mistake progressive ideas about the
severe constraints on opportunity from unequal labor market structures with historical
determinism and lack of human accountability.
The Mexican Government routinely
asserts that its current mismatch between job and population growth rates will
“inevitably” cause emigration. Advocates in the United States, such as the Essential
Worker Coalition, argue that particular groups of workers are necessary for certain
segments of the economy. Inevitability and necessity, however, defy freedom.
Prevention needs to be understood more fully in terms of a capacity to create options that
outweigh the seemingly ”inevitable” patterns and limitations of current circumstances.
Without options, border strategy shrinks to debates on management tactics, arguments
over interdiction and ever-escalating levels of punishment.
Among a wide range of next steps, transformation toward a prevention-led border
strategy would involve at least the following four strategic shifts.
- Aligning Border Security with Global Strategy: Transformation toward prevention
requires a much more forward-leaning foreign policy toward countries of emigration.
For many migrant-sending countries, this will involve a radical shift of orientation. U.S.
immigration policy remains largely a Cold-War artifact. As mentioned previously, in the
days of Cold War rivalries between East and West, the benefit of an alliance involved
easier access to the U.S. market, regardless of the means, mechanisms or conditions. The
Mexican Government, for example, continues to operate within this framework. It
currently expects that its “special relationship” with the United States should lead to an
exceptional migration agreement as part of its overall alliance with its neighbor.
In the 21st century, however, alliances involve non-state actors at sub-national levels as much as if not more than homogeneous state-to-state interests. Opposition is differentiated, decentralized, and asymmetric. As with commercial trade agreements, policies toward migration should increasingly reflect more than volume and ease of movement. They must include agreement on the standards of what crosses, who certifies and takes responsibility for its legality, and how to ensure compliance. Unlike in the days of the Cold War rivalry, sending governments must be willing and supportive of efforts to create viable options to illegal entry into a friendly neighboring country.
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Forging a New Foreign Policy: Border security requires a realignment of policies
with the nation’s neighbors, especially Mexico. For decades, the Mexican Government
has insisted that it has little responsibility for the enormous and sustained movement of
its citizens across U.S. borders without U.S authorization. It has rested that perspective
on an interpretation of a Constitution written almost a hundred years ago during an
authoritarian moment when security and freedom in Mexico required the ability to escape
tyranny. Today, Mexico is capable of creating options and taking responsibility for its
citizens. Yet the government refuses to take even minimally effective public safety
action to prevent its citizens from endangering themselves and families by accepting
smuggling arrangements.
For its part, U.S. policy no longer needs to rely on slowly nurturing democratic reforms in Mexico to ensure stability. Mexico is now moving forcibly toward democracy and it is time to for the United States to forge a more forward-leaning partnership with reform elements in Mexico. The North American Partnership of 2005 could become a good initial step in these reforms if its implementation is prevention-oriented, and not just a framework to maintain the status quo. At present, publicly-announced programs within the Partnership remain limited to familiar efforts to build a common screening perimeter and to coordinate emergency responses. -
Making Progress on Cooperation: One of the challenges to achieving a preventionoriented
border strategy is the persistent inability to make cooperation work.
Transformation of border security is a large, comprehensive task not to be reduced to
improvement in single systems, deployment of greater resources, modernization of
technology, or even new policies designed to change the volume and characteristics of
migrants and travelers in general. A goal of creating “One face at the border,” for
example, is a solution to the management problems of the last fifty years. What is needed
is a strategy for conducting border security in the 21st century.
A prevention strategy would include a network of allied, multinational customs and migration officers working together to enforce minimum standards at critical points of international travel. The Cargo Security Initiative described previously is a constructive step in that direction. It will benefit both the United States and the entire world trading system. Immigration officials could also deploy overseas, although there has been much more opposition to that move. In the late 1990s, however, five countries joined in a pilot program to test the value of such forwardly-deployed coordination. Officials from each of five countries were placed overseas working alongside officers in the sending and transit countries. The results showed that in just a few weeks of coordinated action, officers were able to prevent more people with false documents and identities from boarding planes for the United States than inspectors working only from their traditional position in U.S. ports of entry were able to detect in a three-month period.
Despite declarations of the need for shared responsibility for migration and border matters, the realities are that implementation of prevention measures strains governments’ commitments. Even after the urgency of 9/11, coordination and joint decision-making on border security measures remain difficult. The United States and Canada, for example, are struggling to achieve even a limited agreement on coordinating with each other on decisions related to visa waivers for the new member countries of NATO.
- Changing U.S. Reactive Approaches: The myth of workplace enforcement as a deterrent to illegal immigration highlights the way in which current strategies have a corrupting influence on U.S. domestic policy in general and labor policy in particular. An effective strategic choice should not be between “essential” and “non-essential” workers, as the reform debate in the United States currently poses the issue. A prevention priority must involve active pursuit of a range of alternatives for employers and workers alike, creating more opportunities and more options.
The difficulties in making these four initial strategic shifts underscore a deep-seated
barrier to effective, prevention-oriented border strategies. Prevention requires trust, both
between agencies that must share information, leads, and enforcement action, and more
fundamentally among the public in each country that must perceive and accept legitimate
and effective actions on both sides of the border. Even the three members of The North
American Partnership lack the degree of social trust required to forge new, preventionoriented
cooperative strategies.
Conclusion
The 9/11 Commission faulted U.S. leaders for a failure of imagination in preventing the
terrorist attacks. Unfortunately, in the realm of border security strategy, little evidence
exists that federal leaders have reached beyond their commitment to hard work and
accelerated implementation of long-standing initiatives and policies. Perhaps the
Commission was wrong, and what is needed is only enhanced performance and more
resources. Yet, the persistent call for a new prevention priority should challenge leaders
to go beyond implementing border security programs correctly. The question is whether
they are pursuing the correct programs.
Prevention, in the sense used throughout this article, is a concept that gives priority to
imagination. It requires creation of alternatives to both existing conditions and widelyaccepted
perspectives. It also demands answers to the hardest questions. What would it
take for a certain behavior not to occur? What would it take to give potential terrorists,
and fraudulent travelers, viable alternatives? In this age of terror, the answers are
consequential.
By Robert Bach
Source: http://www.hsaj.org/?fullarticle=1.1.2
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